Reforming Technical and Vocational Education and Training in Tunisia

Strategic Assessment

July, 2017
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Reforming Technical and Vocational Education and Training in Tunisia: Strategic Assessment

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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHK</td>
<td>German-Tunisian Chamber of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALMP</td>
<td>Active Labor Market Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANETI</td>
<td>Agence Nationale pour l’emploi et le Travail Indépendant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APIA</td>
<td>Agence de promotion des investissements agricoles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APII</td>
<td>Agence de promotion des investissements Industriels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATFP</td>
<td>Agence Tunisienne de la Formation Professionnelle</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP</td>
<td>African Union Partnership Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVFA</td>
<td>Agence de Vulgarisation et de formation Agricole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBB</td>
<td>Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPO</td>
<td>Business Process Outsourcing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTP</td>
<td>Brevet de Technicien Professionnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTS</td>
<td>Brevet de Technicien Supérieur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Certificat d’Aptitude Professionnelle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cedefop</td>
<td>European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENAFFIF</td>
<td>Centre National de Formation de Formateurs et d’Ingénierie de Formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPEX</td>
<td>Export Promotion Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNFCPP</td>
<td>Centre National de Formation Continue et de Promotion Professionnelle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONECT</td>
<td>Confederation of Tunisian Citizen Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORP</td>
<td>Centre d’Orientation et de Reconversion Professionnelle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DACUM</td>
<td>Developing a Curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELAN</td>
<td>Entreprise d’Entraînement Professionnelle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>ETF</td>
<td>European Training Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FHI 360</td>
<td>Family Health International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSATI</td>
<td>“Opportunity” Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAG-TVET</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Group on Technical and Vocational Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Islamic Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INS</td>
<td>National Institute of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISET</td>
<td>Institut des Sciences et des Etudes Technologiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMIS</td>
<td>Labor Market Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANFORME</td>
<td>Mise à Niveau de la Formation Professionnelle et de l’Emploi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHESR</td>
<td>Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIT</td>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MVTE</td>
<td>Ministry of Vocational Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODCO</td>
<td>Office de Developpement de Centre Ouest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODNO</td>
<td>Office de Developpement de Nord Ouest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONEQ</td>
<td>Observatoire National des Emplois et des Qualifications (ONEQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONTT</td>
<td>Office National du Tourisme Tunisien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-private partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMART Tunisia</td>
<td>Government economic program to promote offshoring companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium Sized Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>TACT</td>
<td>Tunisian Association of Communication and Technologies</td>
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<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>Technical and Vocational Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIMED</td>
<td>Tunisian Pharmaceutical Laboratories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UTICA</td>
<td>Union Tunisienne de l'industrie, du commerce et de l'artisanat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTN</td>
<td>Textile export company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDA</td>
<td>Workforce Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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Executive Summary
Executive Summary
Tunisia has built up one of the region’s most advanced technical and vocational education and training (TVET) systems over recent decades, drawing from international best practices including the ‘dual system’ model characterized by employer partnerships and substantial on-the-job training. Tunisia’s national professional training agency (ATFP) was recognized as a top TVET model in Africa by the African Union Commission (AUC) in 2015, and offers technical assistance to national counterparts across Africa.

At the same time, the Government recognizes that despite a succession of well-articulated past reform efforts to improve the TVET system, their implementation has fallen short of achieving Tunisia’s ambitious goals to achieve world-class performance. Key challenges and shortcomings are clearly laid out in the MVTE’s reform strategy for 2014-2018. Core functions in need of strengthening include the identification and forecasting of skill and training needs, coordination among public and private actors in areas such as performance monitoring, and inadequate industry knowledge and experience among trainers. Moreover, despite a strategic commitment to decentralization of TVET services, the regions of Tunisia remain excluded from system management.

The urgency of implementing needed reforms to restore Tunisia’s competitiveness and create employment is high, given the far-reaching and potentially destabilizing economic, social and security implications of Tunisia’s pressing youth employment crisis. In support of that priority, this assessment seeks to assist the Government to identify and articulate investments that can ensure sustained and sufficient implementation, to help decisionmakers to mobilize and prioritize support from development partners, as well as to inform implementation of the AUC’s Continental TVET strategy by documenting good practices as well as challenges in one of Africa’s most advanced TVET systems.

The assessment was informed by participatory fieldwork by a multidisciplinary team of experts in TVET and workforce development, private sector development and competitiveness from December 2016 to February 2017. Fieldwork included more than 30 meetings with 72 policymakers, business leaders, young people and educators; visits to six training centers, both public and private; and facilitation of four workshops with key staff from MVTE and ATFP, including regional workshops in Megrine, Kasserine, and Medenine.

Context
Unemployment challenges and disparities
Unemployment rose dramatically after the 2011 Tunisian revolution and the ensuing destabilization of the economy. Even more pervasive is the condition of underemployment, in which youth are working outside their field of interest, often in informal and part-time conditions, and are unable to realize their potential. The unemployment rate of 15% is unacceptably high, and yet that overall figure masks deep labor market disparities among populations, with the most affected being young, female, and rural.
As the figure below shows, workers with tertiary degrees have been disproportionately affected, especially in the ‘interior’ regions away from major coastal cities.

Tunisia’s Employment Challenge: Regional Disparities

Regional Disparities in Unemployment in Tunisia

![Regional Disparities in Unemployment in Tunisia](image_url)

Source: INS Census of Population and Housing 2014

In absolute terms, however, the number of unemployed without a tertiary degree is more than twice as great (represented in the above figure by the size of bubbles, and with figures provided in the table below). There has also been a concentrated impact on women, only 25% of whom are in the labor force. Illustrating the point, women’s unemployment is 37% in six southern governorates (vs. 13% among men) and a staggering 47% among tertiary-educated women. Such gender and education disparities are far less pronounced in Tunis (and other coastal cities), which have higher demand for skilled labor and more accommodating gender norms.

Regional and Educational Attainment Disparities in Unemployment in Tunisia, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Employed All</th>
<th>Employed Tertiary</th>
<th>Employed Non-Tertiary</th>
<th>Unemployed All</th>
<th>Unemployed Tertiary</th>
<th>Unemployed Non-Tertiary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,225,124</td>
<td>546,004</td>
<td>1,679,120</td>
<td>314,279</td>
<td>101,412</td>
<td>212,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Cities</td>
<td>1,073,978</td>
<td>175,672</td>
<td>898,306</td>
<td>257,785</td>
<td>80,939</td>
<td>176,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalized Regions</td>
<td>3,299,102</td>
<td>721,676</td>
<td>2,577,426</td>
<td>572,064</td>
<td>182,351</td>
<td>389,713</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INS Census of Population and Housing, 2014
An economy at risk, but still regionally competitive
Tunisia has experienced a steep slide in qualitative indicators of competitiveness in relation to regional peers, still recovering from the shocks of the last decade, including the global financial crisis of 2008 followed by the Arab Spring. Insecurity and violence continue to inhibit foreign and local investment and discourage tourism. Yet Tunisia retains a relatively high level of economic complexity, a promising sign of future growth and skill upgrading opportunities. Tunisia ranks second only to Turkey in the MENA region and far ahead of the rest of Africa according to the Economic Complexity Index, an empirical measure of complexity developed at Harvard University by Ricardo Hausmann and Cesar Hidalgo. (Hausmann & Hidalgo, 2014)

Construction materials, chemicals, health related products, home and office products, machinery, plastics and other composites are some of the commodities with strategic promise for Tunisia according to economic complexity metrics (AfDB, 2011) Past experiences of South Korea and China, when at similar stages of development to Tunisia, suggest that a coordinated set of policies and investments (including TVET investments) to develop strategic sectors could lead to higher value-added exports (and by extension, more employment in higher paying jobs).

Skills for the future
Despite high unemployment, employers in key sectors (e.g. ICT, textiles, construction and public works, agriculture, and metal works) report difficulty finding new employees with the right skills. Skill requirements are rapidly changing in Tunisia, in line with global trends and particularly in other countries that have undergone so-called ‘premature de-industrialization.’ The rise of service sector employment, as well as the accelerating transformation of manufacturing toward more integrated, and technologically advanced processes, have been among the factors driving increased demand for cross-cutting skills such as communication, social skills, and problem solving, commonly referred to as soft skills (FHI360, 2017). The challenges of adapting to a rapidly changing labor market will likely only increase in many ‘technical’ fields, as increased automation and artificial intelligence continue to advance.

Overview of System Reforms
The assessment team reviewed the TVET system structure and recent history of a succession of reforms and investments since 1993. Overall, the review reveals a system characterized by 1) demonstrated, sustained willingness to reform the system and make it more responsive, 2) an elaborate and structured bureaucracy with significant training capacity, and 3) persistent shortcomings (largely attributable to incomplete reform implementation) as the intended objectives and needs of employers and the aspirations of youth have consistently not been met. Throughout these reforms, the TVET system has remained fundamentally premised on the public provision of training, with a near monopoly on services by public sector institutions. As a result, complementary approaches to solving perennial TVET challenges, including increasing the role of the private sector in training, have been marginal.

Reforms launched in the 1990s have resulted in improvements such as reduced teacher/student ratios, modernized pedagogical methods, better trainer education, and more apprenticeships. More Reforming TVET in Tunisia: Strategic Assessment (DRAFT) July 2017
recent reforms have sought to clear pathways between general education and professional training (and vice versa) by harmonizing education and training curricula. Nonetheless, the pace of growth in enrollment in TVET has been far outpaced by the much larger higher education system for most of this period.

An inflection point for TVET was reached as a result of the economic shocks and employment crisis discussed above, which exposed deeply rooted problems. In 2012, unemployment of graduates of the TVET sector reached 30%, versus 33% for higher education (Masson, 2016). In response, a national conference on the reform of the national TVET system was held in 2012, convening a broad and inclusive public and private dialogue exercise that articulated top-level needs and paved the way for the current reform strategy (2014-18), as described above. The MVTE has sought to innovate by developing 14 projects to implement the reforms, informed through a highly participatory dialogue involving business and other partners, toward the goal of a TVET system that is profoundly transformed, fit for purpose and able to continuously evolve (MVTE, 2016, p. 11). One key focus is on strengthening the capacity of the system to implement change by equipping it with new tools that have been absent from previous efforts. The most important tools are the establishment of performance indicators, which is the central focus of ‘Project 12.’

Current Structure

The current structure was largely established by the 1993 reforms. Today, the MVET is the Ministry in charge of TVET in Tunisia, defines the strategic agenda for professional training, and supervises the operational agencies responsible for key functions including initial training (provided by the ATFP through its 137 centers), continuous training, trainer education, employment services, and labor market information, among others. Four other ministerial departments (Tourism, Agriculture, Defense and Health) share with MVTE responsibility for overseeing professional training in their respective sectors and have developed their own training centers.
Public TVET provision
In Tunisia, the public sector dominates TVET provision, educating 89% of the new workers that hold a TVET diploma. Most of those received their degree from one of ATFP’s 137 training centers located across Tunisia. The ATFP, with almost 7,000 staff, trains on 240 specialties through a network of 1,713 trainers and 2,319 training advisors (ONEQ, 2016).

The ATFP in effect maintains a quasi-monopoly on initial training, except in the sectors where other ministries have their own centers. Its centers offer sector-oriented training in areas including construction, electronics, mechanics, tourism, and textiles. Each typically focuses on one or two sectors (construction, textile and garments, mechanics, etc.) with a heavy focus on industry. Each center is led by a director and, in addition to administrative and training officers, its staff typically include one officer in charge of relations with firms and one in charge of monitoring trainees after they graduate. The quality of centers can vary widely by location, as judged by trainer performance, trainer-educator ratios, equipment, living quarters and opportunities for apprenticeships. Coastal urban areas with more industries and business tend to be better equipped and offer better options for practical training with greater level of direct involvement by employers.

Private TVET provision
The private sector accounts for only 11% of new workers with TVET diplomas. While the MVTE is mandated to control the quality of training offered by private training institutions, little information is available on private education performance. There are 1,025 private entities offering TVET training services, the majority in continuous training and the services sector. Of those, only 180 deliver state accredited initial training.

TVET Financing
A tax credit financing mechanism for continuous education has encouraged the development of private training consulting firms that offer training services for employers. That is one of three major financing mechanisms in place to fund vocational training in Tunisia (Chelbi & Ficatier, 2010). The professional training tax, paid on salaries by larger firms, is meant to spur private investment in training, as firms’ taxes are partially reimbursed in exchange for investments they make in continuous training. This mechanism also, in part, helps to finance initial and continuous training. A “droits de tirage” or “drawing rights” line of financing is open to the many firms who pay little professional tax, or have used up their tax credit for the year, or that are exempt from the tax entirely (such as export-only firms) (CNFCPP, 2017).

Summary of Assessment Findings
Findings are organized according to four major domains, or ‘pillars,’ of needed reforms to make the TVET system more-demand driven, which emerged from the analysis. These are consistent with the existing reform strategy as well as the assessment scope of work co-developed with MVTE. The four pillars reflect the complex, adaptive and interdependent nature of workforce development systems. They are:

Reforming TVET in Tunisia: Strategic Assessment (DRAFT) July 2017
Strategy: system alignment with the economic vision for the country and its regions
Governance: system responsiveness to labor market demand, including private sector participation and ownership.
Labor market information: quality and accessibility of information needed to plan, monitor and evaluate a responsive TVET system
Portable skills: system effectiveness in developing skills to strengthen Tunisia’s current and future workforce.

Strategy
The reform strategy stresses the need for a national vision for economic and social development and its relationship to a national human resource development vision and strategy (MVTE, 2013, p. 17). Our review of best practice international examples (such as Singapore, Ireland and Germany) indicates that successful TVET strategies should, indeed, be an expression of an economic growth and development strategy for a region or country. Workforce development strategies must be calibrated with those economic sectors where there is current and anticipated future growth.

We find that the current reform process of the TVET system is insufficiently calibrated to the economic development priorities of Tunisia and its regions. Meetings and workshops with key public and private sector stakeholders found little evidence that they shared a common understanding of what those priorities are, either at a national or regional level. The current reform effort appears to be operating in isolation from ministries responsible for setting national economic priorities for areas such as economic development, finance, trade and investment, and tourism. Adding to that challenge, counterparts with regional stakeholders indicated that national priorities often fail to reflect regional economic realities and needs. A contributing factor is that, in some cases, there is a lack of clarity on what constitutes a ‘region.’

Governance
Four major, interrelated challenges emerged with respect to the organization and supervision of the TVET system, which are in clear contradiction with explicit aims of the reform strategy. The first is that the system remains heavily centralized and monolithic, despite the shared vision among the Ministry, the ATFP headquarters and its training centers to delegate greater decision-making and managerial authority to local centers. Headquarters and center leaders expressed different views of the barriers to decentralization. The headquarters view is that centers do not have the capacity to handle additional autonomy, both financially and in terms of human resources management. Meanwhile training center directors feel hampered by high levels of bureaucracy and centralized control, even relating to minor operational challenges such as maintenance of office equipment, creating unwanted inefficiencies and delays. At a programmatic level, center managers and staff feel they are prevented from implementing responsive solutions adapted to local economic needs, as they are required to implement the national curriculum.

The second relates to the geographic distribution of training centers and investments. This currently presents a conundrum, as on the one hand, the Government seeks to address longstanding imbalances in investment and development between more economically advanced coastal cities and the underserved interior regions. On the other hand, for the ‘dual system’ model to be effective, trainees must have access to opportunities to be placed in firms where they can develop skills and put theory into practice. In many fields, those opportunities are much more numerous in the coastal cities.

Reforming TVET in Tunisia: Strategic Assessment (DRAFT) July 2017
The third challenge is that **private training service providers and public-private partnerships for training remain peripheral to the system** despite a stated motivation, in the law and in the reform, to stimulate private sector provision of TVET training and the fostering of innovative partnerships. Private sector training providers are essentially limited to skills training in the services sector (such as office administration and basic IT), while the ATFP and its ministerial partners retain a monopoly on more “heavy” sectors such as manufacturing, construction, electronics etc. In best practice countries, the private sector is heavily engaged in the provision of training. In Tunisia, there is extensive participation of firms in apprenticeships, but the quality of on-the-job training varies widely, and is particularly weak among small and medium enterprises that lack resources and capabilities to provide effective support for professional development. Some firms, unsatisfied with the training level offered by existing programs, have taken the initiative to develop innovative, employer-driven programs that are leveraging high levels of private sector investment into the TVET system, and appear to be generating strong positive outcomes in terms of skill acquisition and employment. The report provides case studies on two of these examples, the Sartex training center in the garment industry and AHK’s *Enterprise Formatrice* program on automobile maintenance and repair. Although both programs have formalized partnerships with ATFP, they operate in what seem to be the outskirts of the system. The apparent success of local models, and evidence from international best practices, suggest that testing and replication of such models should be a high strategic priority.

The fourth challenge is the **absence of crucial coordination and independent oversight functions, including a systematic and effective public-private dialogue on skill needs at multiple levels.** Overall there appears to be a high level of fragmentation of initiatives and information, with uneven levels of oversight, multiple donors, and weak linkages among projects and initiatives that could achieve greater impact and scale if linked in a systematic way. Despite the fact that a public-private dialogue is established in the training law, current national level mechanisms and efforts are reportedly ad hoc, and private sector interests are inadequately represented in the view of several large export-oriented employers. At the center level, in practice firms have little say in governance, although by law they are supposed to represented on centers’ Boards. Increasingly, the international literature advocates for the creation of independent national apex bodies to coordinate TVET provision, encouraging participation of private training providers while also providing quality assurance for public and private providers. Importantly Project 1 of the reform strategy aims to develop a Human Resource Development Authority (MVTE, 2016), which could potentially fulfill those functions.

**Labor Market Information**

Currently, key players do not have access to the information needed to plan, monitor and evaluate a responsive TVET system. Labor market information was assessed according to four main ‘buckets’ including skills identification and forecasting, performance metrics and information flows, career information, and the labor market information system (LMIS).

**Skill identification and forecasting:** In demand-driven, best practice systems such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Ireland, employers are lead participants in defining future and current demand for skills, which then drives the skill production process. The highly centralized structure of Tunisia’s
A recurring theme of meetings with center leaders and employers was to stress the need to establish a systematic way of identifying the needs of firms and quickly responding to these needs with training.

Performance metrics and information flows: An effective TVET quality management system relies on the use of performance metrics to inform continuous improvement. In Tunisia, the lack of commonly agreed performance metrics and of the capability to measure them was one of the dominant themes of the assessment, including a workshop with the ‘Project 12’ working group on performance indicators. Although TVET system stakeholders know that they want and need to measure performance, they are less certain as to what to measure and how. Best practice countries (e.g. Ireland, Australia, and Singapore) have developed rigorous metrics to measure and evaluate performance of their skill development systems. All three look inside and outside their system to continuously assess performance. The assessment presents a number of ‘bottom-up’ suggestions of performance indicators proposed by center staff, as well as a Toolbox of indicators that have been proposed by the international Inter-Agency Working Group for TVET (coordinated by UNESCO in partnership with a range of multilateral and regional partners) and is being field-tested internationally.

Currently, the system lacks reliable and comparable data on what works and doesn’t work, and what outcomes are achieved, that would facilitate the identification and replication of successful programs. ATFP has made recent strides in establishing a quality management system, with 19 centers achieving ISO 9001 certification. However, most have lost their certifications again as data on quality must be documented and kept up to date.

There is clearly vast potential in improving information sharing and reporting within ATFP centers to ensure continuous improvement mechanisms. In some cases, the assessment identified excellent processes and management tools (such as sophisticated dashboards) that have been used to monitor student performance in training and apprenticeships, and to track outcomes. Yet these efforts were developed in-house at the center level, and not rolled up or shared more broadly. Meanwhile, ‘top-down’ efforts to establish systematic mechanisms for tracking important metrics including the enrollment rate, dropout rate, and marginal expenditure per trainee have not achieved their potential, as the system has either not been used by centers or the information is not reported centrally. Reportedly this was due to insufficient investment in change management, training, and IT infrastructure.

Career information: Ensuring that job seekers have access to good information about different career paths, what skills and qualifications they require, and what the career prospects are (salaries, location, etc.) is an integral part of the function of an effective TVET system that can direct the flow of trainees to occupation where the job outcomes are the most promising. Currently, however, we found excellent examples from specific programs (such as CORP, AHK Tunisia, ELAN, Fab Lab Solidare) but these tend to operate outside or on the margins of the system. For most TVET students, little if any career advice is available.
Labor Market Information Systems (LMIS): In best practice countries, LMIS are the knowledge base on which labor and educational policies are built and the go-to place for workers and employers looking for work, training and skills. These countries’ labor markets would not function like they do without up to date, readily available and precise information on local and national employment levels, skill demand foresights, job offers and vacancies, trainings and qualifications or user-friendly employment services (FHI360, 2016). In Tunisia, stakeholders agree that better LMIS could provide the missing backbone for effective reform of the TVET system. Today, a wealth of information is created but is transmitted poorly, as illustrated by numerous example of missed opportunities identified by the assessment team.

**Portable Skills**

**A deeper and more systematic emphasis on skills’ portability is needed in order to meet the current and future skill needs of Tunisia’s workforce.** Portable skills, also called cross-sectoral or transferable skills, are marketable and applicable within and across occupations and industries. They include cross-cutting technical skills as well as ‘soft skills’ that are portable by definition.

Soft skills are interpersonal, intrapersonal, and cognitive skills that foster individual and team performance through behaviors such as goal setting, regulating emotions in stressful situations, understanding and navigating unspoken social norms, solving complex problems, and communicating effectively in diverse contexts. Portable skills are critically important today for enabling youth access to multiple and diverse career pathways. Across many industries and occupations, they are anticipated to increase in importance in the future as work processes are transformed by technology, artificial intelligence, and greater internet connectivity. A newly published USAID study finds that experiential learning, or learning by doing, is core to the process of acquiring soft skills, and is complemented by external supports such as nurturing relationships with adult mentors and peers, positive pedagogical practices such as modelling and skill scaffolding, and a conducive environment that integrates learning across school, work and community contexts (Soares, Diener, & Ignatowski, 2017).

In best practice workforce development systems, countries have found ways to identify and categorize portable skills within the context of particular industry sectors. In Tunisia, TVET decision makers readily acknowledge the importance of soft skills and entrepreneurship skills, and are actively seeking to develop more portable skills. For example, ATFP centers are currently implementing entrepreneurial clubs geared to developing the skills associated with entrepreneurship, in partnership with Education For Employment. However, these efforts do not yet appear to be addressed within a broader framework of portable skills or industry-level dialogues identifying skills that will be valued in the future, nor does there appear to be a dedicated effort underway to develop portable skills within the system.

The practice of developing skills via apprenticeships and internships seems well developed in Tunisia, with many centers reporting several hundred ongoing apprenticeships. However, the extent to which employers actively train students or encourage apprentices or interns to learn portable skills is unknown, and several key elements of the ‘dual system’ model, which typically foster the acquisition of portable skills, are absent in Tunisia. Nonetheless, numerous innovative initiatives to develop portable skills are occurring throughout Tunisia, as identified in the report. Although currently on the
margins of the system, those offer a wealth of approaches and experiences that could potentially be replicated and scaled more widely.

**Recommendations**

In order to strengthen each of the ‘four pillars’ of TVET reform as discussed above, our central recommendation suggests a pathway to accelerate implementation of MVTE’s strategy to decentralize the management of the TVET system, through a regional value chain approach. That means that private sector, civil society and regional public system leaders establish clear priorities collaboratively in terms of specific value chains within each region rather than setting sectoral and occupational priorities only at a national level. Within the framework of a clear competitiveness agenda for each region, more targeted TVET initiatives can be developed which can then be implemented equally collaboratively and more effectively. A value chain approach means that all players in the value chain – government, enterprises, educational institutions, and NGOs – must work together toward common goals.

There are four key benefits to this approach, including strengthening local labor markets to better align skills supply and demand, 2) increased ease of implementation at a regional level, 3) fostering continuous improvement by merging ‘top-down’ policies and ‘bottom-up’ initiatives generated by local actors, and 4) speeding the pace of decentralization, which has of course already been adopted as a matter of policy, but the implementation of which has been extremely gradual. An activity concept on ‘Collaborative Action for Strengthening Regional TVET Systems’ is presented that provides the outline of a roadmap for implementing this strategy.
I. Rationale, Context, and Methodology

Brief Background on AUP

The African Union Partnership Program (AUP), funded by USAID/AU and managed by FHI 360, is a five year $5.2 million technical assistance project working with the African Union Commission (AUC) to strengthen youth economic empowerment in Africa. The project will be implemented from 2014-19. AUP supports the U.S.-AU relationship under the U.S. Mission to the African Union.

AUP has an overarching emphasis on economic empowerment for youth in Africa, with a focus on three technical results areas – **education and skills development, trade and market access, and economic governance and social protection.**

By the end of the project, FHI 360 will have supported the AUC to strengthen its core functions including coordinating actions of development partners; encouraging and monitoring progress toward priority outcomes in Member States and Regional Economic Communities; and engaging with local civil society and the private sector to advance implementation.

Rationale

**Accelerating the TVET Reform Agenda in Tunisia**

Tunisia has long held the ambition of achieving a world-class technical and vocational education and training (TVET) system, and has taken important steps to that end. In fact, Tunisia’s system was not long ago considered modern and innovative. Following system wide reforms by the end of the 1990s, the Government had built up strong institutions including the national professional training agency (ATFP) and had partnered with business associations to deliver training following the ‘dual system’ model, including substantial provision of on-the-job training.

Today, Tunisia is still considered a model in Africa; for example, in 2015 ATFP received an award from the African Union Commission for being a top TVET performer, and provides technical assistance to fellow countries across Africa. Yet the Government recognizes that despite a succession of well-articulated past reform efforts to improve the technical and vocational education and training (TVET) system, implementation has fallen short. To be fair, the complexity of TVET reform should not be underestimated. As a 2014 Asian Development Bank study notes, “TVET is arguably the most difficult education subsector to govern and manage because of complexities in the number and type of organizational sponsors, diversity of clients, varied types of delivery, and changing labor market demands.” (ADB, 2014, p. 15)

Even so, because of weak reform implementation, Tunisia’s TVET system is not achieving its potential for meeting the skill needs of key labor market actors, principally youth and private sector employers, in terms of both quality and quantity. Past efforts have been too piecemeal and narrowly conceived, and have not created a system-wide framework for public-private collaboration through which real long lasting change can take hold. The system’s numerous shortcomings are clearly laid out in the MVTE’s latest reform document for 2014-2018 which highlights central problems to be resolved (MVTE, 2013, p. 13), including:
• Absence of tools, processes and leadership to identify skill and training needs. This is especially problematic given that the TVET system design is conceived around the “skill driven approach,” which in theory focuses on defining and meeting the needs within a given sector. In practice, however, training offerings are supply-driven, determined by estimates of what trainings can be offered in each center, given the resources available.

• Poor coordination between the actors that are supposed to work on skills need identification, with no clear-cut responsibility for the exercise. Employer associations, trade unions and other professional associations have not been true partners in defining, monitoring and evaluating the system.

• Trainers, although knowledgeable about their field, lack current industry knowledge and technical skills since they most often do not have private sector experience.

• At the system management level, there remains an absence of forecasting capabilities to plan ahead. Evaluation and monitoring is minimal and not systematic.

• Regions of Tunisia are not involved in the TVET system and its management.

These challenges must be tackled with urgency to restore Tunisia’s competitiveness and create employment, and the willingness to reform is clear. The key question is, what investments are required for reform implementation to be sustained and sufficient this time?

In support of Tunisia’s TVET reform agenda, the purpose of this strategic assessment is to contribute by proposing new approaches to overcome past constraints and challenges to implementation. Specific objectives are to:

1. Assist the Government of Tunisia in the articulation of its needs with respect to developing its TVET system
2. Help decision makers in their efforts to mobilize and prioritize support from development partners interested in investing in TVET and skills development in Tunisia
3. Inform the African Union’s continental TVET initiative, in support of Agenda 2063 implementation, by documenting good practices as well as challenges in one of Africa’s most advanced TVET systems

**Context**

**Unemployment challenges and disparities**

Tunisia’s dire job situation is widely recognized and well-documented. Tunisian policy experts often refer to the country’s sky-high unemployment as a ‘crisis’ because of its links to poverty, social unrest and marginalization of society’s fringes. Reducing unemployment is thus a top priority of the Tunisian government (Elyes, 2015). Unemployment rose dramatically after the 2011 Tunisian revolution and the ensuing destabilization of the economy. Even more pervasive is the condition of underemployment, in which youth are working in an occupation outside their field of interest, often in informal and part-time conditions, and are unable to realize their potential. However, high levels of unemployment and underemployment are hardly a new phenomenon, suggesting that Tunisia is also experiencing the effects of long-lasting structural economic challenges and low competitiveness levels.

The overall unemployment rate is 15%. (Institut National de la Statistique, 2014). Even more problematic are deep labor market disparities by age, gender, and geography, with the most
affected populations being young, female, and rural. Another troubling trend is that the past decade has seen higher skilled workers falling into unemployment at a higher rate than low skilled, and this pattern is particularly pronounced in the ‘interior’ regions away from major coastal cities. See Figure 1 for a visualization of unemployment rates by region, showing far higher prevalence in ‘interior’ regions, and especially among university graduates. Those regions comprise nearly half of Tunisia’s population, but less than a third of the workforce. (Institut National de la Statistique, 2014).

Figure 1: Tunisia’s Employment Challenge: Regional Disparities

Regional Disparities in Unemployment in Tunisia

![Regional Disparities in Unemployment in Tunisia](image)

Source: (Institut National de la Statistique, 2014)

It should be noted that despite the higher unemployment rates among tertiary graduates, in absolute terms, the number of unemployed without a tertiary degree is more than twice as great as the number of unemployed tertiary graduates (represented in Figure 1 by the size of bubbles, and with figures provided below in Table 1).

Table 1: Regional and Educational Attainment Disparities in Unemployment in Tunisia, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Employed All</th>
<th>Employed Tertiary</th>
<th>Employed Non-Tertiary</th>
<th>Unemployed All</th>
<th>Unemployed Tertiary</th>
<th>Unemployed Non-Tertiary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Cities</td>
<td>2,225,124</td>
<td>546,004</td>
<td>1,679,120</td>
<td>314,279</td>
<td>101,412</td>
<td>212,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalized</td>
<td>1,073,978</td>
<td>175,672</td>
<td>898,306</td>
<td>257,785</td>
<td>80,939</td>
<td>176,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,299,102</td>
<td>721,676</td>
<td>2,577,426</td>
<td>572,064</td>
<td>182,351</td>
<td>389,713</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Institut National de la Statistique, 2014)

Although gender parity in Tunisia has now been exceeded in literacy, and primary, secondary and tertiary education – with women representing more than 60% of total enrolled in tertiary education in 2012 – women’s labor force participation rate has stagnated at around 25 percent since 2012, and women’s unemployment exceeds that of men by about 12% (EBRD 2015). As Table 1 below shows, women’s unemployment is 37% in the six governorates of the Southwest and Southeast regions (vs. 13% among men), and a staggering 47% among tertiary-educated women (vs. 19% among men).
Table 2: Unemployment Rates Highest for University Graduates and Especially Females

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>All Education Levels</th>
<th>Tertiary Educated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabes</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gafsa</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kebili</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medenine</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tataouine</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tozeur</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southern Region Average</strong></td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ariana</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sousse</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sfax</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selected Coastal Cities Average</strong></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As illustrated above, gender and education disparities are far less pronounced in Tunis (and other coastal cities), which have higher demand for skilled labor and more progressive gender norms.

**An economy at risk, but still regionally competitive**

Tunisia has not yet fully recovered from the shocks of the last decade, including the global financial crisis of 2008 followed by the Arab Spring. Today insecurity and violence continue to inhibit foreign and local investment and discourage tourism. Tunisia has also suffered a steep slide in indicators of competitiveness. Until 2011, Tunisia consistently scored at or near the top of the Middle East and African regions on the WEF Global Competitiveness Index (ranking 32nd in the world ten years ago) and the World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators. Yet today, Tunisia ranks only 95 out of the 138 economies surveyed in the WEF Global Competitiveness Index 2016–2017. Comparatively, Tunisia has fallen far behind Jordan (63), Morocco (70) and Algeria (83), and ranks only one spot ahead of Kenya.

Yet Tunisia retains a high degree of economic complexity in relation to its regional counterparts, presenting promising areas of opportunity for growth and skill upgrading. Tunisia ranks second only to Turkey in the MENA region and far ahead of the rest of Africa according to the Economic Complexity Index developed at Harvard University by Ricardo Hausmann and Cesar Hidalgo. (Hausmann & Hidalgo, 2014) The Index provides an empirical measure of the knowledge in a society that is applied through the products it makes, calculated based on the sophistication and uniqueness of the products it exports. Even more promising, Tunisia has a favorable position in terms of having a
higher world ranking in economic complexity (47) than income per capita (90), a combination that is highly correlated with future growth.

Authors of a 2011 African Development Bank (AfDB) study applied economic complexity metrics to identify product categories that hold particular strategic promise for Tunisia, including sectors such as construction materials, chemicals, health related products, home and office products, machinery, plastics and other composites. (AfDB, 2011) The authors assert that further support to strategic sectors could lead to higher value-added exports (and by extension, more employment in higher paying jobs), following the successful past examples of South Korea and China when at similar stages of development to Tunisia.

Their analysis holds direct relevance for TVET investments as well. The authors review the experience of South Korea in making investments in strategic sectors such as electronics that were accompanied by targeted investments in relevant skills. These investments, combined with Korea’s already high levels of education, allowed the country to absorb and benefit from international technologies, leading to a rapid increase in capabilities.

Skills for the future
Tunisia faces the same paradox as most other countries around the world: young people are more educated than a decade ago, yet employers say they find it increasingly difficult to find the right graduates with the right skills (FHI360, 2017, p. 3). The ICT, textiles, construction and public works, agriculture, and metal works sectors regularly report that they struggle to find qualified candidates (MVTE, 2013). This disconnect is linked to several factors, not least the evolution in the types of work that have traditionally been a feature of economic transformation, and which have accelerated in recent years. Consistent with countries which have undergone so-called ‘premature de-industrialization,’ Tunisia’s service sector has grown massively without having been built on a mature and highly efficient manufacturing sector. Traditional manufacturing is disappearing. Previously, it was characterized by the application of specific technical skills to repetitive functions, but today’s global production process requires a set of integrated skills complemented by technology. Service sector jobs often place a greater premium on cross-cutting, customer-service related skills such as communication and problem solving, commonly referred to as soft skills (FHI360, 2017).

The challenges of adapting to a rapidly changing labor market will only increase. Jobs most affected by technology and automation are likely to be those on which Tunisia has tended to rely, and which involve routine, well-structured and relatively elementary tasks such as call-centers, outsourced manufacturing or transcribing. Tunisia is renowned within the region for its relatively large and well-educated middle class, now at risk of being ‘hollowed out’. It is more urgent than ever to address the skill needs of the future in order to safeguard the prospects of the middle class – legal clerks, radiologists, etc. – and their children in the future.

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Promoting TVET as a vehicle for youth employment: a government priority

As discussed earlier, part of the government’s response to these challenges and economic opportunities is to actively promote and reform TVET as a vehicle to create jobs and make Tunisia more competitive. Technical education in Tunisia may potentially provide a better pathway to secure a job than general higher education. Previously seen as a ‘voie de garage’ (fallback option), a technical education degree in today’s Tunis may offer a young graduate a better probability of getting a job than the average university graduate with a degree in social sciences and humanities. Indeed, in 2012, unemployment among youth aged 15-35 with a TVET degree was 30% versus 33% for those with a higher education diploma (Masson, Formation en Tunisie: l’histoire mouvementée de ces 15 dernières années, 2016). Yet salaries in many technical fields remain stubbornly low and—no doubt relatedly—TVET education continues to suffer from an image problem with youth (and their parents) who tend to aspire to office jobs with better pay and working conditions.

In countries like Germany and Switzerland, pioneers and world leaders in implementation of the dual system, export-led economies create many high paying ‘technical’ jobs by producing high value, technologically sophisticated products for global markets. Yet, a defining characteristic in these countries is that the burden of training to develop skills largely rests on the employers heavily investing in the skills development of their upcoming and current workforce, working hand in hand with the public sector at every step. In this “dual system” model of TVET, training is less of a burden than an opportunity to meet the need of securing a skilled workforce. Likewise, in Tunisia, greater ownership of and co-investment in the system by export-oriented employers may point the way to more effective performance.

This assessment was conducted by a team of international and local consultants and included youth participation. Following two weeks of preparatory desk research, including a literature review and analysis of publicly available economic data, the team conducted ten days of fieldwork during October 2015. The field assessment included a range of key informant interviews and discussions with stakeholders, including private sector representatives, government officials, donors, educators, and youth (see Annex 1 for a list of interviewees).

Methodology

Team composition

This study was led by a three-person team of experts in private sector development, competitiveness, and TVET, affiliated with FHI 360’s Workforce and Entrepreneurship Practice. The team included a Tunisian consultant and an AUC Senior Youth Advisor who participated in the field assessment.

Participatory, action-oriented approach

FHI 360 conducted an extensive desk review on TVET in Tunisia, complemented by participatory fieldwork from December 2016 to February 2017. A multidisciplinary assessment team was fielded from February 13-24. During the fieldwork, the team conducted more than 30 meetings with 72 policymakers, business leaders, young people and educators. The team visited six training centers, both public and private, selected in partnership with ATFPC.
Moreover, at the Ministry of TVET and Employment’s request, FHI 360 also facilitated four training workshops: one with a team from the Ministry of TVET and Employment focused on TVET indicators, and three regional workshops (in Megrine, Kasserine, and Medenine) bringing together 20 ATFP staff including center directors, training advisors, and trainers from eleven training centers across the three regions.

**Scope, focus and limits**

The agreed Terms of Reference (See Annex 5), co-developed with the Ministry of TVET and Employment and ATFP, stressed three specific themes within the broad overall framework of the TVET reform initiative:

1. TVET system strategy and governance (including performance metrics, performance improvement strategy, and balancing public and private service provision)
2. Labor market information (including career information guidance and labor market intermediation services) to meet the information needs of TVET centers, the Ministry, student job seekers and employers
3. Development of portable skills (including soft skills and entrepreneurial skills) that can be applied across many sectors and occupations and will continue to be valuable in the future

At the request of MTVE, the assessment effort paid special attention to supporting the implementation of project 12 of the reform agenda, which aims to develop a system to measure the performance of the TVET sector.

As referenced above, keeping in response to the urgency of the reform effort, the assessment scope was designed with a strong action orientation, focused on providing participatory, demand-driven training, facilitation, and capacity building through a series of workshops with MTVE and ATFP staff.

**Strategic assessment framework**

The framework for the assessment reflects major domains of findings that emerged from the assessment, which align closely with the themes highlighted in the Scope of Work. Accordingly, findings presented in Section 3 are grouped into four major categories:

- Strategy: system alignment with the economic vision for the country and its regions
- Governance: system responsiveness to labor market demand, including private sector participation and ownership
- Labor market information: quality and accessibility of information needed to plan, monitor and evaluate a responsive TVET system
- Portable skills: system effectiveness in developing skills to strengthen Tunisia’s current and future workforce.

The analysis was also informed by the broader “10 Success Factors of Effective TVET Systems” framework summarized below.
10 Success Factors of Effective TVET Systems

The assessment design and analysis were informed by systematic reference to ten key success factors of effective and efficient TVET and other workforce development initiatives. The performance factors are closely linked with one another and can be considered interdependent elements of a whole and complex system of skill development. The success factors are adapted from a framework originally developed under a USAID grant led by one of the assessment team members, in collaboration with a working group of donors and policymakers (World Bank, USAID, ILO, US Department of Labor) and employers (Motorola, Siemens, IBM, and several small and mid-size firms). (Aring & Corbitt, 1996)

Applied to a TVET system, the ten factors can be expressed as follows:

1. The system reflects an overall economic and social development strategy.
2. There is effective leadership and accountability, and transparency of information for system oversight.
3. The system is demand driven by design.
4. The system is open, equitable, and accessible throughout the life span and to different groups (e.g. part time, full time, women, disabled).
5. Skills acquired are portable now and in the future.
6. A process is implemented for continuous improvement.
7. Public-private partnerships are in place, with co-investment and shared responsibility.
8. System financing is sustainable.
9. Programming is replicable across contexts.
10. The system yields positive economic and social impact.
II. Tunisia’s TVET System: Structure and Reforms

Reforming Vocational Training in Tunisia

In this section, we will explain that the TVET system of Tunisia is characterized by:

1. **Demonstrated and sustained willingness to reform** the system in a quest to make it more responsive to skill demand;
2. **An elaborate and structured bureaucracy** with significant capacity to deliver a wide portfolio of trainings;
3. **Persistent shortcomings** (largely attributable to incomplete reform implementation) as the intended objectives and needs of employers and the aspirations of youth are systematically not met.

Tunisia’s current TVET system structure is best understood by analyzing the successive reform processes initiated in 1993 and 2008, and by demonstrating how the vision behind these reforms has shaped the system as we know it today. The current reform process, which began 2012, but whose implementation is, as of 2017, only just beginning, symbolizes the recognition by the Government of Tunisia that previous reforms have fallen short of meeting their targets, especially when considering the current challenges faced by Tunisia’s youth and economy. According to Mr. Khaled Ben Yahia, the ATFP Director, the Tunisian TVET system is the result of many experiments based on the importation of foreign training models, and, today, the system is not adapted to the Tunisian context in a way that can create growth and jobs at the scale that is needed (ATFP, 2017).

The system fundamentals seem to be deemed solid by the reformers. (Indeed, we will explain how these fundamentals have come about, and created carefully developed based on broad public-private dialogues and openness to international best practices.) And, therefore, the reform process seeks to boost the effectiveness and efficiency of a system whose fundamentals are seen as a given. The question, then, becomes whether the chosen approach will lead to such a leap in performance, by overcoming the shortcomings that have characterized the outcomes of previous reform efforts. It is also important to discuss whether the reforms go far enough as to question one of the system’s central premises, namely that it is up to public institutions to train. This also raises the question of whether the resulting near monopoly of the public sector is impairing the systems’ ability to be open to alternative arrangement beyond the state, including the potential roles the private sector can be led to play in solving some of the perennial TVET challenges.

The 1990s reforms: Tunisia at the “avant-garde” of pedagogical and administrative innovation?

A series of laws introduced in 1993 essentially drew the contours of the Tunisian TVET system as it exists today. The legislation opened the door for several ambitious innovations ensuring quality training through employer partnerships. Tunisia was aligning with the most avant-gardist countries in the realm of professional training (Masson, 2016). The laws symbolized the government’s strategy to make TVET one of the driving forces to boost Tunisia’s economy (Triki, 2012).

The law on the orientation of professional training (“loi d’orientation de la formation professionnelle du 17 février 1993”) established the National Council for professional training and employment.
(articles 7 and 8) which includes committees for professional training coordination and for professional integration. The law also defined the three ways initial professional training may be delivered in Tunisia, namely through:

- a work-study coop program (“alternance”),
- an apprenticeship (“apprentissage”) or
- full time in-school training which also had to include phases in actual work environments.\(^2\)

The law also set the regulatory framework for the private provision of technical training (articles 49-56) stipulating that all individuals or firms have the right to provide training services if they have been granted a license from the Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment (MVTE) who holds the ultimate responsibility for ensuring training quality. Yet, at the same time, two accompanying laws, also promulgated in 1993, created the public institutions in charge of delivering TVET, under the oversight of the MVTE:

1. **Agence Tunisienne de la Formation Professionnelle** (ATFP): Tunisian Agency for Professional Training which oversees the country’s public training centers;
2. **Centre National De Formation De Formateurs et de l’Ingénierie de Formation** (CENAFFIF): the national center for curriculum development and training of the trainers;
3. **Centre National de Formation Continue et de Promotion Professionnelle** (CNFCPP): the national agency is in charge of the continuous training portfolio.

The ANETI, the national agency for employment (then called ATE), was also created in 1993 (ANETI, 2017). While it does not train directly it offers services to graduates of the TVET system and to other workers. It can encourage job seekers to enroll in vocational training programs.

The provisions of the 1993 law were put in effect mainly through the subsequent Mise à Niveau de la Formation Professionnelle et de l’Emploi (MANFORME) program initiated in 1996 which, by putting the satisfaction of skills demand emanating from the economy as the central strategic objective, represented a radical departure from previous approaches to professional training that were largely based on a supply side logic (i.e. training on the basis of what the system is capable off).\(^3\) According to one of the program’s main architects, Mr. Hedi Triki of the MVTE, the only way to manage the TVET system effectively, is to create an alignment between the evolution of the skills needs of enterprises on the one hand, and the supply of training, on the other. To achieve this alignment, the system has to be steered to meet the needs of the economy (Triki, 2012). Therefore, at the heart of the MANFORM program’ was the building of partnerships with the private sector to reach the four main objectives:

1. Strengthening the participation of productive sectors to help determine the demand for skills

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\(^3\) This program was initiated as part of the agreement between Tunisia and the EU to establish a partnership to create a Free Trade Zone.
2. Improving the quality, effectiveness, adaptability and sizing of training supply from public and private institutions so that they can meet the demand for skills of enterprises (one of the main results sought was to establish a management system for centers so that they would have more autonomy and effectiveness)

3. Implementing a quality management system within the centers

4. Improving labor market information and implementing active management mechanisms. (Chelbi & Ficatier, 2010)

In 1996, the Ministry, through the MANFORME program, began implementing the skills approach (“approche par compétences”) (Amyot & Hamel, 2006). It signed 19 partnerships agreements with all sectorial trade associations/federations to establish the needs of each sector, and co-develop the overall training structure and setup update mechanisms. In return for the Ministry committing to developing training curriculum designed to meet the needs identified, partner trade associations were to mobilize their members to develop curriculum and offer apprenticeships and internships (Triki, 2012, p. 265). Trade associations and their members were also to be directly involved in the management of the centers with public-private councils to be created in each training center. Management boards of each public training center were to have a business leader as chair (Triki, 2012, p. 265). Unfortunately, as we will see in the next section this level of private sector involvement and representation has failed to become a reality in any of the training centers.

According to Masson (2016), the reforms of the 1990s, coupled with the significant investment throughout that decade and the early 2000s, through the MANFORME program and other initiatives (Tunisia invested 7.1% of GDP on education in 2000, the highest level of all Mediterranean countries), delivered results in terms of program renovations, improved levels of teacher/student rations and modernization of pedagogical methods.

Professional training benefitted through the adoption of the skills approach, better trainer education (thanks to the CENAFFIF), a national push towards the principles of quality management and, importantly, more apprenticeships thanks to the focus on developing partnerships with firms. In terms of enrollment, the number of graduates coming out of the TVET system went from 13,000 in 2001 to 20,000 in 2006. However, the number of graduates of the higher education system grew much faster, going from 15,000 to 60,000 in the same period.

The 2008 Reform

The legal framework of TVET was again adjusted with the implementation of the February 11, 2008 law which sought to further anchor the TVET system (Chelbi & Ficatier, 2010) within the national economic development strategy. In its article 1, the law redefines professional training as an instrument to “equip the economic enterprise with the tools to improve its productivity and competitiveness.” The law’s main ambition was to further strengthen collaboration between the private sector and the TVET sector. The partnership was to become the main force to drive quality and sustainability of training.

The 2008 cycle of reform also sought to implement clear pathways from general education to professional training (and vice versa) by harmonizing the different education and training curricula offered in Tunisia (Masson, 2016). It was hoped that more cohesion throughout the educational system, enabling movement between technical and general education, would improve the attractiveness of professional training. The law created the current 3 levels (“cycles”) of technical education: Certificat d’Aptitude Technique (CAP, Technical Ability Certificate), Brevet de Technicien Professionnel (BTP, Technician Certificate), Brevet de Technicien Supérieur (BTS, Advanced Technician Certificate).

Together, the 3 paths form the Initial Training (“formation initiale”), which is contrasted with Continuous Training (“formation continue”). Today, a CAP or 2 years of Lycée (high school) are needed to access the BTP cycle. However, the professional baccalaureate was never implemented. The General baccalaureate obtained at graduation from the general Lycée, or the BTP (under certain conditions) are required to enroll in the BTS program. A BTS holder can now access university although integration modalities vary (ETF, 2014) The reform envisaged that both BTP and CAP holders may apply to integrate a Lycée and to pass a “Professional Baccalaureate”. However, the professional baccalaureate which would facilitate going from high school to BTS and was included in the 2008 law has yet to be implemented.

For trainees with insufficient schooling to access the CAP cycle (9 years of schooling required – 2 cycle), the new law created the Certificat de Compétences, a 6 months minimum training program either dual/alternating or apprenticeship based. Minimum requirements vary according to the specialty and training center.

These new pathways, together with more in-firm training (apprenticeship and work-study) were intended to boost the attractiveness of TVET education and thus slow down the growth in enrollment in higher education which by 2009 had become the main channel for unemployment (22% of the labor force with a higher education degree was unemployed in 2009). Lately, the reforms seem to have had some effect as the number of university graduates has levelled out with 61,296 graduates in 2014 (69% of total graduations), whereas the number of graduates from the...
TVET system continues to increase reaching 27,975 (31%) (Institut Arabe des Chefs d'Entreprise, 2016) (Observatoire National de l’Emploi et des Qualifications, 2016).

Unfortunately, the 2011 revolution and the economic crisis that ensued led to significantly higher unemployment also for the graduates of the TVET sector. In 2012, it reached 30% for workers with a TVET degree versus 33% for higher education (Masson, 2016). Figure 3 shows the composition of the youth labor (stocks) and the annual transitions of youth through the different cycles of Tunisia’s education system.

![Education System Diagram](image)

Figure 3: Tunisia Youth Labor Supply: Education Stocks and Flows 2016 (ages 15-29) (Institut National de la Statistique, 2014) (ONEQ, 2016)
Today: the 2013 Reform: putting monitoring, evaluation and the measurement of performance at the center of reform implementation

The international economic crisis which began in 2008 revealed the deep-rooted problems of the TVET system being incapable of effectively contributing to help the Tunisian economy face rapidly evolving challenges which continuously affect the skills needs of enterprises.

The ongoing reform process, instigated in 2012, is motivated by the economic crisis of which soaring unemployment has been the most drastic consequence, and the realization that the system must be a transformative force for the Tunisian economy helping it to create value by becoming less informal, more interlinked with the international economy, more capable of promoting firm growth, driving innovation and creating jobs, especially higher quality jobs.

A national conference in November 2012 on the reform of the national TVET system was held as a broad and inclusive exercise in public and private dialogue which paved the way for the 2014-2018 reform document of the TVET system (MVTE, 2013). It asked participants for a rethink of how TVET is to be positioned within the national human resources development strategy, to ensure better support for the driving forces of the Tunisian economy, through a governance system structured around partnerships and decentralization to the regions of Tunisia (the push for decentralization through the restructuring of regional and municipal entities is a central aspect of the 2014 constitution).

The 2012 Conference identified three main categories of shortcomings (La Revue de l'Entreprise, 2016):

1. **Absence of a common global vision of human resources development** that clearly and accurately defines the role and objectives of vocational training and its place within the system.
2. **The low responsiveness of the national vocational training system** and its low capacity to adapt to the changing and growing needs of businesses, individuals, the regions and society.

3. **The steering and management of the national vocational training system does not allow for a governance model that guarantees fulfilling the economic and social needs** at the national and regional levels.

These shortcomings, since they all relate to the inability of the TVET system to meet the needs of the labor market, are essentially the same as the ones which motivated the 1993 and 2008 reforms. Today, both the high-level civil servants of the Ministry and of the ATFP implicated in the reform, and the training center managers and trainers we talked to, recognize that previous initiatives have not succeeded in creating the requisite systemic changes. What’s more they appear in agreement as to the needs of the TVET system: it is primarily because of insufficient levels of execution that these reforms have fallen short of producing significant results, rather than because of a misguided strategy. The challenges of the TVET system must now be tackled with urgency, but how will the approach to implementation change this time around?

In order to bridge this gap between desired outcomes and actual impact, the MVTE, through a highly participatory dialogue involving its partners including the main institutions representing business, has sought to innovate by developing **14 projects to implement the reform**, the idea being that once all completed, the TVET system will be profoundly transformed, fit for purpose and able to continuously evolve (MVTE, 2016, p. 11). Tangible but ambitious targets for the reforms and related projects have been set: by the end of the reform cycle (2018), 30% of youth should be enrolled in TVET training. The rate of integration to the labor market of trainees 6 months after graduating is to improve by 5% each year. The dropout rate in training programs is to fall from 35% to 15% or less by the end of 2018 (MVTE, 2013)

**Project 12: Implementation of a performance evaluation system for the TVET system**

The 14 projects, listed in Annex 2, are arranged according to 4 specific objectives and developed using result based management techniques, arguing for efficiency and effectiveness throughout the system and improved governance (Strategic objective 2: “effectiveness and efficiency throughout the training process is guaranteed”, Strategic objective 3: “Governance of the system meeting the needs of individuals, forms, society and the region in harmony with the social compact is implemented”). For these to be realized, continuous monitoring and evaluation mechanisms need to be implemented and made the cornerstone of the system. It is therefore positive that two of the 14 projects focus specifically on “creating an integrated monitoring system for the identification of needs” (project 4) and on implementing a performance evaluation system for the TVET system (project 12) (MVTE, 2016). These projects are about determining which indicators will allow for the continuous monitoring of the system in terms of efficiency, i.e. the optimization of the processes, and effectiveness, the ability of the system to reach the desired outcomes which in this case means meeting the needs “of individuals, firms, the region and society as a whole.” (MVTE, 2016)

Implementation of the 14 projects started in 2016, but as of mid-2017 progress has been timid, raising doubts that the ambitious targets depicted above will be met by the end of 2018. In his
introduction to the implementation of the reform document explaining the 14 projects, the Minister concurs that success of the current reform exercise largely depends on the capacity of the system to accompany change by equipping it with the necessary tools (MVTE, 2016, p. 4). The most important tools, the ones that appear to be missing from previous reform efforts, are the performance indicators of Project 12.

That is not to say that previous attempts to implement performance measurements were nonexistent. At the heart of the MANFORME program was the establishment of quality monitoring systems, center management systems and a labor market information system. However, the implementation of these initiatives was only done at the margins (only some centers are using the tools), which undermines the whole system since optimization relies on systemic measurements - the ATFP complaining that centers were not delivering the numbers to ensure oversight. In the centers dedicated personnel were sometimes stationed to follow students after graduation, and to track their outcomes: but these staff recognize that the task is complex and that they fail to get a real picture of the labor market outcomes of the trainees. Better efficiency must start with systematic measurement of costs and elimination of duplication within public provision and overlap with private provision.

Toolbox 1, below, presents global best practices and initiatives to establish and field test TVET performance indicators (It is hoped that these will contribute to the work of the project 12 team).

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**Toolbox 1: Performance Indicators for TVET: international Trends and Standards**

Performance indicators can be conceptualized as “concise, policy-relevant measures which allow monitoring of the health of the system.” (Wyatt, 2004) There is increasing international interest in the development and use of quality monitoring and evaluation tools and indicators for TVET that can inform policy making. Moreover, there is increasing attention to adopting more consistent standards that would enable greater rigor in international benchmarking and comparisons. However, as the Inter-Agency TVET Working Group (comprising major multilateral and regional TVET funders) notes,

> “…there are several longstanding problems related to monitoring and evaluating TVET. These include, among others, the fragmented provision of TVET in many countries, the various methodological challenges related to definition of TVET programmes and generation of relevant indicators and the absence of adequate mechanisms to collect, process and aggregate data available.” (Inter-Agency Working Group on TVET, 2012)

As a result, data availability and quality continue to be particularly problematic for TVET. For performance assessment purposes, it is important to take into account an entire set of interrelated

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indicators, rather than focusing on one or a few indicators in isolation. Most performance indicator systems include four levels reflecting different aspects of organizational functioning:

Table 3: Types of Performance Indicators for TVET Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator Type and Purpose</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Input indicators</strong> measure the resources available</td>
<td>Staffing numbers, the value of monetary investments made in education, subsidies paid, capital works programs, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Workflow or process indicators</strong> measure the amount of work undertaken</td>
<td>Number of students, number of courses, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output indicators</strong> measure system outputs</td>
<td>Number of course or system graduates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome indicators</strong> measure results</td>
<td>Ability to gain employment or further training, increased wages, or ability to accumulate further qualifications leading to higher level credentials.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Inter-Agency Working Group on TVET defines five broad policy areas for TVET, within which indicators can be thematically grouped. Those are:

Table 4: Policy Areas for TVET Performance Measurement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Area</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Governance Context</td>
<td>Extent to which the system is characterized by participation, transparency and accountability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Finance</td>
<td>Availability of resources, prioritization (regarding to relevance, equity and quality); and capacity of the system to ensure that resources are equitably and efficiently allocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Access and participation</td>
<td>Extent to which the system promotes equity and inclusion. Implications of expanding learning opportunities for excluded groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Quality</td>
<td>Effectiveness of teaching and learning process, quality of facilities and equipment, capacity of the system to innovate, quality assurance, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Relevance</td>
<td>Extent to which TVET is responsive to labor market needs and requirements. Mechanisms and available capacity to understand transition from school, to capture labor market signals, and to anticipate emerging skills needs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The IAG-TVET includes the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Bank (WB). Regionally-based members include the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Commission (EC), the
European Training Foundation (ETF), the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB).

(Inter-Agency Working Group on TVET, July 2016)

IAG-TVET Working Group members agreed on a list of indicators in 2012, to be field tested by members. The indicators are grouped into four areas (following the above categories, with the exception of Governance Context, for which indicators are not proposed). Below is a summary of indicators for each of the four domains. Detailed descriptions of each are provided in the 2014 IAG-TVET report on “Proposed Indicators for Assessing Technical and Vocational Education and Training,” 2012. As noted with asterisks, data are often or usually not available for several the recommended indicators.

### IAG-TVET Working Group Agreed Performance Indicators for TVET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Indicator Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Finance</td>
<td>1.1 Spending in formal TVET</td>
<td>Input</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 Total TVET spending by student*</td>
<td>Workflow/Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3 Share of companies providing apprenticeship and other types of training (by size of the company)***</td>
<td>Workflow/Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.4 Share of apprenticeship and other types of training spending in labor cost (by size of the company)***</td>
<td>Workflow/Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Access and participation</td>
<td>2.1 Enrollment in vocational education as a percentage of total enrollment in the formal education system.</td>
<td>Workflow/Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2. Enrollment by type of TVET program.</td>
<td>Workflow/Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.3 Work-based learning participation rate**</td>
<td>Workflow/Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.4 Equity**</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.5 Unsatisfied demand for TVET**</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.6 Typology of Admission Policies to formal school-based TVET*</td>
<td>Workflow/Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.7 Transition paths from upper secondary TVET education*</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Quality</td>
<td>3.1 Student/teacher ratio in formal TVET and in general programs</td>
<td>Workflow/Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2 Completion rate in TVET programs and in general programs</td>
<td>Output</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3. Share of apprentices completing registered programs as a percentage of all apprentices starting registered programs

#### Output

### 4. Share of qualified teachers in TVET and in general program

#### Workflow/Process

### 5. Relevance of quality assurance systems for TVET providers

#### Input

### 6. Investment in training of teachers and trainers

#### Outcome

### 7. Utilisation of acquired skills at the workplace

#### Workflow/Process

### 8. Share of ICT training activities in TVET

#### Outcome

### 9. Satisfaction of employers with TVET graduates

#### Outcome

### 4. Relevance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Employment to population ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Employment status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Employment by economic sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Employment by occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Literacy rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Informal employment rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>Time-related unemployment rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>Working poverty rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>Average real earnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>Number of vacant jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>Net job creation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>Youth outside labor force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>Discouraged worker</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Output

* Indicators for which data are often not available.

** Indicators for which data are usually not available.

Given the extent of international efforts underway to test these indicators, Tunisia may wish to adopt a selection of these indicators in accordance with national priorities and in light of factors such as data availability.
availability and quality. Moreover, Tunisia’s international or regional development partners that are members of the IAG-TVET Working Group may be able to provide updates and results from the field-testing process in other countries. Tunisia may also wish to develop a few custom indicators based on specific policy priorities or research questions.

The Tunisian TVET System Today: a Sophisticated, Mostly Public, Bureaucracy

System actors and governance
The current TVET system, as we have seen, was shaped by the 1993 reform creating its major players (ATFP, CENAFFIF, ANETI, CNFCPP). Today, the MVTE, the ministry in charge of TVET in Tunisia, defines the strategic agenda for professional training, and supervises these operational agencies plus the Labor Market Observatory (ONEQ) which is responsible for providing policy makers, employers, employees, students with labor market information to help decision making.

Four other ministerial departments (Tourism, Agriculture, Defense and Health) share with MVTE the responsibility for overseeing professional training in their respective sectors and have developed their own training centers.

The system is managed by the Ministry and the ATFP who controls all its 137 centers. Decision making is highly centralized and limited to the upper management of these 2 institutions. This is despite efforts to provide more autonomy to the centers through the implementation of management and monitoring and evaluation tools (MVTE, 2013)

Agence Tunisienne de la Formation Professionnelle (ATFP)

In Tunisia, the public sector educates almost 89% of the new workers that hold a TVET diploma. More than 82% of these new arrivals on the labor market have gotten their TVET degree by passing through one of ATFP 137 training centers located across Tunisia. The ATFP, with almost 7’000 staff, trains on 240 specialties thanks to 1’713 trainers and 2’319 training advisors (ONEQ, 2016). Its specialized training centers offer sector-oriented training e.g. construction, electronics, mechanics, tourism, and textiles. Some specialize in apprenticeship, young rural women or the crafts (World Bank, 2014).

The ATFP can be said to enjoy a quasi-monopoly on the initial training i.e. the training that leads to CAP, BTP and BTS diplomas (except in the sectors where other ministries have their own centers). Thus, the ATFP is the main focus of any efforts to reform the TVET system. Arguably, in the minds of policy maker “TVET” has come to be embodied by the ATFP, and the roles of other institutions (and their potentials) is at continuous risk of fading in the background.

Key characteristics about the ATFP’s 137 training centers include:

- A Center Director oversees each center

They are usually focused on 1-2 sectors (construction, textile and garments, mechanics, etc.) with a heavy focus on industry

- An average of 553 trainees enrolled in each center with 167 graduates per year
- An average of 12.3 trainers and 16.7 training and orientation advisors per center. For every 100 trainees, there are 5.36 educators (ONEQ, 2016)
- There are facilities for in-residence trainees (cafeteria and dormitories)
- The center administration usually comprises a staff in charge of relations with firms (training, apprenticeships and job placement) and in charge of monitoring trainees after they graduate (These can be 1 or 2 staff) (ATFP, ATFP Medenine workshop minutes, 2017) (ATFP Megrine workshop minutes, 2017)

The quality of the centers, in terms of trainer performance, trainer-educator ratios, equipment, living quarters and opportunities for apprenticeships can vary greatly according to location. This is especially because coastal urban areas with more industries and business offer better options for practical training and the centers, as firms are more directly involved, tend to be better equipped, perhaps also attracting the best trainers.

**Tourism, Agriculture, Defense and Health sectors**

The ATFP oversees training for all sectors of the economy except for:

1. **Tourism**: the Office National du Tourisme Tunisien (ONTT) supervises public provision of training for the tourism industry (8 centers)
2. **Agriculture**: the Ministry of Agriculture oversees the “Agence de Vulgarisation et de formation Agricole” (39 centers). While it delivered 649 diplomas for initial training trainees in 2014, the AVFA is especially focused on delivering Continuous education: in 2014, 26’387 people received agriculture-related training for a total of 110’869 days of training dispensed.
3. **Defense**: The Ministry of Defense oversees training for the defense sector (18 training centers)
4. **Health**: The Ministry of Health oversees TVET for the health sector.

For these 4 sectors, the MVTE provides shared pedagogical oversight together with the line ministries (see graphical system representation presented previously in Figure 4).

**Table 5: Distribution of Trainees (Initial Training, Not Continuous) in the TVET System in 2014 (ONEQ, 2016)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
<th>Student population</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public TVET institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency Tunisienne de la Formation Professionnelle</td>
<td>50,123</td>
<td>80,246</td>
<td>24,785</td>
<td>88.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agence de Vulgarisation et de Formation Agricole</td>
<td>47,546</td>
<td>76,881</td>
<td>23,198</td>
<td>82.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministère de la Défense Nationale</td>
<td>1,298</td>
<td>1,368</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6: Public TVET Training Center Staff (ONEQ, 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Trainers</th>
<th>Training advisors</th>
<th>Admin</th>
<th>Career advisors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agence Tunisienne de la Formation Professionnelle</td>
<td>1,713</td>
<td>2,281</td>
<td>2,946</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agence de Vulgarisation et de Formation Agricole</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministère de la Défense Nationale</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office National du Tourisme Tunisien</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministère de la Santé Publique</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,393</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,410</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,134</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7: Distribution of Trainees per Sector in the Public TVET Training Centers (ONEQ, 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electricity and electronics</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and public works</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile and garments</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and maintenance of motor vehicles</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanics and metal works</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration, services and IT</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism and hotel</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various service and industry</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food processing industry</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicrafts</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing and aquaculture</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoes and leather</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Centre National de Formation Continue et de Promotion Professionnelle (CNFCPP)**

The CNFCPP is the national agency in charge of overseeing the continuous training portfolio. It is mandated to encourage continuous job training (i) by offering firms technical expertise to identify
their training needs, implement their training plans and help evaluate their impact, and (ii) by offering firms financial support to implement training activities for their employees. Together with the Ministry of Finance, it administers the direct income derived from the “professional training tax” that is levied on firms in Tunisia and authorizes tax credits (see section 3.2) (CNFCPP, 2017)

In 2016, the center counted approximately 100,000 continuous training activities within Tunisian firms (1 person receiving a day’s training counts as 1 activity). Technical support is provided through a network of 35 offices across Tunisia. The CNFCPP plans to create a corpus of training councilors.

The firms typically choose their own service providers for continuous training. They can use service of private training firms or even contract public institutions (usually an ATPF training center). Firms with more than 10 employees need by law to designate a training counsellor within its staff.

The CNFCPP also offers continuous education (either evening classes and distance learning) for workers wishing to strengthen their skills and acquire a recognized diploma. This is done through partnerships with higher education institutions, the Advanced Promotion of Labor Institutes - “Instituts de Promotion Supérieur du Travail and their distance vocational training centers « Ecole Ouverte des Travailleurs » (CNFCPP, 2017)

**Agence Nationale pour l’emploi et le Travail Indépendant (ANETI)**

The National Agency for Employment and Independent Work (ANETI) also falls under the MVTE and has 91 employment offices distributed over Tunisia’s 24 governorates (World Bank, 2014). It oversees employment programs and services: providing guidance for jobseekers and information on job opportunities, disbursing financial support, collecting vacancies and matching between employers and jobseekers. It also implements Active Labor Market Programs (ALMP) and programs to support entrepreneurship. For instance, in 2016, ANETI launched FORSATI a vast program which aims to support 120’000 job seekers by the end of 2017 with soft skills training, and one-on-one job search and entrepreneurship support (ANETI, 2017)

New graduates from the TVET and higher educational systems register with ANETI in order to benefit from job matching activities, financial support and such employment programs aiming to prepare job seekers for the job market and place them in employment through a combination of on-the-job training, employer incentives, subsidized social security coverage, and small monthly stipends. ANETI is therefore an important stakeholder to monitor how new trainees fare on the labor market, namely in comparison with higher education graduates, and according to sectors and geographic location.

**Observatoire National des Emplois et des Qualifications (ONEQ)**

The Labor Market Observatory (Observatoire National des Emplois et des Qualifications) was created in 1997 and is a General Directorate of the MVTE. It is the main component of Tunisia’s Labor Market Information System (LMIS) which it aims to coordinate and promote. It publishes reports on employment and qualifications. It is for instance tasked to collect information on the skills needs of firms. Despite the ambitions, the ONEQ lacks the resources to create timely reports. Its small budget of 130,000 Dinar per year (excluding staff costs) makes it very difficult, according to its Director Mr. Fakher Zaibi, to make nation-wide surveys. One of its most promising projects is the development of
a web-based LMIS which will connect the databases of ANETI, ONEQ, ATFP, Social Security Agency to provide a real-time dashboard on important labor market data. However, it struggles because of lack of resources to implement it (see section 3 for more information). (ONEQ, 2017)

Centre National de Formation de Formatteurs et d’Ingénierie de Formation (CENAFFIF)

The CENAFFIF is the agency of MTVE in charge of training the trainers, namely the initial training for new ATFP trainers, developing training curriculum and methodologies, and helping the training centers implement the latter. It is therefore a cornerstone of the TVET system, especially since the adoption of the “Skills approach” in 1996 which signifies that training must be based on the skills need of firms. CENAFFIF, when it was created, worked intensely with various trade chambers and UTICA to develop training based on needs assessment. However, the collaboration with these private sector associations has since weakened (CENAFFIF, 2017).

Since it was created in 1993, CENAFFIF has developed nearly 500 training programs. On average, it trains 1,600 trainers per year (the average length of a training is 2 weeks) although this number includes several training activities for trainers of francophone Sub Saharan Africa. CENAFFIF regrets that new trainers generally lack any significant private sector experience, and often come directly from university. The reason invoked is the relatively low salaries proposed to trainers which fail to attract more experimented staff. Another key characteristic of the training they develop is that it is national not specific to any region which poses the question of the levels of adaptability of the trainings (CENAFFIF, 2017).

The private sector

While the MVTE is supposed to control the quality of training offered by private training institutions, it offers surprisingly little information on private education performance even though its main survey counts 1,025 private entities offering TVET training services contra the 196 public centers (ONEQ, 2016, p. 18). One distinction the MVTE does make is that out of these 1,025 centers, only 180 deliver state accredited initial training (ie. CC, CAP, BTP, BTS).

The tax credit financing mechanism (see below) for continuous education has encouraged the development of private training consulting firms that offer training services for employers. This would explain why the majority of private training firms tend to be small. According to ONEQ (2016), the vast majority of trainings delivered by the private sector are in the services sector.

Financing the TVET System

There are three major financing mechanisms in place to fund vocational training in Tunisia (Chelbi & Ficatier, 2010, p. 11). The first one concerns the initial training, the second concerns continuous professional training and the third is private investments in professional training. The three mechanisms are interconnected as the professional training tax paid by larger firm is meant to spur private investment in training while, in part, helping finance initial and continuous training.
Table 8: Annual Public Vocational Training Budget for 2017 (MTVE, 2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TND</th>
<th>USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATFP</td>
<td>268,157,000</td>
<td>111,732,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENAFFIF</td>
<td>8,759,000</td>
<td>3,649,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNFCPP</td>
<td>15,166,000</td>
<td>6,319,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>292,082,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>121,700,833</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Professional training tax and tax credit

The Tunisian government has devised an elaborate funding mechanism to support initial and continuous vocational training and to provide incentives for firms to invest in training by taxing firms who do not train their employees: Tunisian firms must to pay a “tax professionnelle” (professional training tax which tax is either 2% of total salaries paid (“masse salariale”) or 1% for manufacturing firms and several firms are exempt (such as export only firms, agricultural firms, and smaller firms).

Firms can get up to 60% of the taxes they paid back if they invest (and can prove that they have spent it) in continuous training activities. In 2016, 29 Million Dinar were approved for training through this “credit impôts” (tax credit) mechanism (CNFCPP, CNFCPP Meeting minutes, 2017). If the firm has paid 100’000 Dinar for professional tax for the year 2016, it can spend up to 60’000 in 2017 on training activities and deduct that amount on the tax dues for 2017.

According to the Director of the CNFCPP (2017), all firms that have paid a substantial amount of professional tax seek to take advantage of the mechanism since it can cover expenses relating to initial training (if the firms are involved in apprenticeships, work-study programs or internships), continuous training for staff or internal training center, training consultancies and even the salary of trainers (up to 3 years).

However, it is mostly larger firms in the banking, transport, manufacturing sectors that can benefit from the tax credit scheme, since they have paid the tax in the first place. In 2014, 1’758 firms benefitted from the tax credit to finance their activities.

Droits de tirage

For smaller firms, the droits de tirage is mechanism whereby they can access funding to support training. The droits de tirage enable private firms to access direct state financing for training activities for their employees in return for their efforts in supporting initial training by offering apprenticeships, work-study program and internships opportunities (CNFCPP, 2017). This line of financing is open to the many firms who pay no or little professional tax, or have used up their tax credit for the year, or that are exempt from the tax entirely (such as export-only firms). The maximum amount of financing the firm can receive in one year is equal to the cost of initial training delivered the year prior. According to the Director of CNFCPP, the amounts disbursed through droits de tirage was approximately 4 Million Dinar in 2016. 1’400 firms requested taking part in 2016, in the droits de tirage scheme. Trainings can be difficult to set up particularly for small firms. The
majority therefore apply for *droits de tirage* financing by organizing themselves into cooperatives. This is common with craftsmen, for example (CNFCPP, 2017).
III. Findings

Is the System Demand Driven? Four Pillars of a Responsive TVET System

Our discussion of findings is based on the various meetings, workshops and site visits held and various desk reviews, including an in-depth examination of Tunisia’s ongoing reform agenda. The reform correctly focusses on both effectiveness (doing the right things) and efficiency (doing things right). In the following sections, we choose to focus on the effectiveness question rather than looking at efficiency because it is entirely possible and often easy to do the “wrong” things with high degrees of efficiency. During our evaluation, our team consistently sought to better understand if the main actors in the system are doing the right things (i.e. are they being effective?).

We used the 10 Success Factors discussed in the Methodology Section for assessing if the right things are being done.7 Positively, Tunisia’s reform objectives are aligned with these success factors, five of which are of particular priority:

- guiding national social and economic vision
- leadership, transparency and accountability
- demand driven skills
- continuous improvement
- financial sustainability

We noted this in in section 2, namely that the vision for the development of the TVET system largely ticks all the right boxes, and that stakeholders all agree that a demand-responsive system of skills training is what is needed. The challenge remains, as for previous reforms, to ensure an effective implementation of these intents. This is, as we have argued, where previous reforms have fallen far short. Our findings and subsequent recommendations are crafted to address this implementation gap: how can Tunisia improve its system so it becomes demand-driven and responsive?

We argue that the reform implementation effort should focus on strengthening four pillars of the system i.e. Strategy, Governance, Labor Market Information and the Portability of Skills (see Figure 5) and improving their interplay, reflecting the complex, adaptive and interdependent nature of workforce development systems. Such targeted interventions are necessary for the implementation process to become a virtuous cycle strengthening the system’s capacity to respond and adapt to labor market needs.

7 These success factors were field-tested in 20 countries and used as examples of best practice in how countries prepare their workforce. They have also been used in numerous international benchmarking studies. The ten success factors initially became the basis for USAID’s Compass for Workforce Development, a Toolkit for Policymakers, Donors, Governments, NGOs and Practitioners, published in 1998) and influenced a number of international donors who used these for training purposes.
A workforce development strategy needs to be calibrated to those economic sectors where there is current and anticipated future growth. Otherwise, the systems might produce trainees with skills for which there is little demand spurring unemployment and curtailing the growth of firms. Awareness of this strategy by system actors, such as the center managers and trainers and the designers of curriculum, is an obvious prerequisite for implementation. If the economic and regional priorities have been clearly defined, training centers should be able to respond with training programs to meet those priorities at local level. The ability to align, arrange organizations and empower system actors (managerial, resource-wise) according to this strategy is what we refer to as system governance, in other words the architecture needed for the implementation effort to be rolled out.

To become responsive to labor market needs, these actors, especially those at local level - the ones with the proximity to current and potential employers - need capacity to continuously capture, analyze, formulate, disseminate the changing needs that are occurring on the labor market to the rest of the system actors who will collectively instigate the required adjustments to the system. This process of understanding the needs and sharing this analysis with other central actors is why labor market information is so fundamental to the reform process.

Labor market information has to be up to date to reflect reality and must be accessible to the system actors who should be able to rely on it to take the right decisions that will support the strategy: trainees will seek to develop skills that are in demand, centers will adjust their training offerings to meet skills needs, firms will see the value in investing in, private service-providers will seize opportunities to offer trainings where there is unmet demand, the TVET apex body will be able to craft policies to improve the industry’s competitiveness further. Yet no matter how good labor market information is, how perfectly aligned the strategy or how well trimmed the governance structure is, if the trained workers have skills that are too rigid, that cannot easily be transferred to another firm, sector or region, continuous adjustments and improvement of the skills distribution, i.e. responsiveness of labor market will not be achievable. This is why, the system needs to integrate
the production of skills that are portable as a guiding principle of all training deliveries, which should infuse all aspects of the system.

Reflecting the four pillars, this section is divided into four interlinked sub-sections. We will follow this structure in outlining shortcomings (which Tunisia is far from alone in facing), at the level of:

1. Strategy, the TVET system is not sufficiently aligned with economic development priorities, especially at regional level;
2. Governance, the TVET System is overly centralized and inflexible
3. Labor Market Information, decision makers, trainers, employers, trainees are impaired by lack of information about the supply and quality of TVET.
4. Skills formation, portability for now and the future is insufficient

But we will also show that there is significant opportunity within the current reform process to strengthen these four pillars and turn Tunisia’s TVET system into an innovative driver of economic growth. These recommendations are inserted in each subsection.

**Strategy: Tunisia’s TVET System is Insufficiently Aligned with the Economic Vision for the Country and its Regions**

Tunisia’s reform guidance emphasizes the need for a national vision for economic and social development and its relationship to a national human resource development vision and strategy: “consensus around an articulated single global vision that ensures consistency across the various education systems, including higher education and vocational training...” (MVTE, 2013, p. 17). Our review of best practice indicates that successful TVET strategies should, indeed, be an expression of an economic growth and development strategy for a region or country. Calibration of the workforce development strategy to those economic sectors where there is current and anticipated future growth is key. In Singapore, for example, the economic growth and development strategy is designed around being one of the world’s most sustainable green cities. Public resources, financing of university research and innovation, public education, and the Singapore Skills Development Fund are organized to supply a workforce with the skills required for achieving this strategy. Ireland’s Skills for 2025 document states:

> “our education and training system will deliver more flexible, innovative and interdisciplinary skills provision. Returns on public investment in education and training will be maximized through more active employer engagement, clear prioritization of initiatives based on available resources and their regular evaluation for impact and efficiency. ...This will involve learners, employers and educators, as well as State Departments and agencies. Progress towards it will involve systematic evaluation of learning outcomes and

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8. An economic development strategy uses a number of tools to identify opportunities for economic growth and development. For a list of labor market assessment tools, refer to Workforce Connections at [http://www.wfconnections.org/tags/lma_tool](http://www.wfconnections.org/tags/lma_tool)
active participation of all. Employers cannot source more relevant skills without responsive education and training providers nor without students pursuing the right education.”

Germany’s economic vision is to be an economy that generates an abundant supply of good jobs by producing high value-adding technology based products to global markets. Recognizing that these products must fall into a globally competitive price range, the country’s employers invest heavily in skills development so as to produce and maintain an abundant supply of highly skilled labor at a predictable cost.

We find that the current reform process of the TVET system is insufficiently calibrated to the economic development priorities of Tunisia and its regions. To begin with, during our discussions in the workshops with ATFP (Tunis, Kasserine, Medenine) and with multiple TVET system stakeholders including leading employers (such as Sartex, Unimed and Sunguard) we found little evidence that the key stakeholders, employers, students, faculty, program managers and policymakers, shared a common understanding of the Government of Tunisia’s economic priorities or the priorities of their region. If the implementers of the strategy are not aware of the priorities, the strategy cannot succeed. Furthermore, the reform documents speak only broadly about the needs of firms, regions and society but does not mention what specific industries should be targeted, and in which regions in a way that knits together TVET with economic development on a regional basis.

We also found that several key economic ministerial departments, such as those in charge of economic development, trade and investment (finance, economy, trade, industry, tourism) were only marginally involved in the reform of the TVET system. An illustration is that these ministerial departments are not cited as partners to the reform document which may explain why precise economic development considerations, such as specific sectoral priorities, are largely absent from it.

In our discussion with regional directors and staff of the training centers, the prevalent thought was that Tunisia’s development plan is made at the level of the state and does not reflect the actual economic situation, especially in the regions.

Lastly, the ongoing reform rationale, coupled with the aspirations inherent in the 2014 constitution, is to emphasize how the labor market must be organized around the needs and aspirations of players at regional level. This requires that regions self-identify as such and are territorially organized by administrative entities with some degree of capacity to imagine and implement a region-specific vision. This national aspiration has not yet been accompanied by actions at regional-level. One of the main reason, the fact that what constitutes a region is not even clear, is examined in the next sub section since it is intricately linked to Tunisia’s Governance. Thus, there is a lack of organizational capacity to analyze regional level priorities and consequently of ability to formulate regional economic development priorities which are a prerequisite to strengthening regional labor markets.

Governance: a Supply-led and Overly Centralized System in which the Private Sector only Plays a Marginal Role

With respect to the organization and supervision of the TVET system, two major contradictions came to stand out during our investigations:
1. The Tunisian TVET system remains heavily centralized and monolithic despite the motivation, shared by the Ministry, the ATFP headquarters and its training centers to decentralize certain decision-making and managerial aspects to the locally based training centers.

2. Private training service providers and Public-Private partnerships for training remain peripheral to the system despite a stated motivation, in the law and in the reform, to stimulate private sector provision of TVET training and the fostering of innovative partnerships.

These two contradictions highlight two defining system characteristics which we explore in this section, namely the overly centralized character of the system and its inability to welcome and enable private sector training offering. These attributes need to be tackled to build a responsive, demand-driven system.

A persistently top down monopolistic system despite the call for regional autonomy

Tunisia’s TVET system is a sophisticated and centrally managed monolithic organization that, to a large extent, appears efficiently supervised. As seen in section 2, it is composed of numerous centers, mostly ATFP, equipped and staffed, both in terms of trainers and managerial staff that we found interested in reforming the system and implementing the directives and curriculum, largely decided at central level.

The current paradox is that senior ATFP managers insisted that they would like training centers to take on more autonomy. Yet, they say that they struggle to give more autonomy to them because the centers do not have the capacity to handle it, both financially and in terms of the human resources management of the centers. A chief complaint from headquarters is that the training centers are not able to define credible targets and budgets to support building an argumentation for their budget requests which need to be backed by credible data and projections. It is understandable that without good information, system leaders at the Ministry or ATFP feel they cannot allocate resources or change the system structure or centers’ geographic distributions. However, the centers are under ATFP control, shouldn’t the ATFP be held responsible for the such system wide organizational information infrastructure missing?

Conversely, the 8 training center directors we spoke to feel hampered at every turn by high levels of bureaucracy which crush any attempt to manage their centers with the degree of autonomy they are entitled to. In short, very little can be adjusted on their side without the prior consent of the ATFP CEO. A telling example is the difficulty experienced to acquire something as small as a new printer when one breaks down, and this even though the center has managed to raise own resources to pay for it. The process requires the center to get it repaired, by making request at central level which has to be approved by the Director General of ATFP. The cost of the repair is much higher than buying a new one, which could be covered by the centers own operational funds, and it takes a long time. Centers are not allowed to utilize income they have generated for a simple purchase or similar investments, if they haven’t reached the 80% annual target of 145,000 Dinar (figure from Mégrine training center). The investment budget is entirely controlled by ATFP HQ. If something as small as the procurement of a printer is a problem, more consequential investments in training equipment can arguably seem even less attainable. In Mégrine, the mechanical training workshop we visited
and whose ongoing enrollment appeared to be a full capacity, was not equipped with an injection-type engine, even though it has been standard in most cars for over two decades.

Such levels of centralized decision-making also carry staggeringly high opportunity costs as they place a big strain on the way resources are spent. The number of human resources involved in such simple procurement, for instance must be significant. An in-depth review of the processes using cost-benefit analysis could be a favorable pursuit to find more decentralized and responsive ways to allocate resources.

During the three workshops we conducted with multiple stakeholders in Tunis, Kasserine and Medenine, participating center managers and staff believe they know “what to do” in terms of adjusting the content of their educational offering, but the bureaucratic top down structure of the system, they feel, is largely what prevents them from implementing responsive solutions. Ideally, if the economic and regional priorities had been clearly defined, the centers should be able to respond with training programs to meet those priorities at local level. The centralized governance of the ATFP’s centers means that centers have no flexibility when it comes to implementing national curriculum, hampering the emergence of adaptive responses. Other complaints from the centers towards ATFP management included:

- “Too many promises and not enough action”
- Little information about the ATFP structure and lack of transparency about the decision-making process, for instance center managers complained they did not know enough, if anything, about the current reform process. “All stakeholders need to be familiar with the reform documents”.
- We have a “clear vision but murky objectives”
- “Urgent appeals for resources to listen to the needs of firms and defining new training programs,” the response to these appeals is far too slow
- “Need to develop of system-wide databases” (see Annex 3 for the three workshop reports).

The challenges of distribution of training centers across Tunisia’s regions

The prevalent thinking among our training center respondents is that regions removed from the big industrial centers of Tunis and Sfax do not benefit from the same levels of investment. This is not surprising as it is consistent with the economics literature which attributes the unbalanced distribution of economic opportunity in Tunisia to the Government’s historical reluctance to invest in the southern and western regions.

Now, the Tunisian government faces a conundrum when it comes to distributing investment in training centers across the country. On the one hand, it wishes to strengthen regional economies, correcting these unbalances to the extent possible which would mean encouraging firm growth across the country and thus upping investment in local level professional training. On the other hand, for professional training to be effective, and especially since Tunisia implements the “dual training model”, trainees need to have continuous access to opportunities to be placed in firms where they can develop skills and put theory into practice. However, these good opportunities are much more numerous in the more economically developed coastal cities which poses a significant logistical problem for the government and the training centers. One illustration of this difficult situation we found in Kasserine and Medenine centers where trainings of cold chain specialists
(“frigoriste”) were severely hampered by the fact that the firms offering apprenticeships were mostly located hundreds of kilometers away, in the Sfax region, curtailing, if not downright eliminating the possibilities of alternating between in-center and on-the-job training.

Such situations, which imply that it is a known given that a certain number of trainees, once they graduate will have to move to another region, demands responses to the question of how to better distribute centers according to the types of trainings on offer. This should be a top priority for the TVET system and one that is known to the authorities (and to a certain extent somewhat dealt with through the “sectoral centers” approach, each center being somewhat specialized) we spoke to but it is also a challenging undertaking. First, pursuing a more effective and efficient distribution necessarily means abandoning the ambition to offer largely similar, localized, training opportunities across a region, by consolidating centers, rearranging the map, shuffling trainees and equipment around. It is bound to be politically unpopular to close down training offerings in areas where there are no job prospects, when the inhabitants in non-coastal regions already feel like second-class citizens.

Furthermore, it pre-supposes that the Government and the regions know where they want to go in terms of regional economic development, and we have found that such local level strategies are non-existent as discussed in the previous section. In fact, as we will see in our discussion on labor market information, even with the ambition, the data and analysis to devise such regional strategic plans is insufficient.

Consolidating training centers, so that each is centered on one or a few core specialties with more in-depth technical expertise and equipment, and arranging them so that they are closest to the types of firms would be a step forward, but the likely consequence that the training with the highest employability would cater to the same regions who would end up with the lion share of specialized centers. Furthermore, such a vast reshuffle would imply that trainees and trainers are highly mobile, incentivized, informed and able to move to the training center of their preference. Yet the reality for many youths is different. Besides the lack of information on the opportunities which we will look into in the next section, youths enrolled in TVET centers come from more disadvantaged homes than their peers in higher learning, and are, as a result, less mobile having fewer means to sustain themselves outside of the realm of their families. Furthermore, the living conditions in the centers’ student housings are far from attractive and investments in quality of trainee life would have to be made to overcome this problem.9

Organizing such a reshuffle would be costly and would necessarily be implemented through centralized top-down decision making and arbitration. It is however, we argue, the opposite type of medicine that the TVET system of Tunisia needs to become more responsive, i.e. encouraging more organic adjustments at local level, according to signals perceived from the labor market.

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9 The situation for resident trainees and dormitories could be investigated further. TVET suffers from an image problem and fails to attract trainees. Poor dormitories and student living conditions might contribute to worsening the images of TVET.
Making this regionalization happen will have to involve the empowerment of local players. The regional directors of employment of the Ministry hold no decision-making power, and, according to the centers, provide little value to them. And while center directors seemed competent and dedicated, they might not necessarily have the needed skills set or the organizational capacity to be able to manage the center with higher autonomy. It does not necessarily help that center top management are civil servants who have typically risen the ranks within Tunisia’s educational system. They are conversant in the principles of educational center management but not necessarily accustomed to the latest managerial techniques, information systems and outreach activities which would seem natural requirements for a training centers whose raison d’être should largely be to adapt to the need its closest stakeholders (i.e. employers, potential and actual students and regional decision-makers). This brings us back to the complaint that ATFP management has voiced: centers demand more autonomy, but have little capacity to manage it.

Yet, bringing more autonomy to the centers so they can adapt more swiftly to training needs that may arise at local level is central to securing a more responsive system. System stakeholders from Ministry, HQ and centers agree. This push for decentralization is, as we saw in section 2, part of wider effort of the government of Tunisia entailing more autonomy for all local branches of governmental institutions. The principle of devolution of power to the regions has been enshrined in the 2014 Constitution and the 2014-2018 TVET reform document aims, namely in its objective 2.2, to create a TVET system that meets the labor market needs of firms, the region and society. In fact, expected result 2.2.1 specifically focuses on identifying and disseminating the skills needs of the regions. This is appropriate: according to a recent FHI 360 Labor Market Assessment found significant opportunities for aligning economic growth potential with skill development in Tunisia’s different regions (FHI360, 2017).

Unfortunately, there is no formal clarity yet as to what constitutes a region in Tunisia. Administratively divided into 24 governorates (much like the French department), Tunisia has no officially designated regions, even though, for the past decade, several proposals have been discussed, the most prominent one dividing Tunisia into 6 large regions each composed of governorates. Furthermore, we did not find evidence of a shared understanding among our interviewees of what constitutes a region in Tunisia. This situation poses a major challenge for implementing the ambition to identify and meet the needs of the local labor market: which training centers are supposed to directly feed the region with skills, which delimitation to the local labor market, what firms demands skills in the region now and in the future? If an alignment of the TVET system, and especially an optimization of the geographical mapping of its centers, with regional needs is to occur, a better understanding of the regional limits is an urgent prerequisite.

Private sector training provision is peripheral and not encouraged
The private sector is a peripheral system player when it comes to TVET training provision in Tunisia. Only 11.3% of initial training graduates of the TVET system emanate from a private training center (see system diagram provided in Figure 4). Furthermore, the private sector training providers are essentially limited to skills training in the services sector (such as office administration and basic IT), the ATFP and its ministerial partners retaining a monopoly on more “heavy” sectors such as manufacturing, construction, electronics etc. This is because cost to train in these sectors are higher, and the private sector cannot compete, and cover such investments, with a public sector that provides these training for free. Yet the spirit of the legislation in place is to encourage private firms
to offer these training. The reality is that very few private providers can step in to compete against
the ATFP.

Where private firms are more present is in the field of continuous training since employers, in order
to benefit from the tax scheme in place, can procure training services and seek reimbursement or
obtain a tax credit. This goes to show that with the right fiscal stimulus, private initiatives can grow
and contribute to make the TVET system more dynamic and, arguably, more responsive. However,
the evaluation team has not investigated the quality of the trainings provided by private providers in
continuous education.

In best practice countries, the private sector is heavily engaged in the provision of training and in the
definition of the needs of the labor market (the latter point is key in our discussion in the next sub
section about labor market information). Here, we want to address how, as training providers,
enterprises can play a defining role in making the system more demand-driven and responsive in
partnership with the public sector. But first, it is important to note that ATFP’s training centers do
collaborate extensively with firms and mainly through arrangement for internships and
apprenticeships that are at the core of the “dual system” that Tunisia’s TVET system is built upon. In
each center an officer is tasked with coordinating the relationship with firms. In Kasserine for
example, the training center has agreements with approximately 250 firms (Megrine minutes). Some
on the job trainings are more effective than others: a challenge that was mentioned repeatedly was
that most employers cannot be categorized as “training firms”; the tutoring they provide is
insufficient and some firms are accused of simply using the interns as free labor without providing
any real training to speak off. Furthermore, most employers are small SMEs and do not have
formalized human resource development plans. They are not in a position to dedicate resources to
training trainees, maybe unwilling since they do not perceive the value for their growth, running the
firm on a more day-to-day basis.

Larger Tunisian firms, though, are capable of this foresight and successfully train and integrate TVET
graduates. UNIMED, a larger SME in the medical sector, prefer to recruit technicians from the TVET
system than engineers from higher education: their skills are more readily applicable to its fields
although, they complain that the costs of training new recruits are very high since the ATFP does not
offer specific trainings in the firm’s field, in this case medical production (UNIMED, 2017). Therefore,
they eagerly recruit the trainees who have conducted their apprenticeships at the firm, to recoup
some of their initial investment.

Other firms, unsatisfied with the training level offered by ATFP have decided to build their own
training center or innovative programs. One major employer, Sartex whose garment assembly uses
advanced computer aided tools such as laser guided cutting machines, has developed its own
training program because the need for skills is urgent and affects their ability to serve international
markets. See the case studies about the Sartex training center AHK’s “Entreprise formatrice”
program below.

Case Study 1: Sartex Training Center
A Cut Above: Industry-led Training Center Provides Tunisian Youth with a Guaranteed Pathway to Careers in the Garment Sector

The Sartex Training Center in Monastir features an industry-operated training model that is providing Tunisian youth with skills for immediate employment in a sector with strong growth potential and opportunities for career advancement. Sartex’s training services offer a powerful example of dynamic and efficient technical and vocational training, which currently is being entirely financed and organized by a single employer in order to enhance its competitiveness and export potential. The training center provides flexible training offerings free of charge, with guaranteed employment at Sartex for graduates who master a standard set of competencies. 200 youth per year complete Sartex programs and obtain immediate employment in the industry, with strong advancement potential for those who master valued skills in areas such as machinery repair. Most youth who drop out do so not because of discouragement or lack of interest, but rather to poaching by other employers in the industry. Yet despite those achievements, it appears that even greater scale and employment impact could be achieved through deeper public-private collaboration as well as the participation of other industry players.

The Sartex facility in Ksar Hellal, right in the heart of Tunisia’s garment cluster, is a leading Tunisian manufacturer and exporter of jeans and slacks (second largest by volume of production). Sartex exports 3.5 million jeans (out of 25 million total from Tunisia) and employs 3,600 Tunisians (out of 160,000 total in the garment industry\(^\text{10}\)). Its international clients include major brands such as Hugo Boss, Guess, Lacoste, Ralph Lauren, and Calvin Klein. Other top exporters include Demco and VTN.

Sartex’s success depends on a combination of high product quality and speed, which allows them to charge a premium compared to competitors from Turkey, China, and Bangladesh. Ten years ago, Sartex merely took and fulfilled orders from clients, but today the company is increasingly taking on greater value addition as a result of investments in research and development and other areas. Today Sartex works with its clients to quickly develop and turn around new designs. This requires managers with versatile skill sets, able to effectively lead diverse teams of engineers, technicians, stylists and others.

Sartex designed and executed its training strategy in order to enhance its competitiveness, and in response to shortcomings in public TVET provision in the garment sector. Several years ago, the Director organized a meeting with the head of ATFP and several center directors and other employers to highlight industry needs and identify potential solutions. Automation is creating the need for new and diverse competencies, which are not being taught in public training centers. ATFP courses teach only cutting skills, whereas the industry increasingly requires employees to master a range of skills involved in different stages of production (cutting, sewing, dying, etc.) Moreover, a training supply gap was identified at the Certificat d’Aptitude Professionnelle (CAP) level of the TVET system, a two year certificate option.

As an outcome of those discussions, Sartex established its training center open to the public, offering a state-recognized CAP degree based on performance on a final exam, which is evaluated by Sartex, Sartex Training Center, and the Garment committee of AFTP. Successful graduates are guaranteed

\(^{10}\) http://www.tunisianindustry.nat.tn/en/tissu.asp
employment at Sartex. Training typically takes one year (as opposed to two in public training centers), but can be completed in as little as six months by students who master competencies more quickly. Unlike CAP recipients from public training centers, Sartex Training Center graduates are able to read specifications and then make jeans accordingly. As a result, they are much more employable and earn higher wages. In some cases, students drop out after three months to take employment in the industry, after mastering the basic prerequisites. But often these dropouts return for more training after recognizing the potential for earning higher wages.

Sartex began by using their best technicians as the trainers, which ensures that training content is of high quality and up to date with industry standards. They then instructed the technicians in pedagogical techniques, with expert support through a partnership with GIZ.

The biggest drawback to Sartex from this model is that it has to pay the entire operating costs (800,000 TD/year) for the center, although some of these costs are reimbursed through the TVET tax scheme. Thus, they are beginning to think about bringing in other employers to help pay for training. According to Sartex, there are several ways by which government could increase its effectiveness in supporting skill development for the garment sector. Their recommendations include:

- co-finance the Sartex training program in order to enhance its scale,
- include the private sector in ATFP management, and
- create a public private partnership to develop the entire garment sector training system.

**Addendum:** the success of the vocational training center led Sartex’s management to think more carefully about other types of training needs throughout the enterprise. They realized that their biggest constraint was middle managers, who could only be trained by senior managers. As part of a deep restructuring, the duties of senior managers were redefined, so that instead of spending 80% of their time ‘fighting fires’, they were freed up to use up to 40% of their time on training, planning and networking. They believe that with this new structure, initially catalyzed by the Training Center, they have come much closer to becoming a genuine ‘learning enterprise.’

**Case Study 2: AHK ENTREPRISE FORMATRICE**

**A Public-Private Partnership for Effective TVET in Automotive and Transport Maintenance and Repair**

Technological trends are rapidly transforming skill requirements for this sector, increasing employers’ needs for a workforce with advanced knowledge and skills in mechatronics (an interdisciplinary field combining mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, and information technology), as well as soft skills that foster more effective communication and teamwork. As a result, automotive and transport sector employers in Tunisia currently face a growing shortage of qualified maintenance and repair technicians. As the availability and quality of maintenance and repair services are ultimately key factors affecting vehicle sales, this represents a serious strategic concern for the industry.
This industry need represents an excellent opportunity for Tunisian youth seeking jobs. Yet at the same time, many Tunisian youth experience challenging school-to-work transitions, lacking the specific knowledge, skills and qualifications that are needed to enter growing and fast-changing sectors. In response, a successful and rapidly scaling TVET public private partnership, called *Enterprise Formatrice*, is providing youth with a pathway into careers in automotive and transport maintenance and repair. The program has been spearheaded by AHK, the Tunisian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, co-developed in partnership with a growing network of employers (e.g. Renault, BMW, Mazda) and the ATFP’s “L’Ariana” Sectoral TVET Center for Automobile and Transport Mechanics in Tunis.

Applying the German dual model system approach to skill development, this initiative has introduced a new quality standard to the training market. Through effective industry partnerships, it has achieved impressive results in job placement, while leveraging substantial resource investments from the private sector to enhance the quality and scale of public TVET provision, strengthening alignment of labor supply and demand.

*Enterprise Formatrice* has piloted a 2.5 year training program that blends technical skills and industry-specific soft skills, with a strong focus on workplace-based learning. There is a strong emphasis on fostering skills for collaboration through working in groups, including the integration of organized sports. Key achievements to date include:

- 100% of trainees in the first round of the program (26 total) received a diploma.
- 24 of 26 trainees (92%) found a job immediately after completion.
- The number of trainees jumped from 26 to 160, between 2015 and the end of 2016, a 615% increase.
- The number of participating employers tripled over the same period, increasing from five to 15.
• 40 tutors have now received *Ausbildung der Ausbilder* International (AdA) Training of Trainers certification within those companies, following best practices from German auto manufacturing.

Building on the successes already achieved, and clear demand from additional employer partners, *Enterprise Formatrice* plans to continue expanding the program and moving to other regions beyond Tunis. AHK, ATFP, and the Ministry of TVET and Employment are also seeking to replicate the approach in other sectors, and are currently assessing opportunities to do so in Sousse.

Unfortunately, these innovative training programs operate in what seem to be the outskirts of the system, inhibiting the spread of learning which could inform updates to training programs offered in other ATFP centers. While both do involve partnerships with ATFP centers, at a central level such models appeared to be met with limited interest, or even suspicion. Our respondents at HQ questioned the motives of Sartex, arguing that its investment was minimal since the firm benefits from tax credits, and that they were using public funds to get bespoke trainees at a low cost.

This evaluation team disagrees and see these innovations as promising public private partnerships that should be encouraged to make the system more demand driven and responsive. While the prime motive of the private sector is by definition profit maximization, enterprises are the best placed to understand their mid to long term needs and offer training on the latest technology and production methods. The question in this section thus becomes, whether Tunisia’s TVET governance structure is open and encouraging to such partnerships.

**The need for an apex body that oversees and encourages participation of private actors**

Instead of a unified vision that would help Tunisian policymakers capture emerging economic opportunities and develop skills for these, we found significant fragmentation of initiatives and information, with multiple donors and apparently little oversight and linkages with different projects that could have far greater impact if linked in a systematic way.

Instead of leadership guiding a dialog with employers on a national and regional levels, we did not find evidence of a regular process of dialogue with key stakeholders, even though this dialogue has been established in the national training law. Instead we found that when dialogue occurs, it has been *ad hoc*.

Some large employers (CEO of Sungard and Sartex) expressed frustration about the seeming lack of interest on the part of government policymakers to participate in a dialogue about skills needs at for both higher education and the TVET system. Many comments suggest that UTICA, the employer’s association, is not delivering on its stated objectives. For instance, Centers are, by law, supposed to have private firms on their boards, but UTICA has, for reasons unknown, not designated any. Firms do participate on the board at the Gammarth center, but it is an arrangement spearheaded by the Center Director which she considers informal, and thus not an official part of the system (Megrine minutes). UNIMED and Sartex respondents also argued that UTICA’s ability to defend their best interests vis-à-vis the government is largely cosmetic.
UTICA has been hailed as a champion internationally for its role in maintaining social cohesion through strong partnership with unions, government and civil-society at large. Yet, it is worrisome that the employers we talked to did not express confidence in the ability of this body to actively promote its interests. We did find, though, that some initiatives are taken at UTICA’s committee level. For instance, it’s IT sector council is engaged in developing an IT sector specific Labor market information system including a better intermediation system and the development of a skills framework (Smart Tunisia minutes). This initiative is a great example of private firms organizing themselves to define and express their needs, encouraged by the government through the Smart Tunisia initiative. Similar initiatives should be encouraged in other sectors (arguably it more difficult to achieve this level of collaboration in less dynamic sectors).

Our review of best practice countries finds that high performing labor market intermediaries (chambers, industry associations, employer groups) are critically important to a functioning TVET system. Increasingly, the literature advocates for a national apex body to coordinate TVET provision in the country with the “capacity to encourage participation of nonstate providers while improving the service delivery capacity of public training providers. By fostering competition in the training market and effectively liaising between training institutions and stakeholders, these apex institutions are able to ensure more optimal TVET provision.” (World Bank, 2012).

Indeed, since workforce development systems are complex, adaptive and interdependent by nature, cutting across the time horizons, resources, language, norms, and cultures of 4 very different stakeholder groups - education, employers, policymakers and youth and their parents – the capacity to manage this interdependency effectively is a defining characteristic of successful TVET systems. In best practice countries, this coordinating role is played by trusted intermediary organizations who facilitate an ongoing dialogue about the workforce needs with the four different stakeholder groups:

- In Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, employers and educators co-determine the skill needs for the country by industry sector and government facilitates this dialogue.
- In Singapore, for skills development, industry players, training institutions, and unions work together in Industry Skills and Training Councils to identify the skills required for industry and to develop industry-specific Workforce Skills Qualifications. (Aring & Goldmark, 2013, p. 9)
- In Sweden, leaders from the ICT industry regularly meet with the Ministry of Education to define learning outcomes in math and science for students graduating from high school.

Partnerships between the public sector (educators and government policymakers and the private sector (employers and their associations and trainees/students) means that these stakeholders co-own responsibility for the results of the training and system’s performance. For example, employers could pay for a part of the costs of the training, by providing equipment, instructors and curriculum expertise, or by paying a school or training center to conduct the training on behalf of the employer. Students, as another stakeholder, pay with their course fees and their time. Tunisia’s Reform Guidance Document refers to the need for public-private partnerships, “the establishment of linkages with the economic sector principally through signing framework agreements with professional organizations and their involvement in the creation or restructuring of vocational training projects and in training engineering activities (p.11).
It is therefore positive and important that Tunisia’s Reform Guidance document emphasizes the need for a new governance model that facilitates this dialogue and that empowers system actors at central and local level. Indeed, it states that “it becomes necessary to adopt a new management model for the system, laying down the rules for the delegation of powers and responsibilities...and clarification of relations between central and regional levels. ...Moreover, given the diversity of stakeholders in the system, governance requires the active participation of all stakeholders in the training process and in particular the social partners, civil society and the regions...” (MVTE, 2013, p. 18).

We find that there is no single best model for how to convene and manage this multi-stakeholder dialogue over time; in some countries, it is a government ministry, in others it’s a business or trade association, in still others it could be an NGO acting as an intermediary organization. Singapore maintains such an independent entity that calibrates supply and demand for skills: its National Workforce Development Agency (WDA) provides resources for intermediation services to move the strategy throughout the stakeholders and hold all accountable. It coordinates 33 Industry Skills and Training Councils who represent key industry partners including employers, industry associations, training organizations, and unions. (Aring & Goldmark, 2013)

The 14 projects formulated under the current reform plan seeks to order initiatives under this implementation plan. As most projects have just started, it is too early to determine whether this approach helps overcome this fragmentation. Importantly Project 1 of the reform process aims to develop a Human Resource Development Authority (MVTE, 2016) although it remains vague about the contours such an organization will take. Getting this Apex body right, so that it can provide autonomy to the regions and encouraging private sector initiatives and participation will be a crucial element in ensuring the success of Tunisia’s TVET system.

**Labor Market Information: Players Lack Access to the Information Needed to Plan, Monitor and Evaluate a Responsive TVET System**

Maintaining oversight over the essential public private dialogue requires leadership and performance measures that hold the various stakeholders accountable over time. It also requires transparency in terms of how decisions are made and in terms of access to information about the performance of the system.

**A demand driven system relies on information that is produced add shared systematically across the public-private divide**

“Demand driven” means that both future and current demand for skills comes from employers and that this demand drives the skill production process. The key question, then, becomes “whether the system has a way of anticipating, identifying, and responding to skill needs of employers?” In Tunisia, the existence of serious skills gaps as well as skills shortages is referred to in the Reform documents: “Indeed, studies have shown that many economic sectors are experiencing a shortage of skilled labor such as in the construction industry, textiles, agriculture, furniture, metal construction and welding. Added to this, most vocational training graduates are unable to integrate the labor market due to a lack of adequate professional skills” (MVTE, 2013, p. 12). Furthermore, identifying the demand for skills and presumably responding to this demand is highlighted under Specific Objective 2: 2.2.1 and 2.2.2: Skills and training needs of the regions (districts) in the short and
medium terms are identified and disseminated; 2.2.2 Skills and training needs of individuals, companies and society in the short and medium terms are identified and disseminated. In best practice countries, it is the private sector which is spearheading the formulation of skills needs and is encouraged to share this information with decision-makers and other system actors:

- **In Singapore**, the Ministry of Labor manages some 30 different committees, each representing key individuals from a specific economic/business sector that Singapore considers important to its future (aerospace, biotechnology, chemicals, green technologies and infrastructure, etc.) Each committee asks and continuously answers the question, “Do we have the skills we need to succeed with this vision and if not, what is missing and how might we go about obtaining the needed skills?”

- **In Malaysia**, independent high-level Councils mediate between the economic vision and supply and demand of human capital; education and training are aligned at all levels, from secondary through university education; sector-based Skills Councils create the space for employers and their associations to play a leading role to identify future and current skill needs;

- **Ireland** utilizes baseline forecasts to better the future demand for skills. Forecasts indicate employment opportunities that lie ahead in many sectors, such as high value Manufacturing, Financial and Business Services, Life Sciences and ICT. “The extent to which these opportunities can be realized will be determined by our collective efforts to increase the skills profile of our workforce to fully utilize the available skills pool on the island.”

- **In Germany**, the Federal Government facilitates meetings in each sector where employers share with education ministry officials the skills they believe they will need in the future; the education ministry of each state and employer associations jointly decide which skills are best learned at work (learning by doing) and at schools (more theoretical) as a part of the country’s dual system of apprenticeship. The skills identified in this way are communicated to the Chambers in each city and the Chamber conducts the final exam after the 3 years’ apprenticeship providing the graduate with a highly fungible certificate. A Federal Institute for Skills Development conducts research and forecasts skill needs. (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung, or BIBB). BIBB’s research is disseminated throughout the TVET system. For example, the Ministry of Labor develops and manages a career information program that orients students to jobs and work, starting in 5th grade and provides career counselling and information centers with online data about the anticipated number of job openings in each occupation/industry for the coming year.

Tunisia’s TVET system is supposed to be demand driven, yet its highly centralized structure prevents it from anticipating and responding to demand for skills in a timely and efficient manner. Training centers respond to training needs that were established in the past and do not appear to have a systematic process such as DACUM for identifying future skills, equipment needs, and curricula. Comments we heard throughout the workshops included “no updated equipment,” “academically trained trainers with little to no industry experience,” “no means to listen to the needs of firms,” “few if any tutors provided by firms. The argument that ‘We need a systematic way of identifying the needs of firms and quickly responding to these needs with training” was a recurring theme in virtually all our meetings with center leaders and leading employers.

Most troubling perhaps is the issue of responding to emerging demand for skills that lead to good jobs, as in the case of the Biopharma industry that could easily hire 1000 new people a year, according to our interview with UNIMED. Company managers who talked with Center managers
said they were unable to get them to develop a training program that responded to their needs. In response to the inability of the TVET system to respond to training needs of firms, a number of innovative programs have sprung up to fill the gap (See Sartex and CORP, for example.) Instead of learning from these programs and updating the training offered in Centers, these training programs operate in what seem to be parallel worlds with no bridges that might connect them to each other.

**Ensuring effective training must rely on quality management system, performance metrics and continuous improvement**

There is no adequate information (metrics, transparent information, communication, demand for skills) about what works and does not work in each Center and its training program. Without good information, it is not possible to identify or replicate successful programs. The system needs to develop mechanisms to gather information about those training programs that are delivering better results in terms of placement in jobs - inside the system or outside, such as in the case of CORP or Fab Labs Solidaire (see 3.5) or others, it might become possible to replicate key aspects of their programs.

The desire to ensure quality across the training spectrum was palpable with all respondents of ATFP, at central and local level, yet the capabilities, financial and human resource-wise to uphold and oversee the delivery of quality training struggle to keep up with the ambitions. Since 2010, ATFP has worked to install a quality management system. 19 centers were ISO 9001 certified (see Figure 4). Most have lost their certifications again as the quality has to be kept up to date and documented (ATFP, ATFP Megrine workshop minutes, 2017). Sophisticated performance dashboards had been developed (see photos) but unfortunately the data was not update onto them (last updates dated from 2010 or 2012).

Similarly, system wide information systems that were designed to allow centers to report on important metrics such as the “enrollment rate”, “dropout rate” or “marginal expenditure per trainee” are not used or transmitted by the centers to ATFP’s frustration. Respondent told us that the roll out of these information systems in particular ATFP’s SimForm - has failed because the implementation effort has been underestimated, i.e. not accompanied by sufficient training, IT infrastructure and change management activities (ATFP, ATFP Medenine workshop minutes, 2017). Actual use of such reporting and monitoring tools are however essential if ATFP wishes to improve the centers’ performance, and of course their ability to become more responsive through greater autonomy.
This is not to say that centers are badly managed. We were impressed by the processes and management tools (such as excel dashboards) implemented in the Kasserine training center, for example: student performances both in classroom and on-the-job were rigorously logged into sophisticated excel files by pedagogical staff. Furthermore, the center made recurrent attempts to keep track of trainee outcomes through phone calls and maintained 6 months reporting processes to gauge whether their trainees had found jobs. Unfortunately, the results were poor as the students under reported their job situation (said they were unemployed even they had an occupation) or were no longer reachable. These were all practices developed in house by the director who appeared frustrated not to be able to share his experience with the rest of the ATFP ecosystem, especially with other center managers. There is clearly vast potential in improving information sharing and reporting within the ATFP to ensure continuous improvement mechanisms.

Principles of continuous improvement and quality management relies on systematic procedures for monitoring and evaluating process and outcomes, incorporating perceptions and evidence from students, graduates, instructors, employers, and supervisors. Indeed, in the context of national skill development systems, these principles materialize around processes that allow system stakeholders to look in two directions: 1. inward to monitor the existing performance of the system (# of jobs obtained, # of dropouts, # of teachers with certificates, amount spent per trainee, etc.), and 2. outward to monitor best practice around the world. Many countries have developed rigorous metrics to measure and evaluate performance of their skill development system, including Ireland, Australia, and Singapore. All three approaches look inside and outside their system to continuously assess performance:

- **Ireland.** Irish policymakers compare internal performance compared to international performance on
  a. Working age employment rate trends

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11 Similarly, in Medenine: there was a project with ETF to call graduates but it did not work because the answers received did not reflect the reality of the trainees’ job situation.
b. ILO unemployment rate trends
c. Adult 25-64 Qualification levels
d. Change in adult 25-64 Qualification levels
e. All Island graduate salaries
f. Highest education of school leavers
g. Destination of school leavers

- **Australia’s** National agreement for Skills and Workforce Development calls for reports that provide baseline data and a comparative analysis of the performance of governments against the outcomes agreed under the national agreement for Skills and workforce development. The aim is to have performance indicators for ensuring that working age Australians have the skills they need to fully participate in the modern economy.

- **Singapore** uses international benchmarking as a form of continuous improvement processes to measure the performance of its Workforce Skills Qualification System for all levels of the workforce. International comparative studies include duration of training, entry requirements, year of award, type of course/training provider, assessment methods, occupational outcomes, course content, and structure and quality assurance.

In Tunisia, the lack of commonly agreed metrics and of the capability to measure them to indicate the efficiency and performance of the TVET system was one of the dominant themes of our meetings throughout our visit. During the workshop held with the project 12 working group on performance indicators, it became apparent that while the TVET system stakeholders know that they want and need to measure performance, they are less certain as to what to measure and how. In the workshop held in Medenine with senior management of 6 ATFP training centers of the southern governorates, participants agreed that there were pragmatic solutions and indicators within reach that require organizational will. The following suggestions were formulated during the workshop:

**Ways to improve trainer performance**
- Auto-evaluation of trainers
- Each trainer should be able to define his needs in term of his own training
- Inspection and face to face interviews with trainers
- Continuous training for trainers and delivery of certificates
- Monitor the success rates of their trainees

**Some indicators to measure trainer performance:**
- Number of trainings the trainer has received in the past 3 years
- Number of pedagogical assistance requests made by the trainer
- Quality evaluation of the training / trainer by an independent third party
- Evaluate the trainer based on a skills evaluation matrix

**To increase cooperation with firms and demand anticipation and to anticipate their demand for skills, indicators could include:**
- Training requests submitted by firms to the Centers
- Capacity to respond to this demand
- Surveys on firm needs could be done by center counselors – perhaps in partnership with business schools.
- Complaints/demands expressed by firms in terms of skills
- The apprenticeship journal (logbook) of the trainee: the firm should mention their needs in there.

For each training specialty, there is a need to have the following indicators:

1. The occupancy rate (easy to obtain)
2. The rate of success (easy to obtain)
3. The rate of drop out (on a continuous basis) which need to be followed up by surveys (feasible)
4. The rate of labor market integration (complex to obtain) through methods such as:
   - When graduates come get their diploma (6 months after)
   - By phone and letters
   - Through social media
   - With incentives to obtain truthful answers
   - Through surveys

Participants agreed that, if for each center and training specialty, these four rates are systematically available, managers will have important signals to work with to improve center effectiveness. Interestingly the centers acknowledge to have the manpower to collect the data and uphold such metrics. Concerning the rate of integration into the labor market which they all say the badly need, participants stated they need that strategic number. Therefore the ATFP in 2010 created the role of « monitoring of graduates » with 1 person per governorates but it is only certain centers that have this person. 12

Effective career guidance must guide potential trainees to the right training and jobs

Our interviews also indicated that little, if any career advice for youth seeking to enter the country’s labor market is available except in specific programs that operate on the margins. (CORP, AHK Tunisia, ELAN, Fab Lab Solidare discussed in the following section). Ensuring that job seekers have access to good career information about different career paths, what skills and qualifications they require, and what the career prospects are (salaries, location, etc.) is an integral part of the function of an effective TVET system that direct the flow of trainees to occupation where the job outcomes are the most promising.

When asked if “in your center, is there a staff in charge of (1) monitoring the graduates and of (2) relations with firms?” the respondents from the following centers said:

- Medenine: no and yes
- Gabes: yes and yes
- Kebili: yes and yes
- Tatouaine: yes and yes
- Tozeur: yes and yes
- Djerba: no and yes

12
Tunisia’s TVET Reform Guidance Document repeatedly refers to quality: “With the exception of a few timid efforts, and despite the importance of evaluation as a guarantee of the quality of training, remains quasi absent at all levels starting from the evaluation of learners’ acquired knowledge and up to the evaluation of the training process, in addition to the evaluation of the trainers’ achievements (p.13) Sub objective 2.5.4 specifies the creation of the evaluation and monitoring system and define its mission and duties. A similar objective specifies designing procedure manuals for evaluation and monitoring of training (P.24).

**Labor Market Information System (LMIS)**

In best practice countries, LMIS are the knowledge base on which labor and educational policies are built and the go-to place for workers and employers looking for work, training and skills. These countries’ labor markets would not function like they do without up to date, readily available and precise information on local and national employment levels, skill demand foresights, job offers and vacancies, trainings and qualifications or user-friendly employment services (FHI360, 2016).

In Tunisia, a wealth of information is created by actors of the TVET system yet we experienced how poorly information is transmitted between players. At local level, centers managers complained that there were not made aware of labor statistics from the Ministry, that regional representatives of the Ministry of labor never transmitted any useful information, that the reform documents were not circulated, etc. (ATFP, ATFP Megrine workshop minutes, 2017) (ATFP, ATFP Medenine workshop minutes, 2017) (ATFP, ATFP Kasserine workshop minutes, 2017). As we have seen, within the ATFP, all levels complain about lack of information flows, reporting etc.

Simple solutions could be implemented to improve the tracking of trainee outcomes. Recouping the database of employment centers where trainees register with ATFP would be a big step forward (or simply installing a report mechanism). Yet our impression was that these institutions only communicated with each other at the surface. Promising initiatives at central level are not supported. We visited the MVTE’s ONEQ department tasked with developing the country’s LMIS and were presented with a promising system that connects the databases of the Employment Agencies (ANETI) with ATFPs and with the Social Security Agency providing a wealth of interesting data potentially in real time about vacancies, sectors where jobs are in demand etc. This tool which would be immensely useful to decision makers at national and regional level, but also for career advice, only needs final investments to be ready for deployment and plugged into the working databases of each agency. According to the engineering team, they have been waiting several years for the funding and green light to deploy the tool in a production environment.
ONEQ’s LMIS database is an illustration of one of the many missed opportunities we discovered in Tunisia with respect to Labor Market Information which all users agree is the missing backbone for effective reform of the TVET system. Information and skilled human resources to use them is available but not utilized. Sustained investment into the implementation of these laudable initiatives must involve the practitioners at local level must be pursued.

Portable Skills: A Deeper and More Systematic Emphasis on Skills’ Portability is Needed
Portable skills, also called cross-sectoral or transferable skills, are marketable and applicable within and across occupations and industries. They include cross-cutting technical skills taught within a systems framework. For example, programs training automobile mechanics can include skills for diagnosing and fixing problems in auto-electronics systems, not only how to service specific mechanical parts of a car. Construction training can impart a broad understanding of the construction industry, rather than only teaching how to weld or do carpentry. Such technical skills are complemented by ‘soft skills’ that are portable by definition. Those are interpersonal, intrapersonal, and cognitive skills that foster individual and team performance through behaviors such as goal setting, regulating emotions in stressful situations, understanding and navigating unspoken social norms, solving complex problems, and communicating effectively in diverse contexts. Soft skills can facilitate acquisition of technical skills. For example, a study of social capital in the automotive repair field found that apprentices with highly developed social skills were more adept at attracting and relating to knowledgeable mentors, learning and advancing more quickly as a result (Nelsen, 1997).

Portable skills are critically important for enabling youth access to multiple and diverse career pathways. They are also more likely to be marketable in the future, even as technology, artificial intelligence, and greater internet connectivity are converging to transform many work processes and production patterns. Indeed, there is increasing economic evidence of returns to social and emotional skills in the labor market, driven by the increasing importance of collaboration and nonroutine problem solving across many occupations (Deming, 2015).

Developing soft skills requires a holistic and integrated approach, rather than a specific training curriculum or course offering. USAID YouthPower Action’s newly published report, “Guiding Principles for Building Soft Skills among Young Adults and Adolescents,” finds that effective soft skill development programs share a common set of characteristics (Soares, Diener, & Ignatowski, Guiding Principles for Building Soft Skills among Young Adults and Adolescents, 2017). Experiential learning, or learning by doing, is core to the process of acquiring soft skills, and is complemented by external supports such as nurturing relationships with adult mentors and peers, positive pedagogical practices such as modelling and skill scaffolding, and a conducive environment that integrates learning across school, work and community contexts.

In best practice workforce development systems, countries have found ways to identify and categorize portable skills within the context of particular industry sectors. For example, Australia has developed a step by step process that identifies skill needs by industry sector, anticipates future needs, certification needs, and where these skills can be learned.13 In Germany, trade union representatives sit on the boards of companies with a mandate to ensure that the skills learned in the dual system do not restrict upward mobility on the part of learners. For example, the occupation of “mechatronics” was created to integrate diverse skill sets that previously were separated by factory production lines (engaging engineers, technicians, mechanics, software engineers, etc.) This approach has been complemented and accelerated by the increasing

13 See http://www.australianindustrystandards.org.au/
sophisticated capabilities of robots developed to make products in factories. In Ireland, the National Skills Strategy 2025 emphasizes the need for “transversal skills” that help the workforce exit and enter the labor market repeatedly over their lifetime. These skills are also referred to as “basic, core, and soft” skills. The National Strategy also emphasizes the importance of cross-sectoral skills that reflect the increasing convergence among industry sectors due to AI and automation.

In Tunisia, TVET policymakers, managers, and staff readily acknowledge the importance of soft skills and entrepreneurship skills, and are aware of the need to develop more portable skills. These do not currently appear to be addressed within a broader framework of portable skills or industry-level dialogues identifying skills that will be valued in the future, nor does there appear to be a dedicated effort underway to develop portable skills within the system. For example, project-based learning is a proven experiential learning methodology that builds soft skills, yet is rarely used in the TVET system.

The practice of developing skills via apprenticeships and internships seems well developed in Tunisia, with many centers reporting several hundred ongoing apprenticeships. However, it is unclear whether any employers actively train students or encourage apprentices or interns to learn portable skills. The Tunisian TVET system is nominally modelled on the German dual system, in which learning happens at school as well as in the workplace, within the context of a three-year curriculum determined by industry associations and education ministries. Tunisia lacks several key elements of the German model, however. As noted above, German labor representatives sit on boards of enterprises, exerting pressure to ensure that skills learned under the dual system are portable. There appears to be no similar mechanism, or pressure, in Tunisia. Another key aspect of Germany’s dual system is that firms believe that they can do better training than schools. Firms that invest in the dual system have a commitment to actively teach their apprentices those skills that can best be learned in the workplace. Moreover, firms that train apprentices proudly wear the label “Ausbildende Firma” or “enterprise formatrice.” Our interviews indicate that most companies do not see training as part of their function and rarely have designated trainers or supervisors for that purpose. Several interviewees suggested that pride in teaching at the firm seems to be missing in the case of many Tunisian employers and negatively affects the quality of training received in firms. While many of our interviews indicated respect for the German dual system approach (alternance), virtually everyone stressed that this approach needs to be more adapted to the Tunisian context.

In a positive effort at mainstreaming portable skills, ATFP centers are currently implementing, in partnership with EFE, entrepreneurial clubs geared to developing the skills associated with entrepreneurship. Rollout is being overseen by a “club entreprendre” coordinator. Enrollment is optional, and appears to remain relatively low. In Kasserine, for example, no more than 15 trainees out of a population of 300 took on the offer to take part in the club.

Numerous innovative initiatives to develop portable skills are occurring throughout Tunisia. Examples of programs that appear to do outstanding work in teaching portable skills include the SMART Tunisia pilot, the “ELAN” program (with Swiss Cooperation), the “CORP” program (with German Cooperation), and the Fab Lab Solidaire, a program of Association Jeunes Science de Tunisie supported by Orange Telecom. Yet for the most part, these seem to operate on the margins, outside the public TVET system. Moreover, we unfortunately found no evidence of cross-pollination where
learning from these important programs could help improve the TVET system. Highlights from each are provided below:

**SMART Tunisia**, a national ICT Federation inside UTICA, is building a training program for technical and soft skills based on employer demand. SMART Tunisia provides a virtual platform where training will take approximately 3 months. SMART Tunisia develops trainings for trainers and enterprises. Program staff are now identifying skills gaps in partnership with ten private sector enterprises. Their mandate is to create jobs and performance indicators are designed to measure progress against this goal.

**ELAN** targets people who have no significant work experience, or who need to be retrained. Program coaches must have a minimum of 10 years of experience in the private sector. Trainees (interns) are called “colleagues” and there is no hierarchy. Trainees spend 60 percent of their time in doing real day-to-day work for a virtual company on tasks generated by real companies. Real work for the virtual company consists of analyzing data and putting it on spreadsheets, developing and managing databases, and communicating with suppliers and customers located in similar virtual firms in other countries. All these tasks are done in teams. 20% of participants’ time is spent in workshops on practical topics such as producing a good resume, and the remaining 20% is devoted to searching for a real job. Program leaders told us that trainees are usually recruited by companies long before finishing their training.

**CORP.** The CORP program was developed soon after the revolution to train job seekers with critical soft skills not acquired in their education or training, with support from GIZ and German Chamber of Industry and Trade. CORP developed a process of helping youth from any region in Tunisia become employable. An email with a CV sent to CORP gets young people an appointment, a skill assessment, and meetings with an advisor who informs them about labor market needs in Tunisia. Youth are then registered for a one-day soft skills training with a coach that using games, role plays, and other learning tools based on situations from real workplace environments. The goal is to help young people learn the skills they need to navigate different work environments. CORP program managers use innovative ways to bring together job seekers with employers. Thus far, 1,553 employability orientations have resulted in 1,000 youth getting jobs of their own. Retraining numbers are even better: of the 130 youth who went through retraining programs, 130 found jobs.

**Fab Lab Solidaire**, Tunis. Fab Labs are special digital manufacturing and prototyping workshops where it’s possible to “think of and make anything.” Fab Lab Solidaire works with the Association of Jeunes Science de Tunisie and last year conducted 45 training sessions on scientific methods, general sciences, electronics, robotics, and astronomy. During weekends and after school, students learn skills in problem identification and solving, electronics, mechanics, materials science, engineering, and software. They learn how to make things they need at the Fab Lab by working in teams. Students at Fab Lab Tunisie recently invented an app called NoQ to help avoid long lines at municipalities. A new mobile Fab Lab is being developed in the South, and a new Fab Lab is being built in Gabes. Globally, Fab Labs are operating in many countries as a platform for innovation and skill development. Fab Labs were developed by MIT in 2001, growing exponentially (doubling in number every 18 months) and today number over 1,200 in 91 countries. Fab Labs are virtually linked to each other and to the Fab Foundation, affiliated with MIT.
IV. Recommendations

Key Recommendation: Accelerate Reform through Regional Interventions to Make the TVET System Responsive, with a Focus on Strategic Value Chains

Our central recommendation provides a suggested pathway to accelerate implementation of MVTE’s strategy to decentralize the management of the TVET system, through a regional value chain approach. That means establishing clear priorities in terms of specific value chains within each of seven national regions, in close consultation with private sector and civil society, rather than setting sectoral and occupational priorities only at a national level. Within the framework of a clear competitiveness agenda for each region, more targeted initiatives can be developed which can then be implemented more collaboratively and effectively. A value chain approach means that all players in the value chain – government, enterprises, educational institutions, and NGOs must work together toward common goals.

From the perspective of TVET reform, there are four main benefits:

1. **Strengthening local labor markets**: aligning capabilities more closely with local labor market requirements and reducing the rigidities of the system are challenges best addressed by firms and training providers who work at the micro level.

2. **Ease of implementation**: the value chain approach is more effective at the regional level, where involved actors can see the tangible benefits of their collaboration, rather than at the national level, where existing “public-private partnerships” are widely viewed as stagnant and ineffective. At the regional and particularly governorate level, the number and complexity of actors is lower, and consensus is easier to achieve. Empowering local actors to take more responsibility and adopting more creative solutions will only occur if practitioners and decision-makers are able to work together in a space that enables collaboration and experimentation. This needs to span the project cycle from conception of ideas to the implementation of activities and the monitoring of their impact. Past reforms have failed to have the desired impact because of the persistent gap in implementation.

3. **Fostering continuous improvement by merging “top-down” policies and “bottom-up” initiatives**: a regional approach will provide an opportunity to embed the current reform strategy in specific regional contexts, and translate general priorities into concrete actions for the improvement of the TVET’s system adaptation capacity. A focus on pilot testing and learning will help identify the most innovative and effective approaches from the “bottom up.” Such approaches can then be scaled and replicated in other regions facing similar challenges. That is especially true in terms of fostering public-private dialogue and measuring the ability of the system to meet demand, processes at the core of continuous improvement.

4. **Speeding the pace of decentralization**: Decentralization has of course already been adopted as a matter of policy, but its implementation has been extremely gradual. This is in part because the exact definition of, and even need for, decentralization is still being debated within key institutions. To circumvent this bottleneck and propel implementation forward, we recommend linking to regional value chain strengthening initiatives that are already underway. Such an approach is gradually being implemented in other Tunisian ministries (in particular Ministry of Industry) and will, therefore, also facilitate the integration of MVTE efforts with that of other ministries.
Given resource constraints, it may be most effective to implement the value chain approach in phases. For example, two priority value chains could be selected in each region to pilot the approach and gain experience initially. The effort could then be expanded as experience grows and once early successes reinforce confidence in the approach. A key result would be that TVET efforts would not remain compartmentalized, isolated as a separate community attempting to meet ever-increasing demands with ever-decreasing resources. On the contrary, by integrating more closely with other efforts to strengthen the private sector’s productivity and competitiveness, TVET initiatives can leverage a broader set of partners, resources, and innovative methods.

One such opportunity is the new Value Chain Development Platform (La Plateforme pour le développement des chaines de valeur) being sponsored by the World Bank (full document provided in French in Annex 4). (World Bank, 2017) (World Bank, 2017) Initial partners include agencies from several different ministries (CEPEX, APII, APIA, ODNO, and ODCO) and private sector actors in the northwest and western regions, who have expressed the willingness to work jointly to implement a common methodology. This inter-ministerial platform will eventually be extended to MVTE and MHESR, but the process will be accelerated if the MVTE takes its own initiative to move in that direction.

In practice, this approach would mean that senior staff of TVET centers in each region would engage with enterprise leaders, NGOs, government officials and other educators to develop more systematic and holistic responses to labor force challenges. Such engagements need to be facilitated by experienced value chain development specialists, and are now being prepared by the Value Chain Development Platform through extensive training and pilot activities.

Our assessment only detected a handful of truly innovative new public-private initiatives in Tunisia in recent years (such as SMART Tunisia, Enterprise Formatrice, CORP, TACT, the Sartex training center, and ELAN). The recommended approach aims at a rapid expansion of new initiatives that are tailored to the specific challenges of each industry in each region, establishing a productive dialogue and practical implementation mechanisms to integrate TVET activities into a broader set of coordinated activities. All initiatives will be aimed at improving the competitiveness of Tunisian enterprises, thus boosting their demand for workers who are better trained to meet the emerging requirements.

Adopting the regional value chain approach will reinforce four major pillars of the reform effort:

- **Strategy aligned with economic development priorities.** Working more closely with industries and firms employing TVET graduates will ensure that TVET activities accelerate economic development. This can be achieved through value chain working groups established with a cross-ministry platform on the government side, in collaboration with a variety of large and small enterprises, relevant NGOs and educational institutions. The main priority for the working groups is to enhance the competitiveness of the value chain. Within that framework, half or more of initiatives coming out of the working group will directly or indirectly involve training and other workforce development issues. Within the TVET system, ATFP and other key institutions (ISETs, AVFA, private trainers) would participate in these working groups, facilitated by an experienced value chain development facilitator/coach. Such working groups have a strong and proven track record in proposing and implementing innovative experiments to improve employability. Results will include closer collaboration.
with private sector, more innovative ideas that are tied more closely with regional economic priorities, and more effective coordination. A value chain map with skill overlay (see visualization on next page, from Jamaica) helps illustrate the value of contextualizing skill needs within a value chain framework.

**Illustrative Intervention:** New public-private partnership initiatives could be piloted in partnership with private sector support organizations or enterprises, based on lessons from existing TVET PPPs in Tunisia, and evaluated using objective criteria (see indicators section). Once a variety of models have been tried and evaluated, the MVTE will have a concrete basis to expand its engagement with private sector co-training models, with fewer concerns about efficiency and efficacy.

**Enabling system governance.** More engagement and support from emerging regional structures will provide impetus for decentralized, accountable governance. The performance-based management reform currently being implemented by the MVTE can be complemented and reinforced as the value chain development model gains momentum.

**Illustrative Intervention:** Develop TVET quality standards for public and private TVET centers, toward the establishment of a quality assurance system. In parallel, the accreditation function needs to be migrated to a semi-independent agency, which is not under the direct authority of the MVTE. This structure will ensure that standards are universally recognized as independent and objective, ensuring more transparency and objectivity. Such initiatives provide an excellent environment for the identification of ‘change agents’ and leadership development. The availability of improved performance metrics, elaborated in the fourth pillar below, also reinforces improved governance, as managers can be held accountable for measurable, meaningful outcomes taking place under their supervision.

**Portable skills.** Integrating soft skills and transferable technical skills will ensure that TVET graduates have skills that are valuable across industries and occupations, now and in the future. As discussed in the findings, a deeper and more systematic emphasis on skills’ portability is needed. Moreover, experience from best practice countries such as Australia and Germany shows that portable skills are most effectively identified and cultivated within the context of specific sectors. Such an initiative would be highly compatible with the regional value chain approach outlined above, and FHI 360’s successful experience with industry partnerships for co-developing soft skills training in neighboring country Morocco, through the USAID-funded Morocco Career Development Activity, suggests that the same approach could work in Tunisia.

**Illustrative Intervention:** With industry partners, co-develop and pilot training to address soft skill needs for priority occupations employing TVET graduates (following the USAID Morocco Career Development Activity model).

**Labor Market Information.** Crucial information is missing for labor market actors, such as information about skills demand now and in the future, quality of trainings and employability of trainees in specific fields, and career advice that guide youth towards the best job prospects, to name just a few. A regional approach will allow the main stakeholders to identify and address their most pressing needs for information, focusing on how filling
them will contribute to strengthening the value chain, and to develop concrete actions to organize data collection, analysis and dissemination, including processes and systems.

**Illustrative intervention #1:** Perhaps the most important information gap is related to labor market outcomes of TVET students after they graduate, which makes it impossible to be sure how many are gainfully employed in a related field. In response, example, detailed ‘spot studies’ could be conducted to track and analyze labor market outcomes from different types of TVET programs to compare variances among training models, regions, types of students, fields of study, and types of training. Such an effort would help shed light on efficacy, supporting the needs of decision-makers from the top levels of the Ministry (e.g. performance-based budgeting) down to the individual training centers. It would ideally be complemented by a ‘top-tier’ initiative at the national level, focused on standardizing performance indicators and tracking outcomes more systematically. That would likely involve closer collaboration between ANETI and TVET centers and greater utilization of social networking software such as LinkedIn and Facebook, etc., for example. See the Toolbox above on “Performance Indicators for TVET: international Trends and Standards,” for more details on recommended priority indicators.

**Illustrative intervention #2:** Establish or improve Career Centers to ensure that quality career counseling and guidance services are provided to all TVET students (leveraging learning and tools from the USAID Morocco Career Development Activity).

**Illustrative intervention #3:** Design and implement a local communication campaign to improve perceptions of TVET and awareness of growing opportunities in priority value chains, aimed at youth in primary, secondary and tertiary education level, including drop-outs.

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Figure 8: Sample Value Chain Map with Entry Points for Youth – BPO in Jamaica
Activity Concept: Collaborative Action for Strengthening Regional TVET Systems
Phase 1: Selection of pilot regions and value chains

Activity 1.1: Select regional pilots (1-2 regions) and value chains to be developed

In the pilot region or governorates, two value chains would be selected based on their employment growth potential and alignment with current or potential TVET system capabilities.

Phase 2: Collaborative action

The recommended activities below are to be implemented concurrently:

Activity 2.1: Sensitization of labor market and TVET stakeholders and identification of system change agents

The objective of this second phase is to identify regional TVET system leaders (private and public) and build a consensus and collaborative framework at regional level for the strengthening of the TVET system to support the Value Chain.

Proposed actions:

1. Presentation of the regional value chain approach to key stakeholders at regional and national levels including:
   - Key firms throughout the value chain
   - Employer organizations, other private sector representatives and trade unions
   - Leading private labor market intermediaries (job matching & placement, etc.)
   - Regional representatives of government institutions such as MVTE, APIA, National Statistics Office, ANETI,
   - Public and private TVET institutions
   - Youth and civil society leaders
   - Regional Development Offices, if any
   - Interested development partners and funders

2. Identification of strategic change agents and analysis of their aspirations and needs

3. Classification of labor market information stakeholders possess and need.

Activity 2.2: Formulation and validation of regional action plans for TVET system development to support the Value Chain

The main objective in this phase is to formulate and validate a comprehensive regional action plan to support the 4 pillars to improve the TVET’s system capacity to support the value chain’s development, i.e. regional strategic alignment, local governance, LMI and portable skills development.

Proposed actions:
1. Organization and facilitation of workshops using "Whole System in a Room" methodology (see box);
2. Co-creation of regional initiatives for TVET development;
3. Obtaining official organizational and financial commitments to the regional action plan change agents of the private and public organizations recognized as key in strengthening the regional labor market.

**Toolbox 2. The Whole System in a Room Workshop**

The **Whole System in a Room Workshop** methodology is a powerful way to generate consensus and action around shared priorities, leveraging the collective expertise and resources of all the actors in the room. It has been used with success by FHI 360, most recently as part of the Morocco Career Development Activity workforce development project.

During the workshop, up to eight stakeholder groups are formed, each with a designated representative and a maximum of 8 individuals. A social network analysis can be conducted in real time using a mobile application, measuring human capital, identifying bonding and bridging links (see an example [here](#)).

The workshop will (i) determine a broad definition of the goal to be addressed; (ii) carefully organize stakeholder groups, each with a designated representative, so that they represent a live model of the Labor Market ecosystem (employers, educators, labor market intermediaries e.g. headhunters and placement agencies, youth, policymakers, civil society, and development partners); (iii) utilize a set of rules and facilitation techniques that routes participants towards a common vision, a set of carefully sequenced activities that allow participants to agree on a common history, set of current trends, common areas they would like to address, objectives, and work plans, rotation of the groups from heterogeneous, to homogenous with participants carefully assigned to specific groups; (iv) production of work plans, one for each of the working groups to which they commit with their own resources.

*Note: For the workshop to be successful, the right people need to take part, i.e. those within each institution who have demonstrated personal commitment to regional, TVET or value chain development. The identification and sensitization process is therefore prioritized and generally requires a minimum of 2 months of preparation.*

**Activity 2.3: System change by supporting the implementation of the regional action plan**

Ensuring the effective implementation of priority activities of the validated regional plan will require targeted and committed advisory support and technical assistance at the level of the collaborative space and within each implementing structure. Support will concentrate on strengthening the managerial capacities of the change agents with methods, tools and coaching.

*Proposed actions:*

1. Selection of priority activities within the validated action plans - with a focus on those that seek to strengthen collaborative initiatives and which are deemed to have most impact on the value chain and the responsiveness of the TVET system - to be supported;
2. Definition of targets, responsibilities and timeframes
3. Organization of activity specific workshops and working groups
4. Monthly and quarterly review mechanisms conveyed by designated and official system leaders
5. Provision of advisory support including change management, and coaching but also more technically specific interventions, for instance to improve curriculum, center equipment, develop trainee tracking, center management system, firm consulting to develop human resource development and in-house training, etc.
6. Support to the collaborative space with regular forums, workshops, etc.

Activity 2.4: Develop progress and evaluation monitoring tools

This activity is dedicated to developing labor market information to empower regional decision-makers and practitioners with the managerial tools to oversee the implementation of the action plan and especially allow them to identify adjustment opportunities and necessities to the educational response to changes on the labor market.

Proposed actions:

1. Design, develop and implement metrics and dashboards to monitoring the impact and effectiveness of the interventions on the value chain, on the labor market and on the running of TVET centers and partner institutions

Activity 2.5: Evaluate, learn and replicate

The final phase will focus on sensitization of partners, including international donors, to obtain further support for the implementation of the national action plan.
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### Annex 1: List of Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
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<th>Title</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment (MVTE)</td>
<td>Saida Ouaneis</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
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<td>Hedi Triki</td>
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<td>Arbi Zouaoui</td>
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<td>Hassine Sioud</td>
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<td>Sondes Derbel</td>
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<td>• National Centre for Trainer Training and Training Engineering (CENAFFIF)</td>
<td>Salem Mhdhbi</td>
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<td>Chafik Abdellatif</td>
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<td>Ammari Hafedh</td>
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<td><strong>Training center Gammarth</strong></td>
<td>HOUYEM ZGOLLI</td>
<td>Director</td>
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<td><strong>Training center in Kasserine</strong></td>
<td>Hassen Omri</td>
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<td><strong>Training center in Grombalia</strong></td>
<td>Bezzaoui Fehmi</td>
<td>Trainer and Head of Multimedia Branch</td>
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<td>Fathi Boughanmi</td>
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<td><strong>Training center in Medenine</strong></td>
<td>Belgassem Lassoued</td>
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Reforming TVET in Tunisia: Strategic Assessment (DRAFT) July 2017
Annex 2. Reform Projects

The recent reform of the national TVET system was triggered by the Arab Spring revolution that broke out in 2011. A steering committee was formed to monitor and to follow the several phases of development of the orientation document for TVET system reform. An inter-agency committee identified the themes of preparatory work and important areas of reform with the participation of representatives from the Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher Education and Academic Research, the Ministry of National Defense, as well as the National Office of Tunisian Tourism (ONTT), the Tunisian Union of Industry, Commerce and Handicrafts (UTICA), the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), the Tunisian Union of Agriculture and Fisheries (UTAP), the Agency for the Promotion of Agricultural Training (AVFA), civil society and private enterprises.

The new reform of the TVET system is based on the following specific objectives:

- **Global vision**: the national vocational training system is well integrated into the National System of Human Resources Development (NSHRD).
- **Quality and Efficiency**: the efficiency and effectiveness throughout the training process are guaranteed.
- **Governance**: a governance model is adopted that meets the needs of individuals, society, companies and the regions in harmony with the social contract.
- **Cross cutting projects**: a TVET system is developed that meets the needs and aspirations of individuals, companies, the regions and society, and promotes lifelong learning.

**Specific Objective 1 (SO1): Global vision**

1. Develop an overall vision that encompasses education, training and higher education. It involves the establishment of a national entity on the development of human capital invested that takes into account the real needs of companies, individuals and society, opening opportunities for lifelong learning.

2. Establish a national system for career training and vocational guidance including the creation of a national agency of vocational guidance (ANIO).

3. Put in place mechanisms to reduce the early exit from the school system through the creation of a National Center for Social and Professional Inclusion (ESPOIR).

**Specific Objective 2 (SO2): Quality and Efficiency**

4. Improving the analysis of labor market needs in a prospective dimension through the establishment of an Integrated System of Monitoring, Foresight and Needs Identification to reinforce the ONEQ (National Observatory on Employment and Qualifications)

5. Development of engineering training and educational engineering of the TVET system with setting up a collaborative platform for exchange of teaching and learning resources.

6. Development of a training system for TVET trainers including staff engaged in pedagogy, supervision and support.
7. Accreditation of training centers and pedagogical evaluation through setting up a **Normalized Acquired Recognition and Educational Evaluation system (DRANEP)**.

8. Restructure TVET centers and equip them with new technologies.

9. Develop continuing training.

**Specific Objective 3 (SO3): Governance**

10. Establish a new **governance system** by strengthening the role of regional authorities in the development and the implementation of TVET policies;

11. Create an **information system** that emphasizes the link between TVET and employment;

12. Establish a **monitoring process** to measure the results of the TVET system.

**Specific Objective 4 (SO4): Cross-cutting projects**

13. Establish a **communication strategy for TVET**.

14. Strengthen the **capacities of TVET stakeholders**.
Annex 3: Workshop Reports
ATFP Workshop with representatives from:

Centre sectoriel de formation et des techniques appliqués en cuir de Mégrine  
Centre sectoriel aux métiers du tertiaire de Gammarth  
Centre sectoriel de formation en télécommunications d’El Khadra

10 February 2017, Mégrine, Tunis

Participants

1. Ammari Hafedh     Director (El Khadra center)
2. Houyem Zgolli    Director (Gammarth center)
3. Fathi Boughanmi    Director (Megrine center)
4. Bezzaoui Fehmi    Trainer, head of multimedia line (Megrine center)
5. Mustapha Lakhal    ATFP
6. Bezzi Abdessamed    ATFP
7. Nicholas Ouma    TVET Specialist, African Union Commission
8. Fatma Abidi     Consultant, FHI 360
9. Monika Aring     Senior Technical advisor, TVET, FHI 360
10. Alec Hansen     Lead economist, FHI 360
11. Kjartan Sorensen  Technical advisor, private sector development, FHI 360

Context

Together with the Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment (MVTE) and the Tunisian TVET Agency (ATFP), the AUC/FHI 360 evaluation team organized 3 workshops in Tunis, Kasserine and Medenine (10-15 February 2017) comprising 5-10 participants each including senior center managers from various centers, student advisors, trainers/educators. Facilitated by FHI 360 experts (economist and an international TVET expert), the workshop focused on discussing and identifying opportunities for improvements and interventions within the current reform efforts implemented by MTVE and ATFP looking, in particular, at:

- The Governance of the TVET system, and the ongoing strategy and capacity to improve the performance of TVET centers in terms of resource allocation, responsiveness to skill demand and increased self-governance.
- Available metrics to evaluate the performance of the TVET systems and of their main actors.
- Soft skills development and entrepreneurship promotion.
- Career information guidance and labor market intermediation services.

Summary of discussions

Introductory words

After presentations, the ATFP representative started off by explaining that headquarters are interested in hearing about Centers’ expectations regarding the reform, about their opinion on
performance metrics and best practices. In particular, ideas on how to follow up and measure the performance of the training delivered by ATFP once graduates are working in companies. The ATFP representatives stated that the discussion was meant to be an open one, and should include ideas on how the center representatives see the future.

**Enrollment, trainee population (some numbers)**

**Mégrine center**
- 1820 trainees in the Center with approximately 500 graduates per year.
- The leather and shoes training line is operating at less than 50% capacity with 189 trainees out of 400 available spots. Interestingly, there is strong demand for skilled labor in this particular sector, and salaries in the sector can be in the higher end at more than 1’000 Dinar/months.

**Gammarth center**
- 3000 trainees in the Center with approximately 500 graduates per year.
- 30% are in « alternance » (work/study program), 70% are in a « residentiel » (in school training with an internship) program.

**El Khadra center**
- 340 agreements with firms for apprenticeships and internships.

**Apprenticeships/ internships, and measuring their quality**
- Centers give opportunity to students to find internships themselves or they can make the choice that the centers help them find internships. Internship skills acquisition is the responsibility of both student and company.
- A validated internship means minimum requirement is reached as per skills acquisition. It does not necessarily mean the internship was good. If trainees don’t succeed the internship assessment they re-do an internship. 2-3% of students don’t pass their work placement.
- But how do you measure the quality of the apprenticeship or internship? The « Livret de stage » or the « livret d’alternance » (the internship or work/study logbook) is one of the main tools used by the centers. Each month the students must present his logbook of have an interview with our teaching. In the logbook, we have listed the tasks and skills that must be accomplished. At the end of the internship/apprenticeship, a 10 min interview with the student is held during which he must present a pitch of what he did and learned.
- Companies are supposed to fill out the logbook, but often don’t really use it as expected by the centers. Most companies are not really training companies or do not perceive themselves as such. Normally in each company the student has a designated trainer but it far from always the case. There are not enough supervisors for internships within the companies. Some young students are excellent and make the most of their experience, yet it largely depends on whether the company values the trainees they host (company culture). Some companies, for instance, have an internal training center and students are therefore well helped in their skills acquisition.
- In 2016, we received several hiring requests from companies for students before they graduate especially for low specializing branches (training of shop floor workers). Some
students do stop their curricula to go directly work in the hosting companies when they find an immediate job opportunity there. This has been frequent when the demand is high and the salaries attractive (in leather for instance).

**Monitoring employment outcomes**

- In the Gammarth Center, one staff follows the trainees once they graduate and is in charge of relations with companies. It’s a quarterly follow up exercise during which graduates and companies are contacted. It is difficult to get accurate feedback from trainees after their graduate. For instance, young people often bias their feedback (say that they are not in a job, when in fact they are) in the hopes of being offered better job opportunities.
- In the El Khadra Center, they have a Development manager who is also tasked with following the employment outcomes of their graduates.
- ANETI (the employment agency) should be the one doing the follow up of the labor force outcomes of the trainees as it’s not the centers core competence to do so.
- Responding to the question “What are the branches of training that are most popular with students according to you?”, the Gammarth Director stated that they don’t measure it continuously, but they do measure the number of applications. They have an information system to process student applications.
- It is particularly difficult to place women in companies. Companies prefer men because its mainly shop floor jobs (male dominated jobs).
- Centers are interested in ideas/best practices to monitor the quality of the training received in firms. Right now, they don’t have an indicator of whether their trainees find work in the firm where they interned.

**Management and autonomy of the centers**

- The term « center » is misleading. Training centers are actually « auxiliary agencies of the ATFP ».
- Since 2011, ATFP has worked to install a quality management system. 19 centers were ISO 9001 certified but several have lost them again as certifications have to be kept up to date.
- Center representatives all agreed that more autonomy to manage the centers has to be provided. It is for instance difficult to acquire something as small as a new printer. The process requires the center to get it repaired, by making request at central level which has to be approved by the Director General of ATFP. It is much costlier than buying a new one on own operational funds, and it takes a long time.
- Centers are not allowed to utilize income they have generated for such investments, if they haven’t reached the 80% annual target of 145’000 Dinar. The investment budget is entirely controlled by ATFP HQ.
- There is a need to streamline the process of obtaining approval from the Director General of ATFP or remove some instances when it is needed. For instance, his approval is need to sign an agreement with a firm, which places a big burden on our administration.
- The Center representatives ask “why not decentralize the operational budget to the centers and implement effective control mechanisms”? The centers do not aspire for total autonomy, but need to be empowered with budgetary discretion and overseen with control mechanisms.
- The law allows center trainers to do up to 208 h of private training /consulting (equivalent to 4 h/week) work in companies on the condition its is approved in advance by the ATFP CEO. The consulting opportunity must be with the field of activity of continuous professional training for continuous improvement of companies, in relevant field /competency of what
he/she is doing at school. It is much too burdensome today and should be facilitated as it allows the trainer to upgrade their knowledge/skills, build a relationship with the firm and obtain extra income.

- In response to the statement raised by ATFP, that centers can not become more autonomous because they are not able to express clearly their need, the centers argue that it is rather a question of adequate management procedures and control that they are lacking. If these procedures are not changed, more autonomy can not be given/implemented. If you don’t define how to control, you can not give autonomy.
- One of the main challenges is to harmonize the programs and their quality across the centers, as their quality differs greatly.

Relations with the firm

- Companies tend to criticize centers but they continue to come to them for recruitment. Partner companies contact the center director when they have recruitments ongoing. Gamarth/El Khadra center estimate that they had requests for 15 graduates in business administration and 15 in telecom, respectively.
- Centers say that they don’t really have a view as to what goes on inside the firm, and they don’t have an impact on the firms. In that sense, the firm can not really be considered a true partner.
- There is no label « entreprise formatrice » (the training firm) and there is no official « tutor » function within the firm, though. There are several partnerships (“conventions”) with firms. For instance, El Khadra center has 340 agreements ongoing with firms.
- Some firms are much more implicated than others in training and it tends to be sector specific: For instance in Multimedia, electricity, textile, food and agriculture, private sector involvement is greater.
- The centers aim is to train youths together with firms. According to the law, a public-private advisory committee is obligatory in each center (it advises the center’ board). However, it is not always in operation. In Gammarth center, they hold 4 advisory committees per year. 3 firms from the service sector take part (a banker, a large distribution company, an IT company). With the center they try to agree on the needs of job market (“We try to equilibrate our flow of graduates depending on the need on the market, we don’t want to train youth and then they don’t find a job”: Gamarth representative). UTICA is supposed to designate the industry representative but often doesn’t. In Gammarth, the assignment of the representatives on the committee was done directly with the firms, but the arrangement is not formal.

Anticipating needs

- A system to effectively identify the need of the private sector is missing. Because the system of identifying company needs is not performant, Centers say they have little idea about the exact needs of companies. And in the companies, they don’t have a good understanding of what the term competency means for them.
- Centers receive very little feedback from the labor market and the centers need some flexibility to be able to change the programs according to needs they are able to identify. The CENAFIF renewals are much too slow.
- There is an issue for IT training programs, the industry in changing so rapidly, our process of programs upgrade is not adequate, some parts of programs taught often become obsolete in the meantime. We need to push for digital learning, to replace the classic paper based learning. We need to develop and promote cross-sectorial knowledge. Project based
methodology as a pedagogic approach in most of disciplines is in use, but to a low extent so far.

- A technological observatory unit per sector should be created
- Approach by competency method implies 3 phases to develop curriculum:
  o Assess the needs of the industry
  o Draw the profile needed by this industry, listing tasks and competencies
  o Program of study: the professional need is transformed to a pedagogic need and we develop our programs. The method of training depends on the industry.

Perception of the reform process

- Centers feel they are reaching a breaking point so any reform bringing improvement are welcome. The Ministry continues to instigate reforms but must recognize that the problems remain. The « approche par compétences » (competency-based) reforms have not worked. The real question is to adapt to the Tunisian context. The Alternance (dual system) was copied on the German system, but we did not consider the specificities and needs of Tunisia’s job market.
- Centers are, nonetheless, somewhat optimistic because the rate of employability from TVET is better than the university system. Our work integration rate after graduation is 42 to 62 per cent on a national basis.
- Centers were well represented in the reform process and all categories of jobs from professional training were represented.
- The new organizational chart of the ATFP and centers plans for a « fonction veille » (monitoring function) which would be welcome. The reform also plans to install a database of trainers of trainers which would be positive if it facilitates access to these resource persons.
ATFP Workshop with representatives from:

Centre Sectoriel de Formation en Energétique de Djerba
Centre de Formation et d’Apprentissage de Medenine
Centre de Formation et de Promotion du Travail Indépendant de Tozeur
Centre de Formation et d’Apprentissage dans les Métiers de l’Artisanat de Tataouine
Centre Sectoriel de Formation en Bâtiment et Forage de Gabès
Centre de Formation et d’Apprentissage de Kébili

15 February 2017, Medenine

Participants

- Belgassem Lassoued Training Centre Director (Medenine)
- Gaidi Hedi Training Centre Director (Gabes)
- Salem Mabrouk Trainer (Gabes)
- Mokhtar chouya Training counsellor (Medenine)
- Anouar Elkarous Training Centre Director (Kébili)
- Ali Addala Training Centre Director (Tataouine)
- Houssem eddine Ben abdellah Training counsellor (Djerba)
- Ben saad Hajer Training counsellor (Djerba)
- Layla Ben salem Rhouma Orientation counsellor (Djerba)
- Belhaj Mohamed Trainer (Kébili)
- Mahmoud Abdelwaheb Technical coordinator (Tozeur)
- Hachmi Hadhri Training Centre Director (Tozeur)
- Alec Hansen Lead economist (FHI 360)
- Kjartan Sorensen Technical advisor (FHI 360)

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- Available metrics to evaluate the performance of the TVET systems and of their main actors.
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Summary

Reforming TVET in Tunisia: Strategic Assessment (DRAFT) July 2017
What priorities would you work on if resources were not an issue?

**Medenine Director:**

- Acquire training equipment (there is for instance no injection style engine to be trained on even though it has been an industry standard for many years!)
- Improve student life to trainees and the difficult living conditions: activities (there are none), internet access and the dormitories.
- Technical training of the trainers: there is a lot of innovation and trainers do make some efforts to keep up. But much more technical trainings are needed, today trainings are too theoretical.

**Gabès Director:**

- Training of trainers
- Replace obsolete equipment
- Improve living and social conditions on schools
- Better geographical distribution of the centers and training specialties (It is not suitable to train on specialties if there are no jobs in the region (for example refrigeration).
- Implementation of an IT system between the centers and the ATFP
- Integrate entrepreneurial values in the curriculum

**Djerba representatives:**

- We are overwhelmed with training specialties because there is no demand for these skills on the labor market. We need to be able to anticipate demand.
- We have no true collaboration with the private sector. It’s only empty words.
- Improve our communication with firms which remains low.
- In 2010-2011, we had 60-70 % apprenticeship placement rates. That number has dropped to 40% today. How to change this reality and with what money?
- Invest in software to help follow the trainees.
- Specific lodging for women trainees as boarding is made for boys and not adapted to girls.
- Create a training center specifically for those youths who want to emigrate

**Kébili representative:**

- Acquire new equipment and new training technology
- Certified technical training of the pedagogical staff
- Develop socio-cultural life on school for trainees: we don’t give any importance in all centers to this crucial aspect for the creation of better citizens.

**Tataouine Director:**

All centers know the same difficulties:

- We need to engage in quality monitoring, from the centers to the ATFP and Ministry
- Improve living conditions in the centers
- Empower the trainer in his/her respective crafts
- Equipment: we need more maintenance
- We need to update training specialties and conduct strategic studies, establish specialties adapted to the demand. Today we don’t know if the graduates skills are adapted.
- Improve relations with firms
- Provide more autonomy to the training center

Discussions

Regionalization and autonomy of the centers

- There are also regional problems. Professional training investment is focused on the big industrial centers, investments in the inside of the country does not reach the same levels. This creates logistical problems, especially if the center is far from an industrial center.
- Many problems linked with the structure of the ATFP.
- The formalities for the centers are too burdensome and complex to obtain the authorizations to operate properly.
- The Regional director of professional training and labor: a political position, the centers are not in relation with him/her. The regional directorate has no statistics or does not share any.
- The development plan is made at the level of the state and does not reflect the actual economic situation

Soft skills

- Soft skills mean: is the person capable of create, innovating living well with his colleagues, interpersonal skills.
- In centers soft skills are taught but not sufficiently or in a systemic way.
- In some centers they have implemented a training Program with Germany: to develop the intern’s capacity to work independently. It is meant as a module.

Quality of the trainings

- Three major weaknesses:
  1. Training of trainers
  2. Training programs (« we don’t have any! »): the programs are not updated, they last for 12 years without any update. They need to be revised with the professions/industries/sectors at least every 5 years.
  3. Equipment is obsolete
- We need to stop with the competency based training which hasn’t proven its effectiveness: we simply don’t have the equipment and we would be better off to return to a residency-based training where our limited resources could be used more effectively.
- Work/study training style is imposed but we don’t have trainers in firms. The tutors required for effective apprenticeships do not exist. Conventions are made at the national level but responsibilities are murky.
- No indicators to know whether we are making progress or not. The centers essentially provide free labor to firms:
  1. We need a management system
  2. Install a pedagogical inspection with capabilities to evaluate trainers
- CENAFIF only provides theoretical training. There are qualified people, engineers for instance, but their capacities are not utilized.
- Geographical location is important: trainees can not possibly have the same qualifications if there are no firms in Tozeur. Yet we insist on giving them the same diplomas.

**Solutions to evaluate performance and quality**

**Ways to improve trainer’s performance**

1. Auto-evaluation of trainers
2. Inspection and face to face interviews with trainers
3. Continuous training for trainers and delivery of certificates
4. Monitor the success rates of their trainees

**Some indicators to measure trainer’s performance:**

- Number of trainings the trainer has received in the past 3 year
- Number of pedagogical assistance requests made by the trainer
- Quality evaluation of the training / trainer by an independent third party
- Evaluate the trainer on the basis of a skills evaluation matrix
- Each trainer should be able to define his needs in term of his own training

**To increase cooperation with firms and demand anticipation and to anticipate their demand for skills, indicators could include:**

- Training requests submitted by firms to the Centers
- Capacity to respond to this demand
- Surveys on firm needs could be done by center counselors – perhaps in partnership with business schools.
- Complaints/demands emitted by firms in terms of skills
- The apprenticeship journal (logbook) of the trainee: the firm should mention their needs in there.

**Indicators to measure center performance in terms of trainees’ employment outcomes:**

- Problem is that there are no real statistics at the Ministry, or participants are not aware of them.
- IT monitoring tool was developed and implemented by ATFP (SimForm) but is badly used, not connected to the internet and not systematically used by centers.
- Medenine: there was a project with ETF to call graduates but it did not work because the answers we received did not reflect reality.
- Rate of integration into the labor market: participants state they need those strategic numbers. This is why the ATFP in 2010 created the role of « monitoring of graduates » with 1 person per governorates but it is only certain centers that have this person.
  Question to participants: in your center, is there a staff in charge of (1) monitoring the graduates and of (2) relations with firms?
  - Medenine: no and yes
  - Gabes: yes and yes
  - Kebili: yes and yes
For each specialty, there is a need to have the following indicators:

1. The occupancy rate (easy)
2. The rate of success (easy)
3. The rate of drop out (on a continuous basis) which need to be followed up by surveys (feasible)
4. The rate of labor market integration (complex) obtained:
   - When graduates come get their diploma (6 months after)
   - By phone and letters
   - Through social media
   - With incentives to obtain truthful answers
   - Through surveys

Participants agrees that, if for each center and training specialty, these 4 rates are systematically available, managers will have important signals to work with to improve center effectiveness.

Summary of priority areas enumerated by the centers

1. Improve training of trainers and boost their empowerment.
2. Acquisition of new equipment, and ensure regular maintenance
3. Ensure continuous reviewing and updating of training programs which are systematically behind times, and reconsider the competency based training model as it is not adapted to the challenges of the TVET system
4. Optimization of centers distribution geographically and according to specialty
5. Improve relations with the firm (tutors and apprenticeships, anticipation of demand and the need for skills, feedback loops)
6. Increase centers’ autonomy by training of the management, IT management and monitoring system, improvement of relations with ATFP and better tools to follow employment outcomes
7. Improve living conditions and community improvement in centers
8. Install an information system between the centers and ATFP
9. Support the external communication efforts of the centers
10. More systemic soft skills training and coaching
ATFP Workshop with representatives from:

Centre de Formation Professionnelle et du Travail Indépendant de Kasserine (CFPTI) Centre de Formation et d’Apprentissage de Sidi Bouzid (CFA)

14 February 2017, Kasserine

Participants
- Mr. Hassen Omri, Director, CPTI Kasserine
- Mr. Missaoui Taeib, Trainer, CPTI Kasserine
- Mr. Nsiri Ahmed, Technical coordinator, CFA Sidi Bouzid
- Mr. Abid Salah, Trainer, CFA Sidi Bouzid
- Mr. Alec Hansen, Lead economist, FHI 360
- Mr. Kjartan Sorensen, Technical advisor, private sector development, FHI 360

Context
Together with the Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment (MVTE) and the Tunisian TVET Agency (ATFP), the AUC/FHI 360 evaluation team organized 3 workshops in Tunis, Kasserine and Medenine (10-15 February 2017) comprising 5-10 participants each including senior center managers from various centers, student advisors, trainers/educators. Facilitated by FHI 360 experts (economist and an international TVET expert), the workshop focused on discussing and identifying opportunities for improvements and interventions within the current reform efforts implemented by MTVE and ATFP looking, in particular, at:

- The Governance of the TVET system, and the ongoing strategy and capacity to improve the performance of TVET centers in terms of resource allocation, responsiveness to skill demand and increased self-governance.
- Available metrics to evaluate the performance of the TVET systems and of their main actors.
- Soft skills development and entrepreneurship promotion.
- Career information guidance and labor market intermediation services.

Summary of discussions

Training centers in numbers

Kasserine center

- 150 trainees in the “Fo program” which is a training program for the 15-20-year-old leading to the « Certificat de Formation Apprentissage » (Certificate of apprenticeship training)
- 329 trainees in the Fi program « formation initiale » (Initial training based on the dual model). It’s open for 16-35 year olds.
- 60% of Fi trainees eventually get employment in the textile firms.
- The CFPTI has agreements with approximately 250 firms.

**Sidi Bouzid center**

- Approximately 600 trainees in the Sidi Bouzid CFA
- 10 trainees take part in the « Club Entrepreneur »
- 50% of trainees are inserted into the labor market after 6 months.

**What priorities would you work on if resources were not an issue?**

- Increase the level of the trainings offered to trainees by:
  - Acquiring new training equipment (According to the Director, since 1994, the CFPTI has not received any new equipment);
  - Perfecting the technical skills of trainers: typically, they are academically trained and without experience nor any professional training (« We need professionals! »);
  - New pedagogical materials;
  - Improve training modeling and programs.
- Address the lack of communication and coordination between the CENAFIF and the training centers. When there is a new training offered to perfect the technical skills of trainers, not all regions benefit.
- Create an « Observatoire Régional des Métiers » (Regional Skills/ Competency Observatory) for the Sidi bouzid, Kasserine, Gafsa, Kérouan District.
- Develop and implement the center’s communication strategies including training in communication to entice youth to enroll in a TVET program or improve their career orientation skills.
- Provide centers with a resource to listen to firms and help them define their needs.
- Provide training centers with a system to register job seekers in the ANETI database. Today this linkage does not exist.
- Implement a « Certificat de Compétences » (Skills certificate) for adults who have acquired skills but do not have any diplomas, namely in the construction sector.

**Perception of the reform and the TVET system**

- The reform draft document was not communicated in time. Participants had never heard about the 14 projects contained in the reform.
- Participants believe there is a vast gap in communication between the ATFP and the training centers. For instance, Centers don’t know the ATFP organizational structure! Communication between the centers tends to be good, it is with the ATFP that it is problematic.
- With each reform, it’s the same tune: good promises but no change management policy to enable their implementation.
- There is clearly a vision from Ministry and ATFP, but the objectives are murky and verifiable indicators to support them are not implemented. Nor is there a communication platform.
- There is a need to implement an information sharing system for the ATFP and its centers.

**Collaborating with, and meeting the needs of, employers**
- Benetton associated firms established in Kasserine demand specific skills in sowing, sowing machines and techniques. This was made clear through the 2012 and 2016 meetings on TVET organized by the Kasserine Center and the Governorate.
- How to help firms to identify and formulate their training needs is a central concern. It is the centers’ responsibility to help firm, and it is not enough to ask for their HR development plan as they typically do not have one.
- There was good practice at the Zaghoun CFA (Centre de Formation et d’Apprentissage): the head of the center’s board was a representative of UTICA and there was an ATFP representative and another head of the firm on the board. The experience lasted 2 years and, as a result, the rate of insertion into the labor market climbed to 76%. However, this form of organization is not common, and even goes beyond what is allowed by the law.
- There is a need to establishing a « habilitation » (empowerment) system to train the trainers as industrials. Define the procedure to design and implement training programs which meet, in time, the needs of firm, with « à la carte » training on top of a base offering.
- Making agreements with firms is not so difficult, it’s more about finding tutors within the firms.

On regionalization

- According to the CFPTI Director, regionalization is the only way to attract significant investment to the regions. Supporting this process, TVET should become a vehicle to attract investors through increased skills availability. This will require high levels of effective collaborations with the private sector at regional level.
- The managerial decision concerning the centers are taken at central level. But the centers are disconnected from the economic sectors. Centers train for trainings’ sake, like a school. The only way that can work is to regionalize so that training serves the region and its firms.
- Centers are not aware of what role the regional director of TVET is supposed to play.
- Are there any occasions to learn from/ compare yourself with other centers? There is only ad hoc/ word to mouth opportunities. If a center wants to start a specialty course in microelectronics, how would the director know the budget needed, the requirements? This information is hard to get.
- Example of leather and shoe making: it has been a few years since all centers offering this specialty have closed in the region but what is the process to establish new specialties?

Performance indicators

- Is there accurate data on firms or investment in the Kasserine region? If you ask UTICA they only provide data on 1 or 2 firms only. There is no regional database on firms or investment.
- The Kasserine directors asks whether the centers are organized and process oriented? What results and what tasks do they have?
- Performance indicators: behind an indicator, there must be sources of information. What and where are they? To measure efficacy, what indicators? Each center director does his own organization: it’s to be optimal or to do nothing
  - The occupancy rate of the centers is an indicator of efficacy.
  - Cost for an hour of training (The Director has this data but who validates it, he asks?):
    - 6’000 dinars was the the annual cost of a trainee in 2006
    - 0.120 Dinar is the marginal cost (only direct costs, not the indirect ones) of an extra hour of training per student. That is an efficiency indictor that we strive for to reach in 2018. We are currently at 0.400 Dinar/hour.
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- The rate of integration of graduates into the labor market is a good indicator of effectiveness
- In Sidi Bouzid, they have 1 person in charge of graduates who is also responsible for collecting job offers.

What would more/better autonomy require?

- Elaboration of a regional development plan with indicators and name « an objective oriented contract ».
- Why not have regional objective based contracts, where each center has the autonomy to reach the objectives? Centers and partners should be able to choose training specialties at the regional level and according to the needs of the region.
- There should be direct and systematic contact with the private sector and offering help to companies.
- Regional networking to share information with the API, ANETI,
- Create a quality management system for the centers. There is a need for an independent auditors and for implementation of defined processes, evaluation mechanisms and feedback loops with students and firms.
- Communication: need for a strategy and a supporting and clear organizational chart.
- For instance, each trainer does his best to identify his equipment needs but in order to make a request, there are no equipment matrix to assist him/her to determine the needs. Allow trainers to express their equipment needs and facilitate their purchase, but also develop national standards for equipment to ensure good and portable skills.
- Having an Observatoire régional des métiers (regional skills observatory) to help developing training according to demand.

Regional sectors

- The most demanded training specialty by Kasserine students was Construction and refrigeration. The expected monthly salary is 800-1200 dinar but jobs are mostly based in Sfax or Tunis so once they graduate they leave the region.
- In 2010, there was strong demand for trainees with a textile-clothing CAP because the Benetton factories were opening. Demand has since gone down significantly but demand is still high for the more qualified « BTP modeliste » trainees. The Kasserine center trains approximately 40 modelists /year which is about 50% of its capacity. Graduates work as factory workers and ear 300-400 dinar per month.
- Refrigeration training: a few years ago the rate of dropout was 37% (same as the national one). The problem was that the cycles of work/study were not adapted to the trainees living conditions and social context which was discovered when a small survey was conducted with the trainees. We saw wee needed to change the work/study rhythm. The center did and as a result the dropout rate fell.
Annex 4: La Plateforme pour le développement des chaînes de valeur (World Bank)

I. Introduction : Développer des Synergies Inter-agences à travers une Plateforme Commune

1. Le CEPEX, l’APII, l’APIA, l’ODNO, et l’ODCO, agences d’appui au développement du secteur privé et des régions nord-ouest et centre ouest, ont exprimé la volonté de travailler conjointement à mettre en œuvre une méthodologie commune d’appui au développement des chaînes de valeur basées sur les produits ou activités de ces régions. Bien que cette initiative est entreprise à titre pilote entre ces agences et dans le cadre de projets spécifiques (voir ci-après), elle vise à mettre en place le fondement pour une action collaborative qui pourrait s’élargir à d’autres membres, d’autres partenaires, et d’autres régions si elle prouve être utile et réussie.

2. A cet effet, une Plateforme opérationnelle commune pour le développement des chaînes de valeur sera mise en place. Par « Plateforme » il est entendu une équipe intégrant les expertises des multiples parties concernés dans une équipe soudée, composée essentiellement de membres compétitivement sélectionnés principalement au sein de ses organismes membre et ce en vue de la fourniture d’un service d’appui conjoint au secteur privé dans les chaînes de valeur visées, et ou de l’échange ou du partage d’un contenu à cet effet entre ces membres. Cette équipe bénéficie d’un statut juridique qui lui permet d’exercer sa mission (voir ci-après).

3. La Plateforme permet de renforcer et d’améliorer l’efficacité de l’appui au secteur privé offert par les organismes participants en (i) harmonisant les méthodologies d’analyses techniques et approches d’appui adoptées ; (ii) orientant les interventions publiques financées par des projets de développement vers les actions les plus percutantes sur la croissance économique locale, et ce selon des approches structurées aussi bien analytiques que participatives ; (iii) réalisant des économies d’échelle, et évitant la dispersion/redondance ; et (iv) facilitant l’accès des MPME bénéficiaires aux divers mécanismes et ressources d’appui existants dans les différentes agences à travers la mise en place conjointe d’un interlocuteur intégré commun. L’impact de l’action sur le développement du tissu productif local (notamment dans les régions défavorisées ciblées) en serait alors fortifié.

4. Il est proposé que la Plateforme soit juridiquement logée au sein de l’un des organismes participant présentant les prédispositions techniques et logistiques nécessaire pour l’accueillir, et ce notamment dans le contexte des projets appuyés par la Banque Mondiale (voir ci-dessous). Hors, dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du PDE III, le Cepex est actuellement en train de mettre en place une unité de soutien au développement des chaînes de valeur à l’export. Il est donc proposé d’élargir l’initiative pour qu’elle soit mieux portée par les différentes agences techniques et régionales concernées et perturantes pour le développement des chaînes de valeurs et ainsi la transformer en une Plateforme inter-agences ; à savoir : i) élargir la composition de ses membres et équipes pour refléter la nature multidisciplinaire de sa mission. ii) élargir les chaînes ciblées à celles non nécessairement exportatrices à court terme, permettant ainsi le développement d’activités dans des régions défavorisées susceptibles de monter en gamme et d’accéder ensuite aux marchés internationaux; iii) géographiquement décentraliser l’équipe pour renforcer sa proximité aux usagers dans les régions défavorisées ciblées.

II. Contexte : Projets concernés de la Banque mondiale

5. Le Gouvernement Tunisien a sollicité le soutien technique et financier du Groupe de la Banque Mondiale pour la mise en œuvre de son plan de développement 2016-2020. Dans ce cadre, quatre...
projets d’investissement financés par la Banque, et ciblant principalement les régions nord-ouest et centre ouest de la Tunisie, incluent des activités de développement de chaînes de valeurs et l’appui à la création d’emplois. A condition d’être bien coordonnés, ces projets représentent une opportunité pour offrir un programme d’appui intégré et impactant sur le développement économique des régions ciblées :

- Le 3ème Projet de Développement des Exportations (PDE III), entré en vigueur en septembre 2015, a pour objectif de contribuer à accroître et à diversifier les exportations par les entreprises soutenues, favorisant l’accroissement de la valeur ajoutée des exportations tunisiennes et leur pérennité, et ce selon, entre autres, une approche de développement des chaînes de valeurs qu’il pilote;
- L’Initiative pour l’Inclusion Economique des Jeunes – Moubadiroun » (PIE), en cours de préparation, vise à améliorer les opportunités économiques dans les gouvernorats sélectionnés à travers une offre de services adaptés aux groupes de jeunes vulnérables ainsi que des services dédiés aux entrepreneurs et entreprises, notamment à travers une approche le développement des chaînes de valeur susceptibles de créer de l’emploi pour les bénéficiaires ciblés;
- Le Projet Développement Intégré des Paysages dans les régions défavorisées de la Tunisie (PDIP), en cours de préparation, comprend une composante dédiée à l’appui technique au développement des chaînes de valeur agro-forestières en vue d’une meilleure valorisation des produits.
- Le Projet d’intensification de l’agriculture irriguée en Tunisie (PIAI), en cours de préparation, se propose de fonder les bases d’une amélioration de la performance de l’agriculture irriguée à travers le développement de chaînes de valeurs agricoles compétitives, et c’en privilégiant une approche basée sur la connexion directe des agriculteurs au marché.

6. Le développement des chaînes de valeur constituant un lien thématique commun entre ces projets, la Banque Mondiale a délivré un programme de formation sur l’identification des segments stratégiques à plus forte valeur ajoutée, la facilitation des dialogues public-privé, et l’élaboration des plans d’actions pour développer les chaînes de valeurs a vingt-sept (27) fonctionnaires provenant d’institutions et agences d’appui au secteur privé (CEPEX, APII, ODNO, ODCO, MDICI, centres techniques au sein du M. de l’Industrie, DGF du ministère de l’agriculture), pendant la période de mars à novembre 2016. La formation visait à renforcer les capacités des parties prenantes dans le cadre de la préparation des projets envisagés et a permis de : (i) doter les fonctionnaires participants des outils d’analyse stratégique les plus utilisés par les professionnels du domaine (tels que les cinq forces et le Diamant de Porter, la Chaîne de valeur, etc.) ; (ii) d’étudier en profondeur plusieurs cas d’étude dans ces domaines d’activités et à l’échelle internationale; et (iii) appliquer les différents outils et exploiter les raisonnements développés à travers les études de cas pour analyser des produits pilotes en Tunisie.

III. Mission de la Plateforme

7. La mission de la Plateforme est d’appuyer le développement des chaînes de valeurs visant les marchés nationaux ou internationaux à plus haute valeur ajoutée. La Plateforme fournira ce service d’appui à travers : i) l’identification et l’analyse des marchés à plus haute valeur ajoutées dans leur domaines d’activité ciblés ; et ii) l’identification et la facilitation de la mise en place de services et investissements communs (ou publiques) nécessaires pour développer ces chaînes de valeurs et faciliter ainsi l’accès aux MPME à ces marchés; iii) la mobilisation et la promotion de la collaboration entre les différents acteurs impliqués au sein d’une chaîne de valeur (publique-publique, publique-privé, et privé-privé) afin de maximiser les effets d’entraînement ; et iv) l’identification, à travers un dialogue public-privé structuré, des politiques publiques (ex : reforment administratives et/ou réglementaires) nécessaires pour renforcer la productivité et la compétitivité des MPME dans ces chaînes de valeurs ; et v) l’accompagnent à la préparation de dossiers de candidature alignés avec cet effort et dirigés aux fonds de subventions de contrepartie des quatre projets ci-dessus mentionnés.

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8. Il est entendu que le travail d’appui technique mené par la Plateforme couvre des situations différentes : (i) le renforcement des chaînes de valeurs au stade embryonnaire mais présentant des perspectives de développement prometteuses - il s’agit de renforcer leur compétitivité à travers un meilleur positionnement sur les créneaux porteurs et les activités à plus forte valeur ajoutée, sur le plan national dans une 1ère phase, et puis à l’international dans une phase ultérieure ; et (ii) le renforcement des chaînes de valeur matures et/ou déjà orientées vers l’exportation - il s’agit de développer les exportations des MPME tunisiennes en identifiant les marchés/produits/pays les plus dynamiques sur lesquels les entreprises peuvent développer un avantage compétitif.

IV. Modalités de fonctionnement de la plateforme

9. La composition de l’équipe et le mode de gouvernance de la plateforme permettent qu’elle soit portée par l’ensemble des organismes et institutions concernées par ses activités.

IV.1. Structure institutionnelle de la plateforme

10. La Plateforme adopte le statut juridique actuel de l’unité de développement des chaînes de valeurs établie au sein du Fond d’Appui à la Compétitivité et le Développement des Exportations géré par le CEPEX, tout en modifiant sa composition et son mode de gouvernance afin de la transformer en une véritable unité inter-agences. Cette modification sera faite dans le Manuel des Operations du fond (qui fait partie du projet PDE-3).

11. Le choix du statut tient compte : i) de l’avantage de capitaliser sur des arrangements institutionnels existants pour passer à l’action sans délais ; ii) de la complexité à attribuer un statut juridique autonome à la Plateforme et la nécessité d’avoir une entité juridiquement mandatée pour autoriser l’utilisation des ressources des prêts accordés par les différents programmes de développement (Banque Mondiale et autres bailleurs de fonds); iii) du fait que le CEPEX est un établissement public à caractère industriel et commercial, qui est soumis aux règles de droit commercial qui sont adéquates pour les interventions proposées ; et iv) du fait que le CEPEX a un mandat large (tout secteur) pour intervenir dans les chaînes de valeurs susceptibles d’accéder aux marchés internationaux.

12. Par contre, la création de la Plateforme est basée sur un accord (i) signé entre les différentes institutions publiques impliquées dans cette initiative (dont le CEPEX, APII, APIA, ODNO, ODCO – mais possiblement d’autres à un stade ultérieur) ; et (ii) approuvé dans le cadre d’un Conseil Inter Ministériel.

13. Un Comité de Pilotage Ad-hoc de la Plateforme siégerait au niveau des premiers responsables des organismes membres (PDG et DG). Le Comité de Pilotage exercera des missions similaires à celles généralement dévolues aux conseils d’administration des entreprises, à savoir : définition des orientations et prise de décisions stratégiques concertée au regard de ce qui concerne l’administration et la gestion de la Plateforme. La présidence de ce Comité de Pilotage serait rotative entre ses membres (tous les 6 mois). Vu la phase de démarrage sur les fond du PDE3 (voir ci-dessous), la rotation commencera par la présidence du Cepex.

14. Un administrateur délégué serait recruté pour diriger la Plateforme à travers un appel à candidatures sur la base de termes de références qui mettraient en avant ses qualités de gestionnaire confirmé capable de fédérer toutes les compétences autour du projet de la Plateforme, ainsi que ses qualités techniques en terme de développement des chaînes de valeurs. La sélection se fera par un comité de sélection proposé par le Comité de Pilotage. Sous réserve d’analyse plus complétée, il est proposé que cet administrateur délégué et chef d’équipe soit nommé par la Présidence du Gouvernement en tant que « commissaire », afin de renforcer son mandat et sa neutralité.
15. Le manuel de procédure de la plateforme forme partie intégrale du Manuel des Opération du FACDE et définira toutes les modalités de gestion et opération afférentes à la Plateforme.

IV. 2. Affectation du personnel dédié à la plateforme

16. Vu la nécessité d’assurer une composition d’équipe exceptionnellement motivée et techniquement solide, les membres de la Plateforme sont recrutés par appel à candidatures transparent et compétitif, sur la base de termes de références et selon un niveau de compétence précisé par le Comité de Pilotage. Toute personne issue du secteur public ou privé est éligible. Dans sa phase de démarrage, la Plateforme étant inscrite dans le fond FACDE, qui est financé par la Banque Mondiale, les procédures d’application seront celles de Banque Mondiale. Chaque organisme adhérent de la plateforme encouragera ses fonctionnaires à postuler, et, en cas de sélection, doit mettre à la disposition de celle-ci le personnel qualifié et motivé.

17. Dans le cas où un/une candidat(e) retenu(e) provient de l’administration, la modalité de recrutement envisagée est le détachement via l’Agence Tunisienne de Coopération Technique (ATCT) (Article 61 § 4-3° de la loi n°112/1983 du 12/12/1983 portant statut général des personnels de la fonction publique telle que modifiée et complétée par les textes subséquents). Dans ce cas le/la fonctionnaire sera détaché(e) de son organisme d’origine en premier lieu auprès de l’ATCT sur la base d’un contrat de recrutement établi par la Plateforme et cosignés par les deux parties et ensuite de l’ATCT auprès de la Plateforme. Dans cette situation le/la fonctionnaire qui aura au préalable négocié(e) son contrat restera régi par ce même contrat durant toute la période de détachement : sa situation administrative n’est plus régie par son organisme d’origine autant que dure le détachement. A noter que ce type de détachement ne sera pas valable pour les fonctionnaires provenant de l’organisme qui héberge la Plateforme ou de son ministère de tutelle, et ce en alignement avec les procédures de la Banque Mondiale.

18. Enfin, la Plateforme pourrait aussi, selon ses besoins, recruter des consultants externes (expertises pointues du secteur privé; firmes pour conduire des études complémentaires spécialisées; etc.) ou collaborer avec des institutions publiques spécialisées (recherches, etc.) dans des domaines.

IV.3. Modalités de paiement de l’équipe de la Plateforme

19. Les dépenses relatives aux frais des ressources humaines de la Plateforme sont assumés par le FACDE (frais des consultants, inclus ceux détachés à travers l’ATCT). Les rémunérations de services des consultants membres de l’équipe de la Plateforme seront variables d’un membre à l’autre et seront fonction de plusieurs éléments d’appréciation dont en particulier le profil du candidat, et le statut dont il bénéficiera au sein de la Plateforme.

IV.4. Financement des activités de la Plateforme

20. Les frais de fonctionnement de la Plateforme sont divisés en deux catégories: i) les couts fixes (locaux, investissements d’installation et d’équipements, etc.) amortis sur plusieurs années (en fonction des investissements en question), et les couts variables d’exploitation et opérationnels relatifs aux travaux de développement de chaque chaîne de valeur engagée. Un coût unitaire par chaîne de valeur sera établi en tenant compte aussi bien des couts variables que fixes. Les coûts unitaires seront établis en tenant compte de toutes les dépenses anticipées, adaptées aux besoins de chaque chaîne (en ce inclut : les investissements (travaux d’aménagement de locaux, matériels informatiques, matériels bureautiques, etc.); frais de personnels; dépenses d’exploitation (location de bureaux, assurances matériels, publications, fonctionnement), organisation des workshops et réunions participatifs; et services externes (consultants, visites de références aux marchés destinataires, appui et coaching, formation, etc.). Sur base d’une convention type, des conventions de prestation de service spécifiques seront établies entre la Plateforme - représentée juridiquement par
le CEPEX - et l’institution concernée (Ministère ou autre) où les prestations de services attendus, frais associés, et conditions spécifiques seront finalisés.

21. Dans un premier temps, lesordonnateurs seront les projets financés par la Banque Mondiale – le PIE, PIAI, et PDIP. Au démarrage de la Plateforme et en attendant l’entrée en vigueur des trois projets cités ci-haut - qui sont en cours de préparation - les frais de fonctionnement liés à la Plateforme seront pris en charge par le PDE III. Dans ce dernier cas, le financement des activités fera directement partie du budget du FACDE, puisque la Plateforme et le FACDE font partie de la même institution (Cepex).

22. Chaque projet cité ci-dessus pourra bénéficier des services de la Plateforme après signature de la convention de prestation de service relative aux chaînes de valeur qui le concerne (tel que définis par l’unité de gestion du projet ordonnateur). En ce qui concerne les projets financés par les prêts BIRD, les coûts unitaires par chaîne de valeur seront standardisés, avec une variation limitée en fonction des spécificités techniques de chaque chaîne (tels que nombre d’intervenants dans la chaîne, diversité des marchés, degré de complexité des activités de la chaîne, dispersion géographique des acteurs, etc.), et ce en fonction de la convention signée.

IV.5 Décentralisation de la Plateforme pour assurer une proximité de terrain

23. L’objectif de décentralisation de la Plateforme est d’assurer un service de proximité et d’être opérationnelle en vue de : i) recueillir auprès des acteurs locaux de la chaîne de valeur les informations nécessaires à la réalisation d’un diagnostic structuré et participatif; ii) établir un dialogue continu et structuré avec les différents acteurs locaux de la chaîne de valeur ; iii) Assurer une continuité et cohérence globale entre le travail analytique de marché et le travail de terrain avec la participation des acteurs locaux ; iv) définir en concertation avec les entreprises et producteurs locaux, ainsi que les organisations professionnelles concernées, les plans d’affaires nécessaires au développement des chaînes de valeur ciblées; et enfin v) assurer une coordination forte avec les organismes décentralisés dont la mission est complémentaires à celle de la Plateforme.

24. Le déploiement de la Plateforme au niveau régional sera facilité par le déploiement géographique des agences participantes. L’APII et l’APIA disposent d’un réseau dense de représentations régionales déploées au niveau territorial (dans tous les gouvernorats) et à un degré moindre le CEPEX aussi (Sousse, Sfax et récemment Kasserine). De même, les organismes décentralisés tels que l’ODNO et l’ODCO siègent naturellement dans les régions défavorisées. La Plateforme pourra capitaliser sur la présence physique des institutions membres (ou d’autres) pour installer une partie de son équipe directement dans les régions défavorisées visées.

25. Dans un premier temps, et afin de ne pas trop fragmenter l’équipe qui doit passer par une période de formation et construction d’esprit d’équipe, il est proposé que les effectifs de la plateforme soit basés dans deux ou trois localités simultanément: un local central (ex : CEPEX) et un ou deux dans les régions NO et CO (ex : Siliana/Jendouba et Kasserine). Ceci permettra aux équipes de bien couvrir les activités dans les régions ciblées, sans perdre l’accès aux ressources humaines et connexions aux marchés disponibles à Tunis. Les modalités d’hébergement des équipes au niveau décentralisés devraient être précisées contractuellement entre le CEPEX et l’organisme hébergeur.

IV.6 Complémentarité avec les fonds d’investissements prévus par les projets de développement (notamment financés par la BM)

26. Dans chacun des 4 projets de développements mentionnés dans la section II, un budget considérable, indépendant de celui de la Plateforme, est dédié au co-financement des investissements nécessaires pour le développement des chaînes de valeurs ciblées par ces projets (respectivement). Ces budgets sont gérés différemment dans chaque projet, mais visent le même but : inciter la croissance des chaînes de valeurs ciblées en cofinançant (ou subventionnant) les investissements

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stratégiques des MPME (actifs dans ces chaines) dans leur productivité. Dans leur ensemble, ces fonds offrent conjointement un appui à la croissance économique et l’emploi dans les régions défavorisées ciblées communément par ces projets (notamment le nord-ouest et le centre-ouest).

27. Pour chaque projet, le choix des chaines ciblées dans le mandat fait à la Plateforme (suivant la convention mentionnée dans le IV.4), reflète le choix des priorités respectives de ce projet: produits forestiers, emplois des jeunes, exports, intensification de l’agriculture irriguée, etc. Les services rendu par la Plateforme visent à : i) contribuer - à travers la partie analytique de son travail - aux critères d’identification et de sélection des investissements à faire par les des quatre projets, et ce afin d’augmenter l’impact de ces investissements publiques (ex : mettre en valeur les maillons les plus faibles dans les chaines, ou les domaines de services qui permettent mieux de renforcer la compétitivité des produits de la chaine dans les marchés a plus haute valeur ajoutée, etc.) ; et ii) fournir aux quatre projets de développement un viviers de sous-projets candidats pour considération au co-financement, rigoureusement préparés et déjà bien alignés avec les orientations stratégiques identifiée (marches a plus haute valeur ajoutée, etc.).

28. La décision finale de quels sous-projets d’investissement retenir (dans une approche de sélection compétitive) revient aux projets respectifs, notamment à travers une évaluation indépendante faite par un comité d’experts désigné par chaque projet. Ce comité pourra étudier la solidité des sous-projets, leurs cohérence avec le cadre analytique fourni par la plateforme (deuxième avis indépendant), et surtout leurs alignment avec les objectifs propres des projets de développement (par exemple : parmi les projets jugés cohérent avec le cadre analytique fourni par la plateforme sur une chaine x, le comité de sélection du projet PGIP favoriserait ceux en plus cohérent avec la gestion intégrée des paysages ciblés et/ou le renforcement des forêts ; par contre le comité de sélection du projet PIE favoriserait plutôt ceux facilitant directement l’emploi des jeunes vulnérables, ou qui contiennent un aspect de formation à l’emploi, etc.).

29. La responsabilité de supervision de la mise en œuvre des sous-projets appartient aux financeurs, et donc aux projets de développement respectifs (PGIP, PIE, PIAI, etc.), et non à la plateforme. Par contre, si cela est jugé plus convenable, et comme tâche supplémentaire à son cœur de métier, il est envisageable que les projets respectifs délèguent à la plateforme (à travers la convention de provision de service) la supervision et l’accompagnement dans la mise en œuvre des sous-projets sélectionnés/cofinancés.

**Méthodologie de travail et activités spécifiques**

30. La Plateforme est composée d’équipes techniques dédiées au soutien au développement des chaines de valeur ayant un potentiel d’accès aux marchés internationaux. Chaque équipe technique composée de 3 personnes se focalise sur le développement d’une seule chaine de valeur, et ce pendant une durée moyenne de 7-9 mois (en trois phases, tel que décrit ci-dessous). Une fois le travail accompli, les membres d’une équipe technique peuvent continuer à travailler au sein de la Plateforme sur une autre chaine de valeur. La taille de la Plateforme et la composition des équipes techniques par chaine de valeur sera révisée selon les besoins techniques d’appui des chaines de valeur.

31. La Plateforme assumera les trois grandes responsabilités suivantes :

1) **Réalisation d’un diagnostic participatif de la chaîne de valeur** qui inclut, entre autres, les taches essentielles suivantes :

- Entretiens avec au moins 20 agents de la chaîne de valeur sélectionnée en vue d’obtenir des informations sur les acteurs du cluster local, de déterminer « qui est qui » et leur fonction au sein du cluster, ainsi qu’identifier les innovateurs et les porteurs du changement;
- La construction d’une base de données de références de tous les bénéficiaires potentiels dans les clusters visés (p. ex. nom, numéro de téléphone, CIN ou CIF, chiffre d'affaires annuel, etc.)
• L’identification des segments stratégiques de marché et des zones d’amélioration à travers le repérage des couples produits/marchés les plus dynamiques sur lesquels les acteurs économiques du cluster peuvent développer un avantage compétitif ;
• La facilitation des dialogues public-privé (DPP) autour des nouvelles orientations du marché et des scénarios d’amélioration : tenue de trois réunions publiques qui se tiendront au début, à mi-chemin et à la fin du diagnostic de la chaîne de valeur en présence de tous les agents de cluster identifiés afin de leur présenter la chaîne de valeur actuelle, les défis, les nouvelles stratégies et nouveaux segments stratégiques, les nouvelles opportunités de marché et les activités proposées afin de renforcer la chaîne de valeur ;
• Identification des facteurs clés d’achat à travers la réalisation d’un voyage de référence pour rendre visite aux acheteurs avancés dans le segment le plus stratégique de la chaîne de valeur et obtenir les critères des acheteurs avancés ;
• Constituer des groupes de travail stratégiques avec les agents des clusters sélectionnés afin de confirmer la nouvelle stratégie pour le cluster ;
• Constituer des groupes de travail thématiques en fonction des lignes d’action identifiées pour améliorer la chaîne de valeur (p. ex. amélioration de la production, accès aux marchés, finances, etc.) en vue de confirmer qui sera chargé d’entreprendre les actions nécessaires pour que le cluster entre dans le nouveau segment stratégique ;
• Proposition des lignes d’action qui viendront le Plan d’amélioration des affaires du cluster.

2) Elaboration d’un Plan d’Amélioration des Affaires qui constitue le socle pour identifier les plans d’investissement et d’actions nécessaires à entreprendre sur base de Dialogue Public-Privé (DPP) soutenus analytiquement. Il s’agit précisément de fournir un document qui décrit et justifie :

• L’ensemble des grands axes d’amélioration requis au sein d’une chaîne de valeur spécifique pour renforcer et assurer son développement ;
• Une série de lignes d’action, elles-mêmes divisées en activités spécifiques. Chaque activité comprend des informations sur le type de soutien nécessaire – formation, assistance technique ou services communs – et fournit des détails sur le soutien (p. ex. sa nature, son type, le calendrier, le budget prévisionnel, etc.) ;
• Une priorisation des lignes d’actions issues du DPP selon l’impact attendu (dont le chiffrage peut nécessiter une analyse plus profonde) et selon l’ampleur de la défaillance du marché.

3) Préparation des appels à candidatures auprès des fonds de subvention de contrepartie pour les lignes d’actions prioritaires. Chaque ligne d’action approuvée pour la mise en œuvre fera l’objet d’un appel à candidatures auprès du fonds correspondant par Projet/opération en cours de préparation. Ainsi, la plateforme technique doit assurer :

• La préparation des termes de références pour chaque ligne d’action (services partagés, etc.);
• L’assistance des entreprises pour préparer et présenter leurs candidatures aux fonds disponibles pour leur renforcement dans les domaines identifiés dans la phase 1&2 du travail de la Plateforme, comme Tasdir+ dans le cadre du PDE III, ou par la suite aux autres fonds associés aux opérations en cours de préparation
• Le suivi de la mise en œuvre des actions, a titre de facilitateur et animateur, dans le but d’assurer la continuité de la dynamique de développement de la chaîne de valeur jusqu’au point ou cette dynamique est reprise en charge par les acteurs eux-mêmes (organisation professionnelle ou partenariat public privé, etc.)
32. Les outputs de la Plateforme se matérialisent concrètement en deux formes de produits:

A) Les Plans d'Investissement et d'Affaires par chaines de valeur (PIA):

33. Le PIA est un document public, technique qui décrit et justifie toutes les activités nécessaires dans une chaîne de valeur spécifique, qui a traversé toutes les étapes d'un diagnostic structuré de la chaîne de valeur. Chaque PIA contient une série de lignes d'actions qui sont ensuite décomposées en activités spécifiques. Chaque activité comprend des informations sur le type d'appui nécessaire, tels que la formation, l'assistance technique ou les services communs, ainsi que les données spécifications de l'appui (comme par exemple nature, type, calendrier, budget prévisionnel, etc.). Une fois approuvé, le PIA constitue la base de référence pour les fonds d'investissement pour déterminer quelles subventions de contrepartie seront fournies pour une chaîne de valeur. La mise en œuvre du PIA permettra aux bénéficiaires d'accéder à des marchés à plus forte valeur ajoutée et ouvrira la voie à d'autres. La mise en œuvre de la subvention de contrepartie est la prérogative du fonds et de son projet d'accueil.

B) Les plans individuels de subvention de contrepartie pour les candidats aux fonds d’appui appuyés par la Plateforme

34. Les plans individuels pour bénéficier des subventions de contrepartie est un document technique (plan d'affaires) qui décrit les activités qui seront entreprises par les candidats au fonds pour répondre à une ligne d’action/activité prévue par le PIA et pour laquelle un appel à candidatures est lancé de façon concurrentielle selon des Termes de Références définis. Si des entreprises-candidats souhaitent s'engager dans des d'actions qui s'alignent avec le PIA moyennant incitation par les fonds disponibles à cet effet, la Plateforme financerà l’accompagnement technique de ces candidats à élaborer leurs plans d’affaires individuels de manière à bien répondre aux objectifs de renforcement de la compétitivité d’une chaîne de valeur tel que repris dans le PIA. Ces plans incluent les informations relatives aux activités prévues, les budgets respectifs, la durée d’exécution, etc. Ainsi, un pool de plans d’affaires individuels par ligne d’action/activité du PIA sera appuyé par la Plateforme et soumis à la considération des fonds d’appui disponibles (de manière concurrentielle). Au-delà de la coopération technique entre la Plateforme et le Projet, la sélection finale des candidats retenus à la subvention de contrepartie est la prérogative du fonds et du Projet correspondant.
Les DPP sectoriels (par CV): une approche participative axée marché pour identifier les chaînes de valeur optimales et les services communs nécessaires pour les développer

3 mois

Identification des barrières
- Documentation et analyses des données et études existantes
- Entretiens avec les acteurs de la chaîne de valeur sélectionnée pour recueillir des informations sur le cluster local, déterminer qui est qui et identifier qui sont les innovateurs et les champions;
- Enregistrement des acteurs locaux et identification des bénéficiaires potentiels avec des informations pour créer la ligne de base (nom, numéro de téléphone, revenu annuel, etc.);

Orientation de la stratégie
- Voyages ou visites pour rencontrer les acheteurs avancés dans le segment stratégique le plus attrayant de la chaîne de valeur et de recueillir des critères avancés acheteur;
- Réunions de groupes stratégiques avec des agents de groupes sélectionnés pour confirmer la nouvelle stratégie pour la chaîne de valeur;
- Groupes de travail thématiques basés sur les lignes d’action identifiées pour améliorer la chaîne de valeur (par exemple améliorer la production, accéder aux marchés, à la finance, etc.) pour confirmer la propriété des actions nécessaires pour que le cluster entre dans le nouveau

Définition et préparation des actions
- Élaboration d’un Plan d’Amélioration et de Développement de la Chaîne de valeur, incis des lignes d’action précises et un plan d’investissement ciblé - avec les ministères concernés et les agences / administrations de mise en œuvre;
- Aider les entreprises et les producteurs qui ont des projets individuels qui s’alignent avec le PAE pour préparer leur candidature pour le financement par les différents fonds disponibles;
- Préparer des projets d’investissement dans des service partagés (élaboration des TDH, juridiction, etc.) et soumettre une demande de financement à des fonds ou programmes adéquats dans un ou plusieurs projets

Outputs
- Plan d’Amélioration et d’Investissement (PAE) pour le développement de la chaîne de valeur établi de manière participative entre acteurs privés et publics. Le Plan décrit et justifie toutes les activités nécessaires dans une chaîne de valeur spécifique (investissement privé et public, changements réglementaires et administratifs, actions communes, etc.), suite à un processus aussi bien analytique que participatif spécifique aux chaînes ciblées.
- Projets d’investissements dans des services partagés, préparés et lancés à travers les fonds d’appuis liés.
- Candidature individuelles d’MPME et producteurs pour co-financement en cohérence avec le PAE

Trois réunions publiques, au début, au milieu et à la fin du diagnostic de la chaîne de valeur, avec tous les agents de cluster identifiés pour leur présenter la chaîne de valeur actuelle, les défis, la nouvelle stratégie et les segments stratégiques, les nouvelles opportunités de marché et les activités proposées pour renforcer la
Annex 5: Terms of Reference

Context of the assessment

Tunisia has embarked on a broad reform agenda emphasizing the need to address three major systemic problems: 14

1. Absence of a common global vision of human resources development that clearly and accurately defines the role and objectives of vocational training and its place within the system.
2. The low responsiveness of the national vocational training system and its low capacity to adapt to the changing and growing needs of businesses, individuals, the regions and society.
3. The steering and management of the national vocational training system does not allow for a governance model that guarantees fulfilling the economic and social needs at the national and regional levels.

To alleviate these problems, the Government of Tunisia has developed 14 strategic projects whose implementation began in January 2016. 15

The African Union Commission (AUC), as part of its continental TVET program to promote the employment of youth and women, aims to share knowledge and experience among its Member States, and provide tools for evaluating TVET models and identifying strategic areas for interventions. In 2015, the AUC recognized Tunisia as having one of the top performing public TVET agencies in Africa: the Agence Tunisienne de la Formation Professionnelle (ATFP). 16

Following up on this recognition, and in support of the ongoing system-wide reform efforts in Tunisia, FHI 360, through the African Union Partnership project funded by USAID, proposes to undertake a strategic TVET assessment in Tunisia that can serve as a model for other countries.

With funding from USAID Tunisia, and in consultation with the AU’s continental TVET program, FHI 360’s team of private sector development, competitiveness and TVET experts will co-design and implement a needs assessment that will identify effective practices, strategic opportunities as well as gaps in capacity that could be addressed through technical assistance.

16 The ATFP was among ten TVET model centers awarded a prize by the AUC at the 2015 Specialized Technical Committee meeting of Education, Science, and Technology held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Scope of Work

The scope will be finalized in accordance the Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment (MVTE) with ATFP and with input from USAID/AU and USAID Tunisia. The evaluation will focus on:

1. Governance of the TVET system with evaluations of:
   • Available metrics to evaluate the performance of the TVET systems and of their main actors.
   • The MVTE and ATFP strategy and capacity to improve the performance of TVET centers particularly in terms of resource allocation, responsiveness to skill demand and increased self-governance, in light of the reforms' focus on increased regionalization and training center autonomy.
   • ATFP’s comparative advantage within the broader universe of TVET provision, and identification of opportunities for the Ministry of TVET and Employment to foster a healthy overall TVET sector with a balance of public and private services;

2. Soft skills development and entrepreneurship promotion, investigating:
   • The ongoing strategy to mainstream soft skills development in the curriculum;
   • The initiative to promote entrepreneurship in TVET centers;
   • Opportunities to incorporate international best practices (such as FabLabs/ maker spaces, innovation centers) to boost skills development in the trainings offered by the centers.

3. Career information guidance and labor market intermediation services:
   • The strategy to improve on-site and off-site career information (pre and post enrollment) and post-graduation monitoring;
   • Information services and needs of the TVET centers, the Ministry, student job seekers and employers.
   • Opportunities to strengthen and expand the TVET sector’s participation in labor market intermediation services.

At the request of MTVE, the assessment effort will support the implementation of project 12 of the reform agenda, which aims to develop a system to measure the performance of the TVET sector. For each of the three areas above, the assessment team seeks to identify key available metrics that exist and to propose new ones, with the goal of improving the steering and performance of the system in alignment with the priorities identified by the Government of Tunisia.

Field work and participatory approach

The assessment will include 2-3 weeks of fieldwork by a multidisciplinary, mixed international-local team managed by a Francophone team leader. The fieldwork will include extensive consultation with industry, TVET policymakers, and ATFP and private TVET administrators and educators.
In close collaboration with MVTE and ATFP, the team will organize 2-3 focus group-style workshops in regions of strategic importance for ATFP to be selected in consultation with MTVE, ATFP and USAID Tunisia. With 10-15 participants (senior center managers, regional education and labor inspectors, trainers/educators), the workshops will be facilitated by an international TVET expert and will focus on the aforementioned three themes aiming at identifying opportunities for improvements within the current reform efforts implemented by MTVE and ATFP.

The AU Human Resources, Science, and Technology Department would participate by providing input on the assessment design as well as participating in the fieldwork (either HRST staff or one of HRST’s African TVET expert advisors). We anticipate that the assessment can serve as a model for future TVET assessments elsewhere in Africa to be commissioned by the AU.

The end deliverable will be a strategic assessment report that identifies good practices, gaps, and strategic opportunities for reforms.

**Activity Summary**

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<td>Finalization of scope and terms of reference.</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>Field assessment and workshops</td>
<td>Presentation of preliminary findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting</td>
<td>Strategic Assessment Report with Executive Summary and Recommendations (25-30 pages)</td>
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**Team Composition**

Kjartan Sorensen, Team Leader  
Alec Hansen, Chief Economist  
Monika Aring, Senior Workforce and TVET Advisor  
Nicholas Ouma, Senior Youth Advisor, African Union Human Resources, Science and Technology Department  
Fatma Abidi, Program Coordinator  
Obed Diener, Technical Director